Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s tour to 8 Pacific Island countries led to an escalation of the concerns of Western powers about the Pacific. In response to this, the USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Japan announced that they had launched a new initiative called the “Blue Pacific Partnership” to support the Pacific Islands on June 24, 2022. In addition, in the new Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Summit held in Madrid on 28-30 June 2022, it was emphasized that “China follows an ambitious and compelling policy.” In addition, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand’s participation to the NATO Summit was considered as a remarkable development. All these developments show that the US-China rivalry in the Pacific may evolve to a new dimension.
In this context, Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents to your attention the views it received from Enrico Cau, Associate Researcher in the Taiwan Center for International Strategic Studies (TCISS), to evaluate the latest moves of the USA in the Pacific and the search for new allies against China in this context.
- How do you evaluate China’s initiatives in the Pacific region? Is China’s presence in the Pacific political, economic or military?
Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific include political, economic and security, rather than military proper, dimensions. The political dimension is conducted mainly through diplomatic action. The economic one is mostly channeled across trade and the Belt and Road Program. The security dimension relies on several activities some of which legal, such as seeking to take control of build ports to support China’s maritime operations across South China Sea, Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, as well as through the illegal occupation, building and militarization of a set of disputed maritime features in the South China Sea. In broad terms, the three dimensions of Chinese action across the region are coordinated in such a way that the disputes and the political issues arising from its security activities, are mitigated through diplomatic and economic initiatives. Overall, China’s overarching goal points at the need to A) build a safe maritime buffer zone across the first and second island chains; B) achieve co-development and co-exploitation rights over the maritime resources across the Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea in particular, and C) In doing the above, also deny, to an extent, economic, political and security access to potential foreign competitors. Examples of these activities are now tangibly manifesting themselves through China’s recent attempts to gain a foothold in several Pacific islands. An activity that, so far, has had mixed results with remarkable successes such as the new security agreement signed with the Solomon, but it had mixed results with other island-states across the pacific.
In this regard, I expect China to continue it activities in the South China Sea, while trying to expand its clout across the Pacific. However, such activities will find increasing opposition from both regional countries and the United States and their allies. Is mismanaged, Chinese actions may well result in the formation of a substantial anti-Chinese coalition whose effects, will stretch beyond the Indo-Pacific, in forms of sanctions and tendencies to further isolate China and curb initiatives that are crucial for China’s economic and social stability, such as the BRI.
- The US and China are increasing their military activities in the Pacific. What do you think about the rivalry of the two countries in the region?
Sino-American rivalry in the region is due to stay unchanged in the short to middle term. This is due to two fundamental reasons. 1) Chinese activities in the South China Sea, in the Pacific and, in particular, around Taiwan. This situation is part of a cycle of action (on the Chinese side) and reaction (on the US side) that, in lack of game changing events, is due to continue, between periods of relative quiet and peaks where the relationships between the two countries become more tensed. This type of dynamics bears an intrinsic risk of escalation due to miscalculations and misperceptions, a risk that can be further acutized by poor communication. What is clear at this stage is that despite the growing competition, none of the parties, including Taiwan, India and the ASEAN countries, on top of China and the United States, are eager to engage in overt conflict.
- Is RIMPAC, that which is the world’s largest joint naval exercise led by the US, a message towards China?
I can confidently say that it does not seem the case. RIMPAC is a military exercise whose original purpose, since 1971, has been promoting interoperability between different services and different countries. The main purpose is to train on joint operations revolving around potential, current and ongoing maritime threats at large. Across the years, activities have included both conventional military operations, such as mine laying, mine clearance, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Recovery (HADR) operations, submarine operations, surface operations, as well as non-traditional security operations, such as counter-piracy, down to include logistic and service operation, such as salvage operations and so forth. China itself was invited and participated in two RIMPAC exercises, in 2014 and 2016. It is however clear that the oncoming RIMPAC edition will include activities aimed at countering major opponents in the Indo-Pacific, reason being that type of activity reflects the objective current situation of the regional security landscape, from China growing assertiveness, to growing instability in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. A set of challenges that will define the regional security landscape for the foreseeable future.
- Is the US increasing allies against China in the Pacific?
Based on the current situation, the United States enjoy a relatively steady degree of support even in face of its declining influence over allies and potential such. This as a result of what is perceived as China’s growing assertiveness and coercive practices across the South China Sea in particular, but also in other parts of the globe. However, with the exception of some steady allies in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, the situation across South and Southeast Asia is much more blurred. Some countries traditionally support US presence in the region, such as Singapore and Malaysia. Other countries have ambivalent behaviors towards US’ presence, such as the Philippines. Other countries shift their support towards the US based on their security contingencies, with this being the case of Indonesia and, to an extent, Vietnam. In general, the US are a welcome trade and security partner but its capacity to spread democracy and US values across the region is notoriously low, and a cause of distrust towards US initiatives. All of this points at forms of temporary support for US security goals across the region, rather than at a solid alliance system involving all stakeholders across the region. Cases of such forms of support include countries like Indonesia, and other countries that have traditionally eschewed close, long term contacts with the United States, and have retained more independent foreign policies.
- What can we infer about the latest the US-China rivalry in Asia-Pacific?
Unless some groundbreaking change in posture occurs, the trend will remain escalatory. The major challenges remain the South China Sea, the recent attempts of Chinese expansion in the Pacific and, the real conundrum, the Taiwan affair. These security concerns are further compounded and aggravated by the recent events in Ukraine, where Chinese diplomacy has to face difficult challenges, caught between west’s pressure to condemn Russian actions in Ukraine and the need to somewhat support or maintain a neutral posture vis-à-vis Russia. If mismanaged, Chinese diplomacy in this case may result in fallouts in the economic dimension and further exacerbate the relations between China and not only the US but with a significant part of the west. More in general, the nature of Sino American issues is linked to both challenges in the Indo-Pacific, as well as ideological differences that over time will become increasingly visible, probably causing a shift from divergences over single issues in specific regions, to divergences over systemic ideological differences that point at a generic incompatibility, with rivalry assuming a broader global scope. Signs of such trend are obviously visible through sanctions, trade hurdles and the growing competition over influence building across the world.
- How do you see the future of security in the region?
Under the existing conditions the outlook is moderately negative. China will continue to try to expand its diplomatic and economic influence across the region while also bolstering its national security by trying to build a thicker maritime buffer across the South China Sea and, as we have seen from the recent initiatives in the Pacific, also beyond. At the same time, the United States and its allies will continue to shape the ongoing security architecture, revolving around the QUAD, AUKUS, Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the newer economic initiatives designed to add an economic component to the security dimension. The latter including the new Build Back Better World (B3W) and the more recent Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Since most of these initiatives are relatively new, at the moment it is difficult to predict how much success they will have in persuading allies and potential such to coalesce around a structured pool of countries providing sustained support to such initiatives. This is particularly true in the case of the ASEAN bloc, traditionally more inclined towards non-alignment and avoidance of conflicts that could put at stake growth, development, stability and, ultimately, disrupt domestic political and social balances.
More in general, the regional security landscape will be shaped not only by local events, but also by changes of leaderships in key countries, as well as by major events in other global regions that are transitioning or at risk of transitioning towards more unstable conditions whose fallouts may reach and affect also the Indo-Pacific.
