At the 13th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) held on October 30, 2026, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed inviting Russia to the OTS+ format or granting it observer status within the organization. This proposal, articulated by the Kazakh President at the summit held in Ankara, has added an unexpected geopolitical dimension to the discussions regarding the future of Turkic integration. Although the proposal in question does not constitute an initiative envisioning Russia’s full membership in the organization, it raises a critical question concerning the geopolitical orientation of the Turkic world: Can Turkic integration continue its development without provoking strategic anxieties in Moscow?
At first glance, Tokayev’s proposal may appear paradoxical. While the OTS brings together Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) hold observer status within the organization. Russia, on the other hand, is neither a Turkic state nor a member of the organization. Nevertheless, Tokayev justified his proposal by referring to the presence of Turkic peoples in Russia, such as the Tatars, Bashkirs, and Sakhas, as well as Moscow’s “Altai-Cradle of Turkic Civilization” initiative, which is also supported by Kazakhstan. Tokayev stated that Russia’s participation would strengthen the organization’s international visibility and yield benefits for all participating countries.[i]
Cooperation among Turkic states has transcended cultural diplomacy to encompass transportation, trade, investment, digital infrastructure, and political consultation; consequently, the OTS has begun to acquire increasing geopolitical significance. The growing institutional capacity and objectives of the organization could be perceived by Moscow as an attempt to establish an alternative regional architecture in a geography where Russia has traditionally held substantial influence. However, it should be noted that the OTS essentially operates as a platform aiming for deeper cooperation rather than a formation directed against Russia’s interests. Nevertheless, the strengthening of political and economic coordination among the Central Asian and South Caucasian states may gradually diminish these countries’ dependence on traditional Russia-centric regional arrangements. The expansion of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) stands as one of the primary examples of strategic cooperation within the OTS that constitutes an alternative to the northern routes passing through Russia.
While Astana possesses compelling rationales for deepening its cooperation with Türkiye and other Turkic states, it also regards the maintenance of stable relations with Moscow as a fundamental pillar of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Sharing the world’s longest continuous land border with Russia and maintaining comprehensive economic and security relations with its northern neighbor significantly elevates the costs of a confrontational approach for Kazakhstan. Therefore, Tokayev’s proposal can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent Turkic integration from being perceived as an exclusionary geopolitical project. Rather than allowing Moscow to remain outside an increasingly prominent regional configuration and view this development with suspicion, Kazakhstan is conveying the message that Russia can also be part of a broader architecture of cooperation. In other words, Astana may be signaling that the strengthening of the Turkic world does not necessitate the strategic marginalization of Russia.
Another notable aspect of Tokayev’s speech was his reiteration of the emphasis that the OTS is not a military alliance and should not evolve into such a structure in the future. To date, the OTS has not officially aimed to establish a collective defense mechanism. However, the deepening of military cooperation and political coordination could provoke alternative assessments in this regard, particularly in Moscow. For instance, the Ankara Declaration proposed the enhancement of multilateral and fruitful cooperation in the defense industry and the exploration of establishing an OTS Defense Industry College program hosted by Türkiye.[ii] Tokayev might be attempting to draw a clear distinction between regional integration and military alliance formation. This approach signifies Kazakhstan’s preference to prevent the organization from transforming into a security bloc that could exacerbate geopolitical competition while simultaneously bolstering institutional cooperation. This message serves a dual purpose. For Türkiye and other Turkic states, it delineates the boundaries of Kazakhstan’s preferred integration model; meanwhile, it reassures Russia that the OTS is not intended to become a military instrument directed against its interests. By advocating for Russia’s participation in the organization while explicitly rejecting the militarization of the OTS, Tokayev may be attempting to shape both how the organization is perceived externally and the trajectory of its institutional development.
Russia’s increasingly developing relations with the Turkic world also harbor a significant historical and ideological dimension grounded in the strategic utilization of historical memory and competing civilizational narratives. Russian Eurasianist thinkers regard the Mongol era not merely as a period of foreign domination but as a defining stage in the development of Russia’s independent Eurasian identity. Within the framework of this interpretation, the Mongol and Golden Horde legacy contributed to Russia’s transformation from a political entity situated on the periphery of Europe into a continental power with a distinct civilizational trajectory. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in his article titled “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background,” similarly characterized the Mongol period as a critical element in the consolidation of Russia’s independent role in Eurasia. By citing Alexander Nevsky’s policy of conciliation with the Golden Horde as an example, Lavrov argued that this historical choice facilitated the preservation of Russia’s religious and political autonomy in the face of Western pressure.[iii] More recently, in January 2026, Lavrov explicitly stated that Russia is participating in initiatives aimed at preserving the shared history and historical memory of Turkic peoples. In this context, he specifically referred to the annual political and academic conference titled “Altai Mountains, Cradle of Turkic Peoples,” initiated by Moscow in October 2024.[iv]
By emphasizing Turkic-Mongol connections and its historical relationship with the Great Steppe, Russia can position itself not as an external power seeking influence in Central Asia, but rather as a historical participant within the broader Eurasian and Turkic civilizational sphere. This approach introduces a historical framework that predates Russia’s Tsarist expansion into Central Asia and the Soviet era. Instead of relying solely on the shared historical experiences of Central Asian societies under Tsarist and Soviet rule, Moscow may also invoke an older Eurasian heritage shared in various forms by the Slavic and Turkic worlds. However, it is essential not to interpret these historical narratives as elements that entirely supersede imperial or Soviet historical references.
Such a narrative also yields consequences regarding Türkiye’s position within the Turkic world. The larger economic scale and advanced defense industry capacity that Türkiye possesses compared to other independent Turkic states provide Ankara with significant structural advantages within the Turkic world. Ankara’s privileged position in the Turkic world is founded upon the linguistic, cultural, and historical ties it shares with Turkic societies. Moscow’s Eurasianist interpretation, conversely, may present an alternative understanding of this shared heritage, to which Russia also attributes historical and civilizational importance. By presenting the Turkic world as part of a broader Eurasian historical experience, Russia could potentially complicate Türkiye’s position as the primary political and cultural proponent of this geography. Nevertheless, Lavrov has also articulated that Türkiye is a central pillar of the Turkic world and that steps are being taken toward the development and deepening of the Organization of Turkic States.[v] Russia’s participation within the OTS+ framework could confer an institutional dimension upon the historical narrative that Moscow already champions through diplomatic and academic initiatives.
This proposal by Tokayev holds significance in demonstrating that Kazakhstan sustains its multi-vector foreign policy approach. Astana traditionally endeavors to maintain its strategic partnerships with diverse power centers without becoming excessively dependent on any single power. Its relations with Russia, China, Türkiye, and Western countries exemplify this approach. Tokayev’s statements regarding transportation serve as another indicator of this strategy. While emphasizing the importance of the Middle Corridor and its increasing contribution to trans-Caspian connectivity, he also highlighted the economic opportunities presented by the North-South Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In other words, Kazakhstan does not aim to replace one geopolitical or economic framework with another; rather, it seeks to maintain its access to various intersecting networks. The same logic underpins Tokayev’s approach to the OTS. The strengthening of relations with Türkiye and other Turkic states does not signify the abandonment of cooperation with Russia. On the contrary, Astana aims for these relationships to coexist within a broader and more flexible regional architecture. By adopting a stance that advocates for interaction between the Turkic world and external actors, Kazakhstan can also enhance its diplomatic weight within the OTS. Consequently, Astana can emerge as an actor capable of shaping the organization’s relationship with the broader Eurasian geopolitical environment.
At the same summit, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev also proposed institutionalizing cooperation with third countries through the OTS+ format. In this context, it is envisioned to organize sectoral ministerial-level meetings initially focusing on trade, transportation, investment, and joint projects.[vi] Mirziyoyev’s initiative places Tokayev’s proposal within a broader framework. Rather than treating Russia as an exceptional case, the OTS could develop a mechanism through which various external partners can interact with the organization on the basis of mutual interests. Such an arrangement could enable Turkic states to expand their international partnerships while preserving the fundamental identity of the organization. Establishing cooperation with external actors does not necessitate granting these actors membership or influence over the organization’s internal decision-making processes. In this context, Russia’s participation in the OTS+ format would differ significantly from full membership in an organization founded upon the political and cultural cooperation of Turkic states. While the presence of Turkic-speaking communities in Russia provides a historical and cultural rationale for cooperation, this circumstance does not transform Russia into a Turkic state in an institutional sense. Therefore, observer status or project-based participation within the OTS+ framework appears more congruent with the organization’s current identity. Mirziyoyev’s initiative further indicates that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan may share a mutual interest in transforming the OTS into a platform more receptive to international partnerships.
Furthermore, the term presidency was transferred from Azerbaijan to Türkiye, Uzbek diplomat Mirvokhid Azimov was appointed as the new Secretary General, and Uzbekistan was designated to host the forthcoming summit scheduled for 2027. These developments coincide with a period in which the organization is striving to translate its political objectives into more tangible institutional and economic cooperation mechanisms. While Türkiye’s assumption of the term presidency may impart a new momentum to the Turkic integration agenda, the elevation of Uzbekistan’s institutional role demonstrates Tashkent’s increasingly deepening relations with the organization. In this context, Kazakhstan’s proposal introduces a new dimension to prospective debates concerning how the organization can expand its international sphere of influence while safeguarding political cohesion and strategic autonomy among its member states.
Additionally, it is necessary to emphasize that Russia has not yet been admitted to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) nor has it been granted observer status. The Ankara Summit concluded without the announcement of any decision regarding this proposal. Furthermore, the nature of Russia’s interest in participation, as mentioned by Tokayev, and whether Moscow has submitted an official application in this regard remain ambiguous within the scope of publicly available information. Consequently, this initiative should currently be evaluated as a proposition put forward by Astana rather than a formal process initiated for Russia’s accession to the organization.
In conclusion, Tokayev’s proposal elucidates the complexities confronted by regional integration in a geopolitical environment where institutional cooperation cannot be evaluated independently of the interests of neighboring powers. By proposing Russia’s participation in the OTS+ format, Kazakhstan may be aiming to shape the boundaries of Turkic integration in a manner that preserves its own strategic autonomy while attempting to prevent the emergence of an institutional architecture that Moscow could perceive as a challenge to its regional standing. This calculus also intersects with a more comprehensive competition regarding Eurasian identity, wherein Russia increasingly invokes the Turkic-Mongol historical legacy in an effort to consolidate its own position within the broader Turkic world. Nonetheless, the inclusion of external actors within the OTS framework entails new questions concerning institutional integrity, decision-making autonomy, and the limits of regional inclusivity. Therefore, the fundamental imperative for Turkic states will be to expand their international partnerships without permitting external actors to influence the organization’s internal political orientation. From Kazakhstan’s perspective, the objective is not solely to reconcile relations with Moscow and Ankara, but rather to preserve a regional order wherein deeper Turkic cooperation bolsters, rather than constrains, its capacity to pursue an independent and multi-vector foreign policy.
[i] “Tokayev Proposes Considering Russia’s Participation in OTS”, UzDaily, https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/tokayev-proposes-considering-russias-participation-in-ots/, (Access Date: 01.11.2026).
[ii] “Ankara Declaration of the Thirteenth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States”, The Organization of Turkic States, https://turkicstates.org/u/4-ankara_declaration_final20agreed.pdf, (Access Date: 01.11.2026).
[iii] “Russia’s Foreign Policy:Historical Background”, Russia in Global Affairs, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1523653/, (Access Date: 01.11.2026).
[iv] “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Turkish media”, MFA Russia, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2075802/, (Access Date: 01.11.2026).
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Summit of the Organization of Turkic States”, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://president.uz/en/lists/view/9800, (Access Date: 01.11.2026).
