Japan’s recent radical moves in foreign policy and defence spending point to a multidimensional transformation at a time when the global geopolitical order is being fundamentally shaken. Moving beyond the pacifist constitutional framework imposed in the aftermath of the Second World War, Tokyo is no longer willing to remain a passive observer of regional crises. This strategic shift can be seen as a deliberate series of moves aimed at positioning Japan as both a norm-setting and deterrent actor in the process of reshaping the global order. Within this framework, Tokyo is rebuilding its national security architecture around military, diplomatic and economic pillars, while accelerating the evolution of its relationship with its ally, the United States, from asymmetric dependence toward pragmatic cooperation.
Seeking to carve out an autonomous sphere of influence in the emerging multipolar world, Japan is extending its geopolitical weight beyond its borders. In the Indo-Pacific, which has become the epicentre of shifting global power dynamics, Tokyo is seeking not merely to preserve the status quo, but also to become a principal architect of the institutional and military barriers designed to constrain unilateral moves by revisionist actors. This awakening reflects Japan’s determination to break out of its shell and play a greater role in shaping the global order. In this context, Tokyo no longer views its security as confined to the Pacific, embracing instead the principle that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible. Accordingly, while strengthening institutional ties with NATO and European countries at the global level, Japan is also building multilayered security networks with ASEAN countries in its immediate neighbourhood, restructuring its defence diplomacy along two main axes: global and regional.
Against this backdrop, Japan’s recent radical steps in foreign policy and defence spending can be viewed, at first glance, not as a return to its imperial past, but rather as part of its pursuit of becoming a “Normal State” that is non-militarist yet conscious of its geopolitical weight. This development may also be conceptualised as a “Neo-Meiji Awakening.”
Indeed, Tokyo has come to recognise that a passive foreign policy is no longer sufficient to safeguard its national security.
Behind this transformation lies the rapid shift in the military balance in the Pacific in China’s favour, coupled with the growing inadequacy of traditional deterrence mechanisms. From Japan’s perspective, therefore, the prevailing geopolitical circumstances have created an unavoidable need to revise its historical identity by reconciling it with contemporary global realities. As a result, Japan is also compelled to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy.
Japan’s Transoceanic Security Pursuits and a “Coalition of Middle Powers”
Indeed, Tokyo’s recent moves, at least for the time being, appear to reflect not an attempt to revive the expansionist ambitions of the past, but rather the defensive instincts and strategic maturation of a rational middle power driven by the need to safeguard its sovereignty in an increasingly multipolar world. This middle power also appears to be seeking a “coalition of middle powers” built around complementary interests arising from shared perceptions of risks and threats, beginning with its immediate neighbourhood but extending to more distant regions as well.
As partly noted above, the China-centred transformation of Asian and Indo-Pacific geopolitics appears to have placed Japan within an increasingly existential security predicament. Fluctuations in US domestic politics and the relative weakening of Washington’s global commitments—as most recently illustrated by Europe’s disappointments in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and by the vulnerabilities of the US security umbrella witnessed during the war with Iran and in relation to the Gulf states—appear to have raised a pressing question in Tokyo: “How far can Washington actually protect us?”
At the same time, vulnerabilities in supply chains involving critical technologies, semiconductors and rare earth elements are compelling Japan to turn economic policy into a protective shield. In this context, Japan sought to place its strategic autonomy on a legal footing through the “Economic Security Promotion Act”, which entered into force in 2022 as part of its broader effort to manage geopolitical risks.
The law is essentially built around four pillars: 1) strengthening domestic control over critical supply chains, particularly those involving semiconductors and medical supplies; 2) protecting critical infrastructure projects against cyberattacks and foreign interference; 3) preventing the leakage of sensitive technologies through patent secrecy measures; and 4) promoting the development of breakthrough technologies with state support.
Through this law, Tokyo seeks both to protect its domestic industries and to deepen its technological integration with the Western bloc. The legislation also serves as a legal safeguard against espionage by subjecting foreign acquisitions of critical national companies to greater scrutiny, while at the same time institutionalising Japan’s economic intelligence capacity. In this way, Japan appears to be seeking a role not as a passive observer caught between hegemonic power blocs, but as a “systemic balancing power” and “norm-setter” in the reconstruction of the international system.
Tokyo aims to secure a leading role in global diplomacy not only through military power, but also by employing soft-power instruments and presenting itself as a defender of global trade and international law. In this context, Japan is seeking to create an alternative centre of attraction along emerging corridors through multilateral financing and infrastructure projects, thereby preventing the global system from becoming monopolised by authoritarian blocs.
Tokyo has also placed the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) at the centre of its global diplomacy, with the aim of ensuring that maritime trade routes remain governed by multilateral legal principles. By positioning itself as a mediator and development partner between the Western bloc and developing countries, particularly the Global South, Japan seeks to prevent the emergence of an explicitly anti-Western alignment in the international system. It is also making use of “friend-shoring” mechanisms designed to build critical infrastructure and technology networks with reliable and democratic partners, while reducing the leverage of actors that weaponise economic dependencies.
Global Institutional Ties with European Countries and NATO
Within the framework of the doctrine that Atlantic and Pacific security are interconnected, Japan has elevated its institutional relations with NATO and European countries to the level of strategic partnership. Tokyo has assumed a leading role within NATO’s IP4 grouping of Indo-Pacific partners and has institutionalised operational cooperation with the Alliance in areas such as cyber defence, artificial intelligence, space security and maritime security through an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP). Through its partnership with the United Kingdom and Italy under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan is integrating its conventional defence industry into the European defence ecosystem. In addition, through Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAAs) with France and the United Kingdom, Tokyo has established the legal framework for joint military exercises and troop deployments. These institutional ties can be regarded as a central pillar of Tokyo’s strategy to build a global and resilient deterrence front with the Western world against the China-Russia axis.
Security Partnerships with Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN), QUAD and the US Dimension
In its security partnerships with ASEAN countries, Japan has focused on capacity-building and defence diplomacy in line with the “Vientiane Vision.” By providing coastal states such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia with coast guard vessels, radar systems and reconnaissance aircraft, Tokyo is strengthening regional maritime domain awareness. In addition, the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) signed with the Philippines has opened the way for the deployment of Japanese forces in Southeast Asia, marking a significant strategic shift. Tokyo is also reinforcing the defence infrastructure of ASEAN capitals through its “Official Security Assistance” mechanism, which channels economic development assistance into infrastructure projects with security and defence purposes. Through these moves, Japan can be seen as seeking to overcome the mistrust left by its colonial past, combine economic partnership with military cooperation, and build a regional barrier capable of balancing China’s sphere of influence.
Japan is also assuming a critical military role within the QUAD as an “intelligence provider” and a “maritime security anchor.” Through joint military exercises such as Malabar, Tokyo is strengthening its anti-submarine warfare capabilities while sharing advanced radar and satellite surveillance data with its partners to monitor developments in the East and South China Seas. It also seeks to function as a logistical hub within the grouping, with the aim of securing allied supply lines in the event of a potential Taiwan crisis.
In this way, Japan is compensating asymmetrically for its conventional military shortcomings by integrating itself into the QUAD’s collective defence and early-warning networks. This integration suggests that, while leaving the “spear” role in the Pacific to the United States, Tokyo is restructuring the alliance balance by assuming responsibility for the “shield” and for the logistical command functions of the broader defence architecture.
Washington, therefore, far from opposing Japan’s new vision and its more assertive military posture, appears to regard it as one of the principal pillars of its Asia/Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet this support is neither unconditional nor without limits. While the United States wants Tokyo to assume greater responsibility for regional security, it also seeks to prevent its ally from becoming a fully autonomous military power centre independent of Washington’s global interests. In this context, the Pentagon aims to keep Japan’s moves within a framework of oversight through joint operational command structures, seeking to ensure that Tokyo’s rise continues to serve a multilateral security architecture that remains under US leadership.
At a time when its global resources are increasingly stretched, the United States strongly supports Japan taking on a greater share of responsibility for regional security. At the same time, while Washington has given Tokyo greater latitude to develop its own command-and-control mechanisms and strengthen its conventional deterrence, allowing Japan to engage in unilateral military operations entirely independent of Washington, or to pursue nuclear armament, would under current conditions be tantamount to “committing harakiri.” The alliance model that emerges from this dynamic can therefore be described as one of “Pragmatic Integration,” in which Japan is protected while simultaneously being kept within a broader framework of control. Indeed, this relationship is increasingly evolving away from an asymmetric “protector-protected” model toward a reciprocal and pragmatic partnership in which both sides depend on one another. As long as the United States continues to need Japan in order to balance—and, in this sense, constrain—China, this partnership appears sustainable.
Conclusion
In the emerging future landscape, Japan appears poised to become a “Hybrid Superpower” with exceptionally strong military capabilities and deterrence, deriving its strength for now not from nuclear weapons—while nevertheless reserving that “right”—but from technological superiority, economic security legislation and its capacity to shape international norms. As the global system moves further toward multipolarity, there is a strong possibility that Japan will move beyond its role as the Western alliance’s forward outpost in the Pacific, carve out an autonomous sphere of influence of its own and become an indispensable anchor of global stability. In a changing geopolitical and strategic environment, Japan appears determined to establish itself as an indispensable actor in the new balances and equations taking shape.
In this context, Tokyo’s strategy of “Active Deterrence” appears capable of demonstrating to the world that, when military power is combined with smart diplomacy and economic security instruments, a state can become a major rule-shaping actor in the global order without relying on nuclear weapons. If this transformation is successfully completed, Tokyo could emerge in the new Asian order as a structural actor with substantial balancing weight: coordinated with Washington, yet possessing its own red lines, and equipped with a stronger capacity to mediate in global crises. Japan’s search for cooperation beyond its immediate neighbourhood also offers important clues about the broader horizon of Tokyo’s new vision. Such efforts could bring Japan further to the forefront of a possible “Coalition of Middle Powers” and make an important contribution to processes of “strategic autonomy.”
Ultimately, the “New Japan,” by integrating the global networks it has built with NATO with the regional security shield it is constructing alongside ASEAN, is set to establish itself on the global stage not merely as a passive bulwark against the geopolitical storms of the future, but also as a determined and strategic force helping to steer the course of global security. Japan’s ongoing return to elements of its historical strategic identity, together with the steps it is taking—and may yet take—to assume a more active role in world politics, and the possible consequences of those moves, have already begun to attract considerable interest and curiosity, as well as concern in some quarters.
