To evaluate the recent developments in India’s foreign policy, the Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) presents below the interview with Dr. Sankalp Gurjar, Assistant Professor of Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, India.
1. What are your thoughts on India’s foreign policy and, in particular, “strategic autonomy”?
India’s foreign policy is designed to transform the country. Indian diplomacy is geared to create an enabling environment for the economic development of the country. In practice, it means India maintains good ties with major powers as well as with regional and smaller powers. India provides special attention to its neighbourhood via the “Neighbourhood First” policy. For the Indo-Pacific region, India’s “Act East” and “SAGAR” policies come into play.
In terms of assessing India’s foreign policy, New Delhi has done reasonably well in the face of four difficult challenges in the last six years: the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine War, Middle Eastern Wars since 2023 and the Second Trump Administration. Each of these challenges presented India with very difficult trade-offs and tested its ability to adjust to the fast-changing global security environment.
In 2023, India hosted the G-20 summit in New Delhi. The country has managed to ensure economic growth and secure energy supplies despite the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The Trump tariffs have posed a challenge for the Indian economy. India has dealt with it by engaging with Washington for a trade deal and by diversifying exports to other developed countries. India has signed Free Trade Agreements with the UK, the EU, and New Zealand.
India’s vaunted principle of “strategic autonomy” is visible in its approach to the Ukraine War and the Iran War. In the Ukraine War, India has refused to criticise Russia. Despite India’s close ties with the West, India did not shy away from importing large quantities of Russian oil. In the Iran War, India has not supported either side, and amidst allegations of a tilt towards Israel, New Delhi imported Iranian oil when sanctions were lifted.
Another key demonstration of India’s strategic autonomy is in the membership of minilateral groupings. India is the only country that is a member of BRICS Plus and the QUAD.
2. What are the limits of India’s military-security cooperation with Western countries in the Indo-Pacific region? In this context, how does New Delhi view the West’s increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific?
In the last two decades, India has constructed a close security partnership with Western countries. The US, France, and Germany are important Western partners for India’s security. India’s defence partnerships with Western countries include the acquisition of advanced platforms as well as defence-industrial cooperation.
The Indo-US defence cooperation has been on the upswing. Indian security forces field several American platforms such as C-130 J Hercules aircraft, C-17 Globemaster aircraft, P-8 surveillance aircraft, M-777 Howitzers, etc. Indo-French defence collaboration dates back to the 1950s, and India is a major customer for the Rafale aircraft. Germany has been engaged for the Indian Navy’s submarine acquisitions.
The Indo-Pacific region is a key geography of India’s defence ties with the West. Western countries such as the US, UK, and France view the Indo-Pacific as a key strategic geography. Over the years, Western engagement with the Indo-Pacific has gone up. Initiatives such as AUKUS are indicative of the growing Western interest in the region. The growing Western engagement is useful to the extent that it balances China and creates more strategic options for the regional states.
The limits of the Indo-Western security relationship come into focus if we discuss the question of alliances. India does not join military alliances. New Delhi builds security partnerships without taking on the responsibility of others’ security. It is wary of involving itself in others’ wars. India does not feel comfortable being a junior partner in any security relationship. Even during the Cold War, India did not join any military alliances. The current Indian approach is consistent with the past and the present needs of the country.
3. Do you think India has found a balance between the US, European countries, Russia, and China?
India has strived to balance its relationship with major powers. With Russia, India has a deep politico-military relationship, while the US is a relatively new defence partner. China remains a major security challenge, while the European countries are important for access to capital and technology. Each of these ties impinge on other relationships. For example, India has faced Western pressure over the Russian oil purchases. Reportedly, Moscow feels let down due to India’s growing defence relationship with the West. Meanwhile, China is wary of India’s deepening ties with the US. Therefore, India is continuously performing the difficult balancing act between these countries.
For India, perhaps, the most consequential bilateral relationships are with the US and China. The Indo-US relationship is broad-based and multi-faceted. It encompasses political, economic, security, people-to-people, and cultural dimensions. India and the US are maritime democracies, plural societies, and are important economic and security players in the Indo-Pacific. The relationship has been on an upward trajectory for 25 years. India and the US share concerns about the rise of China. The “China factor” has been a key building bloc of the relationship. The Second Trump Administration has emerged as a challenge for the Indo-US relationship. The strains in the relationship are not permanent.
India faces the strategic challenge of China on its Northern borders. Despite the lowering of tensions and gradual normalisation of China ties, India remains careful. China is one of the largest trading partners for India. The lack of access to the Chinese market and growing trade deficit are persistent issues for New Delhi. The China challenge is important beyond the bilateral dimension. China’s close military relationship with Pakistan is a worrying factor for India’s security. Last year, in the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan, China provided active technical support to Pakistan. To meet the China challenge, the role of the US, Europe, and Russia remains critical in building India’s comprehensive national power and in helping with military modernisation.
As the world gets increasingly fragmented and polarised, maintaining the balance between the US, China, Russia and the European countries will become challenging and yet, equally, necessary.
4. Do you think a NATO-style collective security organization could be established in the Indo-Pacific? If so, what would India’s stance be? Would it join? If the answer is no, why do you think it wouldn’t join?
I do not think a NATO-style security arrangement is possible in the Indo-Pacific at the current juncture. Compared with Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, in strategic terms, Asia of the 2020s is very different. The shared threat of the Soviet Union and Communism brought the NATO countries together. The security competition, then, was between two opposing systems.
In contemporary Asia, the security competition is within the same system. China is a security challenge for many countries in East and South Asia, and yet, it is also the largest trading partner for most of these countries. Therefore, it is difficult to see a NATO-like arrangement emerging in the region. There are questions of American credibility. The regional states would be keen to hedge their bets while improving their geopolitical positioning.
Even if the NATO-like alliance comes up in the Indo-Pacific, India would not join it. New Delhi prefers to maintain “strategic autonomy” and would be wary of joining a club that will divide the world into black and white. India will assess the utility of any such initiative in the context of its own difficult security challenges.
Such NATO-like arrangements invariably have a hegemon in the leadership role. India does not like to be a junior partner to any such country. India aspires to be a “leading power” and “net security provider”. India will not sacrifice its strategic autonomy and independent foreign policy for membership in a security arrangement.
