Connectivity has historically been one of Central Asia’s defining features. Today, for landlocked countries in the region, connectivity has become a fundamental element not only of economic development but also of access to international markets. However, in a geography where this access is provided by neighboring countries, dependence on a single actor or route can give rise to significant risks and vulnerabilities. In this respect, the multi-vector foreign policy approach pursued by regional states affords them greater room for maneuver against such potential disruptions. Indeed, without abandoning their existing partnerships, Central Asian states are moving to diversify their economic partners and trade routes. In this context, it can be seen that in recent years the region has increasingly adopted a multi-corridor connectivity strategy based on developing alternative routes in different directions, particularly westward and southward.
Within this framework, Central Asian states are increasingly embracing an outward-oriented approach to regional cooperation to gain access to broader regional and global markets. By enhancing regional and interregional connections, regional states aim to benefit from the economic opportunities and potential transit revenues offered by Central Asia’s geographic position.[i] However, this trend does not mean that Central Asian states are pursuing a joint and institutionalized infrastructure policy. The simultaneous opening of routes developed in accordance with different national priorities toward different directions can be regarded as a reflection, in the transport domain, of the region’s multi-vector foreign policy. In this context, the Middle Corridor and the Trans-Afghan Railway constitute the westward and southward legs, respectively, of this emerging approach.
During his visit on 23 July 2026 to the Aktau International Sea Trade Port, one of the key points of the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov emphasized the importance of developing maritime and railway infrastructure for the fast and reliable transportation of cargo from Central Asian countries to the markets of the Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe.[ii] Accordingly, the ongoing efforts to develop the Port of Aktau demonstrate the importance Kazakhstan attaches to the Middle Corridor and its prominent role along the route.
Similarly, Uzbekistan is advancing its southward connectivity policy through the Trans-Afghan railway. Indeed, on 17 July 2025, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed a trilateral framework agreement to jointly prepare a feasibility study for the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Railway (Trans-Afghan Railway). Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in turn, approved the domestic official procedures related to the agreement on 4 February 2026.[iii] These steps point to the active role Uzbekistan has assumed in developing the Trans-Afghan Railway and the importance it attaches to the project. This decision also demonstrates that Uzbekistan is advancing the national process required for the project.
In this context, the Middle Corridor and the Trans-Afghan Railway are two separate initiatives prioritized by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, respectively, in line with their different geographic positions and national economic priorities. Nevertheless, the simultaneous advancement of these westward- and southward-oriented routes points to a shared tendency toward diversifying connectivity at the regional level. Accordingly, rather than stemming from a single joint infrastructure policy, Central Asia’s multi-corridor connectivity strategy is being shaped through the complementary regional effects of different national initiatives.
Central Asia’s emerging multi-corridor connectivity strategy has the potential to provide various advantages for regional countries. One of the main potential advantages of the Trans-Afghan Railway stems from the route it follows. The project is expected to constitute one of the shortest land routes connecting Central Asia to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports. In addition, by offering an alternative route that does not pass through Iran, it may diversify the access options of landlocked Central Asian countries to global maritime trade routes.[iv]
Similarly, the Middle Corridor also offers regional countries an alternative connection toward the west. The Middle Corridor can contribute to positioning Central Asia as a key route and an important logistics hub in trade between East and West, and to strengthening its role in global supply chains. Together with the development of infrastructure and transport links along the route, the strengthening of Central Asia’s economic ties with China and easier access to European trade partners may further consolidate the region’s position in global trade.[v]
In this framework, the westward-extending Middle Corridor and the southward-extending Trans-Afghan Railway stand out as two complementary routes in the diversification of connectivity. While Central Asia’s geographic location makes the region significant for both initiatives, it can be said that regional states are increasingly evaluating the opportunities offered by this location in line with their national priorities and economic development goals.
Although a trend toward multi-corridor connectivity is taking shape in Central Asia, this trend has not yet evolved into a joint and institutionalized regional connectivity policy. The differences among regional states in terms of national priorities, economic interests, and levels of participation in these initiatives indicate that the multi-corridor connectivity approach is, to a large extent, a process advancing through parallel national policies.
At the same time, the success of this multi-corridor connectivity strategy also depends on various factors beyond the region. With regard to the Middle Corridor, the lack of coordination among the countries along the route and the inadequate linkages between different segments of the route stand out as the main challenges. As for the Trans-Afghan route, high costs, security risks, insufficient infrastructure, and mountainous terrain conditions are among the factors complicating the process. In addition, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan create political and operational risks that could hinder the stable functioning of the route.[vi]
It therefore appears difficult for the multi-corridor connectivity strategy to be realized solely through the national policies of Central Asian states. The future of this strategy will also be shaped by the cooperation regional states establish with various external actors, as well as by a range of political, security, and infrastructure-related conditions.
It is likely that this strategy will persist and expand in scope in the coming period. The region’s lack of direct access to open seas, its need for access to diverse international markets, and the multi-vector foreign policies pursued by regional states to avoid becoming dependent on a single actor all indicate that the search for alternative connections will continue.
Given the prominent roles Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have assumed in the Middle Corridor and the Trans-Afghan Railway, respectively, it can be anticipated that progress on these two routes may encourage other Central Asian states to participate more actively in existing connectivity initiatives or to develop similar initiatives of their own. As progress is made in multi-corridor connectivity initiatives, Central Asian states may move toward developing a more coordinated regional approach. However, due to differences in national priorities, economic interests, and levels of participation, regional coordination can be expected to strengthen gradually through long-term and stable cooperation. In conclusion, although the multi-corridor connectivity strategy has not yet evolved into a joint and institutionalized policy, it may continue to grow in importance as a regional strategy stemming from, and continuing to develop through, parallel national initiatives.
[i] Shabir Ahmad Khan, “Trans-Regional Integration and Connectivity in Central Asia: Strategies of Russia, China and European Union”, Economic Diplomacy, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392117660_Trans-Regional_Integration_and_Connectivity_in_Central_Asia_Strategies_of_Russia_China_and_European_Union, (Accessed: 21.08.2026).
[ii] “Prime ministers of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Discuss Prospects for Increasing Transportation Along the Middle Corridor”, Official Information Source of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://primeminister.kz/en/news/prime-ministers-of-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan-discuss-prospects-for-increasing-transportation-along-the-middle-corridor-31688, (Accessed: 21.08.2026).
[iii] Gregory Lundin, “The Trans-Afghan Corridor in 2026: Using the Uzbekistan-Pakistan Route Before the Railway”, GetTransport, https://blog.gettransport.com/trends-in-logistic/trans-afghan-corridor-2026-uzbekistan-pakistan-railway/, (Accessed: 22.08.2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “The Middle Corridor: The future of Central Asian growth and cooperation”, Asia House, https://www.asiahouse.org/2025/07/20/the-middle-corridor-the-future-of-central-asian-growth-and-cooperation/, (Accessed: 22.08.2026).
[vi] Galiya Ibragimova, “Multiple Wars Are Ruining Central Asia’s Efforts to Diversify Its Trade Routes”, Carnegie Endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/06/central-asia-trade-routes, (Accessed: 23.08.2026).
