Who has benefited from the war launched against Iran on 28 February 2026 by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, after persuading United States (US) President Donald Trump, and who has emerged as the greatest loser, constitutes a significant subject of debate. A fragile ceasefire process expected to last two weeks, along with indirectly conducted negotiations through mediators, points to a critical turning point that will determine which actors will rise and which will recede in the future. While both sides issue statements declaring victory to gain advantage at the negotiating table (diplomacy), it can be said that a considerable distance still needs to be covered for a lasting peace.
To identify which actor or actors have benefited from the war, it is first necessary to examine the objectives of Israel and the US. In this regard, Israel’s primary objectives can be listed as follows: regime change in Iran; preventing it from producing nuclear weapons; eliminating its military defensive and offensive capacities, particularly its missile capabilities; ending its support for proxy actors in the Middle East and the activities of these actors; in short, eliminating all “Iran-originated threats” to its national security.
Whether the US aims for regime change in Iran through this war remains uncertain. According to the New York Times, Trump stated during the decision-making process that his team needed to ensure that “Iran could not possess nuclear weapons” and “could not launch missiles at Israel or other countries in the region.”[i] Therefore, it can be argued that the primary objective of the US is to ensure that Iran ceases to be a “threat,” particularly to Israel. This objective includes preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons, eliminating its military capacity—especially missile capabilities—and ending its support for proxy actors in the Middle East as well as their activities.
Regarding regime change, Trump and the Pentagon claim to have achieved this objective. In this context, Trump stated that Iran’s new leadership is “less radical and much more reasonable.”[ii] Interpreting the change in Iran’s administrative cadre as regime change, Trump sought to project an image of success in this regard. However, regime change does not merely mean replacing the ruling elite; it entails altering or reconstructing the country’s system of governance through structural changes. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite changes in leadership, the regime continues to exist with its constitutional structure, decision-making mechanisms, and institutions intact.
Based on this information, if we evaluate who has won or lost the war regarding the three actors, several points can be made. First, Israel aimed to eliminate the Iranian regime, which it perceives as a threat. However, since regime change has not occurred, the possibility that Iran may pose a stronger threat to Israel in the long term persists. Moreover, it is claimed that Iran’s missile capacity has not been eliminated and that only half of its missile stockpile has been used.[iii] In this case, Iran still retains the capacity to strike Israel (and thus pose a threat). However, it remains uncertain how long Iran can sustain this situation in terms of economic and military capacity. Therefore, it can be said that Israel has achieved only limited progress or success in its primary objective. Second, Iran’s ability to maintain its influence through proxy actors in the Middle East also continues. This issue appears to be one that could be partially resolved through a future peace agreement. However, given that Iran is an ideologically founded regime, it considers issues such as the nuclear question, missile capacity, and proxy actors as red lines. Therefore, it appears quite difficult for Iran to make concessions on these matters.
On the other hand, due to the destruction it has suffered, Iran appears to be the greatest loser of the war. While Israel’s heavy attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon continue, the ceasefire with Iran also proceeds on a fragile basis. Whether a lasting ceasefire and peace agreement is possible remains uncertain. Therefore, the content and provisions of a potential peace agreement have become extremely significant. Such an agreement would, in a “de facto” sense, function as a second founding document determining Iran’s future. This is because critical issues such as sanctions, nuclear activities, missile capacity, and proxy actors may be addressed within this agreement. How Iran will be restructured after the war, how quickly it will recover economically, how and in what direction it will develop its military capacity, and whether it will maintain its connections with proxy actors will become clear following the anticipated peace agreement. However, one point remains clear: as long as the structure of the regime in Iran does not change, the policy of exporting the revolution—constitutionally guaranteed—will continue. From this perspective, it can be argued that Israel and the US have not fully succeeded in their objective of eliminating Iran as a threat, and that they have achieved only limited progress in this regard.
As the negotiation process continues, there is also curiosity regarding the direction in which the war will produce outcomes. In this context, the most pressing questions concern how Iran will navigate its recovery process, how it will develop economically and militarily, whether it will undertake any revisions in its governance structure, and how it will reconstruct its regional strategy. It can be said that the war is currently in a fragile ceasefire phase and has reached the stage of a “frozen” conflict. Regional militia networks, particularly Hezbollah, constitute the foundation of Iran’s policy of “exporting the revolution.” However, the costs of the war and increasing pressures may lead to the restructuring of these networks or their evolution into a lower-profile strategy. This may result in Iran limiting its regional influence and maintaining it through more covert and indirect means. Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that Iran has fundamentally transformed its strategic behavior patterns. Therefore, the emerging picture points not to a definitive victory, but to a situation of “strategic balance” in which the parties have constrained each other’s room for maneuver without completely eliminating it.
In conclusion, the ultimate winner or loser of the war will be determined not solely by the level of destruction on the battlefield, but by how the post-war order is constructed, the extent to which agreements can be implemented, and the long-term strategic adaptation capacity of the parties. From this perspective, the current situation should be evaluated not as an endpoint, but rather as the initial phase of a new geopolitical struggle.
[i] “Orta Doğu’da savaşı başlatan cümle! Ateşkes sonrası konuşmalar ortaya çıktı”, Milliyet, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/son-dakika-orta-doguda-savasi-baslatan-cumle-ateskes-sonrasi-konusmalar-ortaya-cikti-7568616, (Access Date: 10.04.2026).
[ii] “Iran’s ‘new’ regime looks much the same, only harsher”, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/03/middleeast/trump-claims-iran-regime-change-intl, (Access Date: 10.04.2026).
[iii] “ABD istihbaratı açıkladı: İran’ın füze ve İHA kapasitesi büyük ölçüde korunuyor”, Dünya, https://www.dunya.com/dunya/abd-istihbarati-acikladi-iranin-fuze-ve-iha-kapasitesi-buyuk-olcude-korunuyor-haberi-820376, (Access Date: 10.04.2026).
