On August 28, 2026, South Korea’s National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac stated that they support US President Donald Trump’s efforts to restart dialog with North Korea, but South Korea should not be left out of the process. These developments have brought the diplomatic balances on the Korean Peninsula back into focus. According to Wi, the Washington-Pyongyang dialog should achieve concrete progress in North Korea’s nuclear program, contribute to the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and not weaken South Korea’s security preparedness.[i] This approach shows that Seoul is trying to maintain its position in the process while shaping the conditions of this diplomacy instead of opposing dialog with North Korea. Therefore, the fundamental issue raised by the current development is broader than whether Trump will meet with Kim Jong-un again: How can a state, whose security largely depends on the guaranty of a major power, remain an actor in great power diplomacy that directly concerns its own security?
This question cannot be evaluated independently of the asymmetric alliance relationship South Korea has with the United States. One of the fundamental issues faced by smaller or more dependent allies in alliance theory is the risk of being abandoned by their ally on one hand, and being dragged into a conflict that does not fully align with their own interests on the other. South Korea is trying to manage these two risks simultaneously in the U.S.-North Korea nuclear crises, and it is doing so through a “conflict manager” role that develops peaceful alternatives while maintaining alliance coordination.[ii] South Korea’s current stance also points to a similar dual necessity: Seoul does not want the erosion of the American security guaranty, but it also does not prefer Washington to shape its North Korea policy completely independently of its own security interests.
However, recent developments have made the risk of diplomatic marginalization more visible for South Korea, alongside the classic risks of abandonment and being dragged along. The continuation of the U.S. military security guaranty does not mean that South Korea will be significantly influential in the diplomatic processes determining the future of the Korean Peninsula. Washington’s ability to establish direct leader-level relations with Pyongyang poses a significant risk for Seoul, albeit different from the end of the alliance. In this case, South Korea could become a secondary actor in the political negotiations shaping its own security environment while continuing to be militarily protected. Wi’s emphasis on the need for them not to be “excluded from the process” can therefore be interpreted as a more structural concern regarding South Korea’s position as a political subject on the Korean Peninsula, rather than merely a diplomatic sensitivity.
This concern is connected to the past Trump-Kim diplomacy. Trump and Kim met three times during the 2018-2019 period, and direct leader diplomacy between the United States and North Korea became central to the politics of the Korean Peninsula. Although the then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in played an important facilitative role in establishing dialog between the parties, the increasingly direct U.S.-North Korea line has shown that Seoul’s capacity to determine the outcomes of the process may be limited. The diplomatic process largely stalled with the inconclusive end of the 2019 Hanoi Summit, and the Washington-Pyongyang dialog failed to bring about a permanent change in North Korea’s nuclear capacity.[iii] Trump’s renewed direct diplomacy with Kim in 2026, therefore, creates a new opportunity for South Korea while also raising previously experienced issues of representation and influence. Trump’s instruction to reduce the scale of joint military exercises with South Korea also shows that Washington’s diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang could directly impact security practices within the alliance.[iv]
However, Seoul’s current policy is not aimed at obstructing Trump’s North Korea initiative. On the contrary, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung asked Trump to lead peaceful diplomacy on the North Korea issue in June 2026, and Trump expressed his willingness to work in that direction.[v] Thus, South Korea is simultaneously promoting the Washington-Pyongyang dialog while trying to limit the implications of this dialog on its own security and diplomatic position. Although this situation may seem contradictory at first glance, dialog and deterrence do not have to be mutually exclusive from Seoul’s perspective. While the Trump administration has scaled back some U.S.-South Korea exercises, Seoul continues to conduct the Freedom Edge exercise with Washington and Tokyo from September 9-11 against North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities.[vi] Therefore, South Korea does not abandon alliance mechanisms aimed at maintaining security capacity while supporting diplomatic engagement.
This policy can be seen as an effort by South Korea to preserve its maneuvering space within the alliance rather than a distancing from the US alliance. In an asymmetric alliance, the autonomy of a small ally does not have to be measured by its ability to act completely independently from the large ally. A more feasible goal for South Korea is to be able to participate as much as possible in the formation of decisions concerning its own security while maintaining the American security guaranty. Therefore, Seoul’s request to strengthen policy coordination with Washington can be seen not merely as a sign of dependency but as one of the tools for shaping U.S. policy toward North Korea. Similarly, the re-establishment of inter-Korean dialog could create a direct political channel that might reduce South Korea’s dependence on the Washington-Pyongyang line.
However, South Korea’s capacity to be a diplomatic subject has significant limitations. Firstly, the influence that Seoul can exert over Washington is not at a level that can completely determine the U.S. policy toward North Korea. Trump’s personalized leader diplomacy can move faster than institutional alliance coordination. Secondly, South Korea’s ability to participate more actively in the process depends on Pyongyang’s willingness to engage with Seoul. Therefore, although Seoul tries to have a greater say in Washington-Pyongyang diplomacy, it does not have the capacity to shape the preferences of the two main actors in the process on its own. South Korea’s scope of action is therefore limited not to full diplomatic autonomy but to the level of being able to protect its own security interests and representation capacity within an asymmetric alliance relationship.
In conclusion, the fundamental issue facing South Korea is not to become independent from the U.S. security guaranty. The more important issue is how much influence Seoul can have over the processes that determine the political future of the Korean Peninsula while the need for this guaranty continues. In the event of the resumption of the Trump-Kim dialog, success for Seoul will be measured by how much South Korea can participate in shaping this process, alongside the talks reducing nuclear tension. The security dependency of a state and its capacity to be a diplomatic subject are not mutually exclusive; the main issue is how much decision-making, representation, and influence can be generated within the dependency relationship. In this regard, the example of South Korea shows that asymmetric alliances do not necessarily render smaller actors passive, but rather that the operational space of these actors must be continuously reproduced within the framework of security dependency.
[i] Heejin Kim, “South Korea backs Trump bid to revive North Korea talks, seeks nuclear progress”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-backs-trumps-efforts-resume-north-korea-talks-2026-08-28/, (Date Accessed: 28.08.2026).
[ii] Kimberly Peh, Soul Park, Seung Joon Paik, “Navigating the Twin Risks in Alliance Dilemma: South Korea’s foreign policy during the US-DPRK nuclear crises”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2026.2677709, ss. 608-612.
[iii] Mason Richey, “Beyond the Blame Game: Regional Implications of the Hanoi Summit”, 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2019/03/mrichey032919/, (Date Accessed: 28.08.2026).
[iv] Costas Pitas, David Lawder, Heejin Kim, “Trump orders Pentagon to cut back military exercises with South Korea”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-instructs-pentagon-reduce-military-exercises-with-south-korea-2026-08-16/, (Date Accessed: 28.08.2026).
[v] Joyce Lee, “South Korea’s Lee asks Trump to lead peaceful diplomacy with North Korea”, Reuters,https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/south-koreas-lee-asks-trump-lead-peaceful-diplomacy-with-north-korea-2026-06-16/, (Date Accessed: 28.08.2026).
[vi] “South Korea, Japan and US to hold North Korea-focused nuclear missile drill”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-japan-us-hold-north-korea-focused-nuclear-missile-drill-2026-08-28/, (Date Accessed: 28.08.2026).
