The government formed under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni in Italy in October 2022 surpassed the record of Silvio Berlusconi’s second government by exceeding 1,400 days as of September 4, 2026, and became the country’s longest continuously serving government after the Second World War.[i] In Italy, where the average lifespan of governments is limited to 14 months and 68 different governments have been formed since 1946,[ii] the longevity of the Meloni government constitutes an exceptional example within Italy’s chronic government instability, while on the other hand, it demonstrates that the populist radical right in Europe can transform electoral success into a lasting governance experience. However, the fact that Futuro Nazionale, founded under the leadership of Roberto Vannacci after breaking away from Lega in February 2026, can find a response among voters despite the radical right being in power draws attention.
In this context, Meloni’s governance experience is important in understanding under what conditions this development emerged. Because after taking the prime minister’s seat, Meloni took on a broad responsibility ranging from Italy’s economic stability to EU obligations, from the NATO alliance to public finance and the entire country’s foreign policy. This governance responsibility reveals the limits of turning radical rhetoric into applicable policy. Indeed, research shows that while Meloni acts moderately and pragmatically in foreign policy, she preserves the important elements of her radical right line in domestic policy on issues such as immigration and culture wars.[iii] Therefore, being in power does not eliminate Meloni’s political line; it draws a mandatory framework for her that determines to what extent and with what tools this line can be implemented.
Vannacci’s rise gains meaning exactly at the point where the boundaries of this framework are opened to debate. Because Futuro Nazionale does not bring an immigration and identity agenda that Meloni abandoned back into politics; it argues that the policies already pursued by the Meloni government do not go far enough. Vannacci even states that he offers the ideological clarity that the ruling coalition no longer provides.[iv] Particularly in citizenship and immigration policies, Vannacci criticizes Meloni; he proposes increasing the residency period required for Italian citizenship to twenty years, making advanced knowledge of Italian a condition, and granting citizenship on the basis of belonging, which includes adaptation to Italy’s cultural values.[v] Additionally, he announces that returning a portion of the immigrants in the country to their countries of origin is one of the main political goals of Futuro Nazionale. While the Meloni government’s priority is reducing irregular migration and border control; Vannacci makes a declaration of assimilation extending the debate from who can come to the country to which of those currently in the country will be accepted as part of the national community. Therefore, the Vannacci-Meloni divergence extends from the control of migration to how citizenship and national belonging will be defined.
A similar Meloni-Vannacci divergence is seen in the field of the EU and foreign policy. While Meloni maintains a national sovereignty approach but pursues a policy that defends Italy’s interests within the Union; Vannacci advocates halting European political integration and transforming the EU into a more flexible organization of intergovernmental cooperation. The divergence becomes even more apparent on the issue of Ukraine. While Meloni, despite her differences of opinion with the Trump administration, maintains support for Kyiv and Italy’s position within NATO; Vannacci opposes sending weapons to Ukraine and wants relations with Russia to be redeveloped. These differences, ranging from immigration and citizenship to European integration and foreign policy, make it difficult to evaluate Vannacci simply as a harsher version of Meloni. In particular, his handling of citizenship with a more exclusionary understanding of belonging and his making reverse migration one of the fundamental elements of his political program transform Futuro Nazionale into an actor pushing the boundaries of the populist radical right.
Essentially, all these features can be considered at first glance as classical extreme right actor ideology. However, the fact that Futuro Nazionale was supported by a large voter base shortly after its establishment reveals a paradox that needs to be examined. In the SWG research published in early September, Futuro Nazionale rose to the position of the country’s fourth-largest political force with 7.5 percent, leaving behind Meloni’s strongest coalition partner, Forza Italia. However, Fratelli d’Italia maintains its position as the leading party with 26.8 percent.[vi] This data shows that while Meloni’s leadership and her party’s voter support continue, Vannacci also reaching a significant vote potential in a short time demonstrates that two different political actors on the Italian right can find a response at the same time. Therefore, to understand Vannacci’s rise, which cannot be explained as a natural consequence of Meloni’s weakening, it is necessary to look at how he secures voter support.
It would be an incomplete assessment to consider Vannacci’s voter response only through immigration and identity policies without adding the economy parameter. As a matter of fact, although the Meloni government has taken successful steps toward ensuring political stability, strengthening market confidence regarding public finance, and reducing irregular migration, the successes achieved do not eliminate Italy’s long-standing economic problems. Even though real wages increased by 1.3 percent in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the previous year, they remain below the 2021 level. Moreover, while the increase in energy prices raises inflation, real wages are expected to fall by 0.9 percent in 2026.[vii] In this environment, Vannacci approaches the rhetoric of immigration, security, and national identity not merely as a cultural issue, but also associates it with economic losses. In particular, by connecting high energy prices and economic decline with the Ukraine War, sanctions against Russia, and current foreign policy choices, he makes economic dissatisfaction a part of a broader sovereignty and national interest discourse.[viii] Thus, alongside a harsher immigration policy, Vannacci offers voters a holistic explanation that economic loss, cultural change, and political insecurity are different consequences of the same problem. This explanation makes it easier for Vannacci to receive support from Lega and Fratelli d’Italia voters, as well as from segments that did not vote in the 2024 European elections, during a period when Meloni is strong.
The fact that Futuro Nazionale has started to create a second center of attraction in right-wing politics thanks to this support has not yet elevated Vannacci to a position that would pose a direct alternative to Meloni, but the support given to the party exceeding 7 percent in a short time constitutes a weight that cannot be ignored by the center-right in the upcoming elections. In this direction, the main problem for Meloni is how the division of right-wing votes will affect the election results if Futuro Nazionale competes outside the center-right alliance in the 2027 elections. In elections where the competition between the center-right and center-left is close, Vannacci competing as a separate political actor could cause Meloni’s alliance to lose seats, especially in electoral districts where deputies are elected on a majoritarian basis.
On the other hand, including Vannacci in the alliance could also create a cost for Meloni. The harsh policies Vannacci advocates regarding immigration, the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia could change the current political line of the center-right alliance. Therefore, Meloni has to consider the possibility of Vannacci remaining outside the alliance and dividing right-wing votes on the one hand, and the risk of a potential partnership changing the political balances on the other. This dilemma opens up a sphere of influence for Vannacci beyond his vote share and transforms Futuro Nazionale into an important actor that must be taken into account in the center-right’s electoral strategy.
Vannacci’s rise is also a development that must be taken into consideration for the EU. Over the last four years, Meloni has been able to maintain institutional and international obligations and sovereigntist rhetoric in a balance in relations with the EU. Vannacci, on the other hand, directly opens the boundaries of this harmony to debate. The fact that rhetoric such as his EU approach, ending support for Ukraine, and developing relations with Russia turns into increasing voter support may cause Meloni to turn to a harsher line in EU policies in order to protect her voter base even if she does not form an alliance with Vannacci. Therefore, in the upcoming period, it is important for Brussels whether it will form a permanent voter base large enough to internally pressure the Meloni government’s European policy.
This situation also brings a new dimension to European political debates. Vannacci’s rise shows that evaluating the shift to the right in Europe as a one-way voter movement from traditional center parties towards the radical right is an incomplete analysis. As a matter of fact, the Italian example indicates that the institutionalization of the radical right in power does not end the radicalization dynamics in right-wing politics; rather, harsher and more exclusionary demands can gain strength around a separate political program. Therefore, the Vannacci case makes visible an important possibility regarding the new phase of the rise of the European extreme right. In the first phase, extreme right parties brought issues such as immigration, national identity, sovereignty, and multiculturalism to the center of the political agenda; in the second phase, some of these parties achieved electoral success. The development emerging in Italy, on the other hand, makes visible the possibility that the limitations brought by being in power may form the driving force of a new radicalization within the radical right.
As radical right governments are forced to limit their policies due to institutional and international requirements, actors who present these limits as compromise or inadequacy can mobilize voters with their harsher demands. In such a situation, competition can begin between the radical right acting with the responsibility of power and more radical actors who reject the limits brought by this responsibility. As a result of the competition, coming to power may cease to be a mechanism that ensures the moderation of the radical right and may turn into a ground that enables the emergence of harsher political objections. Therefore, Futuro Nazionale under the leadership of Vannacci does not only mean the rise of the extreme right for Europe; at the same time, it makes visible the risk that the restriction of the radical right in power could feed a new wave of radicalization.
In conclusion, the Italian example provides important data showing that the rise of the extreme right in Europe is not a linear process that is completed by coming to power. While Meloni’s long-lasting government reveals that the populist radical right can transform electoral success into a lasting governance experience; Vannacci’s rise in a short time shows that the institutional, legal, economic, and international boundaries brought about by being in power turn into a new source of organization for actors criticizing the government in right-wing politics. If this dynamic, which is in its initial stage in Italy, is seen in other countries as well, the institutionalization of the extreme right could point to the beginning of a new phase of radicalization, and this situation could turn into one of the dynamics determining the direction of the European extreme right.
[i] Bedirhan Demirel, “İtalya’da Meloni Hükümeti, Son 80 Yılın En Uzun Ömürlüsü Oldu”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/infografik/53804, (Date Accessed: 04.09.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Fabien Gibault, “Giorgia Meloni: Three Years in Power, Between European Pragmatism and National Ambiguities”, The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), https://www.iris-france.org/en/giorgia-meloni-three-years-in-power-between-european-pragmatism-and-national-ambiguities/, (Date Accessed: 04.09.2026).
[iv] “Far-Right General Upends Italian Politics”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-general-upends-italian-politics/, (Date Accessed: 04.09.2026).
[v] Lisa Zanotti, “Futuro Nazionale İs Redefining What İt Means to be Italian”, The London School of Economics and Political Science, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2026/09/07/futuro-nazionale-italian-citizenship-identity/, (Date Accessed: 07.09.2026).
[vi] Angelo Amante, “Italy’s New Far-Right Party Becomes Fourth Most Popular İn Polls”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/italys-new-far-right-party-becomes-fourth-most-popular-polls-2026-09-01/, (Date Accessed: 07.09.2026).
[vii] “OECD Employment Outlook 2026: Italy”, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-employment-outlook-2026_9c4f5c3e-en/italy_ddc2139a-en.html, (Date Accessed: 04.09.2026).
[viii] “Russia’s ‘Trojan Horse’ İn Italy Tests Giorgia Meloni”, Fınancıal Times, https://www.ft.com/content/1188b86e-b279-4cc7-a890-b4e2ce02cdc2?syn-25a6b1a6=1, (Date Accessed: 07.09.2026).
