At a time when the European Union’s (EU) approach to economic security towards China is becoming increasingly visible, Beijing’s response is not limited to economic means alone.[i] The European Commission’s search for new regulations to diversify critical supply chains, trade tensions centered around rare earth elements and electric vehicles, and the institutionalization of “de-risking” rhetoric are also producing a significant transformation in China’s diplomatic method towards Europe.One of the latest examples of this transformation occurred during the meeting of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi with the Federal Minister for European and International Relations of the Republic of Austria Beate Meinl-Reisinger.
Wang Yi’s request for Austria to take a “constructive role” in improving China-EU relations can be considered at first glance as a bilateral diplomatic contact. [ii]However, this contact raises an important question because it takes place at a time when the EU is preparing to toughen its common economic security policies towards China: “Why is China intensifying its diplomatic contacts with member states such as Austria instead of responding directly to the economic security policies of the European Commission?”
This diplomatic method can be considered as an approach to turning institutional differences into the field of diplomatic action by establishing simultaneous engagement with national capitals that affect the decision-making processes of these institutions without completely excluding supranational institutions. This multi-layered structure also directly affects the diplomatic strategies of external actors. In the international policy literature, “venue shopping” refers to actors’ preference for corporate or political channels that can have the most impact on decision-making processes in order to achieve their goals. [iii]In this context, considering the multi-layered governance structure of the European Union, Brussels is not the sole decision-making center. Therefore, China’s diplomacy with member states such as Austria can be read as a strategy to access different levels of decision-making at the same time, rather than an attempt to bypass EU institutions. Beijing sees that the EU’s economic security agenda for China is being produced in Brussels, but to what extent this agenda can be implemented depends on national economic preferences in other capitals.
The selection of Austria in this equation is not coincidental. According to current data, approximately 650 Austrian companies operate in China. This economic connection makes Vienna one of the diplomatic contact actors that can maintain a more balanced tone in intra-EU discussions in the context of bilateral relations from the Chinese point of view. At the same time, Vienna’s historical legacy of “non-connection” since the Cold War and its pragmatic diplomacy, aiming to stay within the institutional system and build bridges, is another factor in Beijing’s choice of Vienna.[iv] For this reason, from Beijing’s point of view, Vienna stands out as a suitable capital where a more pragmatic and Deceptive discourse can be supported in China-EU relations, and it can also be considered as a strategy to soften Brussels’ strict stance from the inside. This approach is a rational institutional geography mapping that correctly interprets the EU’s sovereignty structure from a Chinese perspective. Beijing views the Union as a dynamic market where national interests are negotiated, rather than a monolithic bloc.
This strategy is not limited to Austria alone.[v] The fact that French President Emmanuel Macron led a video conference with China on economic imbalances ahead of the G7 Summit indicates that the channels of dialogue in Europe’s China policy have not been completely closed göstermektedir. [vi]On the one hand, the EU is trying to reduce dependence on China and diversify its critical supply chains; on the other hand, capitals such as Paris are keeping open economic negotiation channels that do not exclude China. This situation reveals that Europe’s line towards China is not a one-way break, but a complex diplomatic balancing act that tries to manage the relationship while reducing risks. China, on the other hand, reads these differences as a natural part of its decision-making processes rather than evaluating them as Europe’s institutional weakness and shapes its diplomacy accordingly.
For Beijing, Europe is not merely institutionalized in Brussels. Europe also consists of national capitals with different industrial interests, supply dependencies, trade priorities, and political sensitivities. In other words, China is now conducting diplomacy not only with the European Union, but also with different economic and political trends within the European Union. This situation poses a significant challenge for the EU. Because Brussels’ “de-risking” approach can only be effective to the extent that it is aligned with the economic interests of member states. If the EU cannot reconcile its economic security policies towards China with the different priorities of national capitals, Beijing will continue to turn these differences into diplomatic touch points. Therefore, China’s new European diplomacy uses the multi-layered structure in the decision-making process of the Union strategically rather than directly targeting the institutional integrity of the EU.
In conclusion, China’s move towards Austria marks a new diplomatic phase in EU-China relations. While Europe is strengthening its economic security policies, China is responding to this transformation by diversifying its diplomatic methods rather than just economic countermeasures. Beijing is no longer an actor negotiating with Europe only through Brussels; it conducts a multi-layered diplomacy that takes into account the weight of national capitals in the Union. Therefore, the future of EU-China relations will be shaped by the institutional negotiations between Brussels and Beijing, as well as by the different geoeconomic preferences of European capitals towards China.
[i] Philip Blenkinsop ve Charlotte Van Campenhout, “EU to propose diversification law to drive de-risking fromChina”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-propose-diversification-law-drive-de-risking-china-2026-06-19/, (Date of Access: 01.07.2026).
[ii] “China seeks Austria’s help in easing China-EU tensions”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-seeks-austrias-help-easing-china-eu-tensions-2026-06-25/, (Date of Access: 01.07.2026).
[iii] Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal IntergovernmentalistApproach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473-524, 1993, s. 517.
[iv] Christian Kaunert ve Sarah Léonard, “The Development of the EU Asylum Policy: Venue-Shopping in Perspective”, Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (9): 1396–1413, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.677191, s.1397.
[v] Reuters, a.g.e., (Date of Access: 01.07.2026).
[vi]Michel Rose ve Ethan Wang, “China joins Macron-led video call in rare economic talks ahead of G7 summitin France”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-joins-macron-led-video-call-rare-economic-talks-ahead-g7-summit-france-2026-06-11/, (Date of Access: 01.07.2026).
