Analysis

China’s Approach to the US-Israel-Iran War

There are no existing conditions, treaties, or circumstances that require China to provide overt military support to Iran in this matter.
A primary objective of China’s global strategy is to minimize the risk of direct military conflict with the US as much as possible.
While maintaining its ties with Iran, China is focused on reducing the risk of a direct military confrontation with the US.

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China’s stance on the US-Israel-Iran war has become a major point of interest following the events of February 28, 2026. Due to Beijing’s long-standing cooperation and alliance with Iran against the West, the international community and Western media initially expected a harsh response against Israel and the US, or even explicit support for Tehran. However, while China condemned the strikes, it primarily called for the protection of Iran’s sovereignty and non-interference in its internal affairs, while stressing the importance of energy security in the Strait of Hormuz.[1] Despite this diplomatic support, some experts have criticized the nature of the alliance, arguing that China remained largely silent and failed to provide Iran with the necessary military or practical support during the conflict, alongside Russia.[2]

In fact, the current conditions, treaties, or broader context do not require China to provide overt military support to Iran. Such assistance may be occurring indirectly or covertly; however, it is unlikely that this would be diplomatically acknowledged during an active war. Before examining the reasons for this, it is worth noting the political, economic, and military partnerships established between Iran and China over the last decade. This solidarity, built on the pursuit of multipolarity and a shared stance against the West, is precisely what led many experts to expect that Beijing would stand by Tehran under any circumstances and offer explicit military aid.

One of the most influential factors behind this expectation has been the regular military exercises conducted by Russia, China, and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean since 2019. In fact, just ten days before the attacks on February 29, these actors held their seventh joint naval drill in the Strait of Hormuz.[3] Since 2019, Russia, China, and Iran have attached special importance to these exercises to project power, create a deterrent against Western forces, and ensure maritime security in the critical Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, these drills were intended to deter any potential attack against Iran.

In 2021, China and Iran signed a massive $400 billion, 25-year agreement covering various sectors such as economy, trade, banking, telecommunications, transport, energy, and security. It was claimed that this deal included military cooperation, joint exercises, security force support, and intelligence sharing in the Strait of Hormuz to secure the Iran-China oil trade.[4] Even though not explicitly stated in the terms, one of the most debated topics at the time was whether China would provide secret military support to Iran under this agreement. Then-Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif denied these claims, stating there were no secret clauses and refuting allegations of Chinese military support in the Strait of Hormuz.[5] Looking back from 2021 to the present, the significance of this issue has become very clear.

Since 2021, it has become clear that Iran sought Chinese military support to bolster its national security, though this cooperation remained limited in scope. At this point, it is crucial to note that Article 146 of the Iranian Constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases within the country. However, by forming partnerships with China in areas such as joint exercises, technology sharing, space cooperation, and other military fields, Iran clearly aimed to build deterrence against the US and Israel and secure an advantage in a potential conflict. The key point to emphasize here is that, although the 2021 Iran-China 25-Year Cooperation Program includes military and security cooperation, it contains no commitments regarding mutual defense.

In other words, it is important to emphasize that there is no security agreement stating that an attack on one party is an attack on the other or requiring a collective response. Furthermore, one of China’s core foreign policy principles is based on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. China maintains this principled stance even in its relations with friendly and allied nations. In this context, looking at bilateral or multilateral agreements, China has no commitment to defend Iran or join it in a war against the US and Israel. Therefore, comments suggesting that China has abandoned Iran militarily seem to lack both factual reality and a solid basis.

Moreover, it can be argued that China provided Iran with military intelligence during this process by publishing satellite images of US bases in the Middle East.[6] China’s provision of defense industry equipment, spare parts, and other components to Iran can be viewed as part of a routine military cooperation process conducted under bilateral agreements. Currently, the US claims that this cooperation will expand to include financial support and the supply of critical missile components.[7] However, it is already clear that this cooperation will have certain limits. Ultimately, while the relationship between China and Iran has reached the level of a strategic partnership, it is not a traditional military alliance. In other words, the relationship progresses within a flexible framework where economic, diplomatic, and geopolitical interests intersect.

There are several fundamental reasons behind China’s cautious stance regarding Iran. First, although China is a rising power in the global system, it remains extremely wary of forming military alliances or becoming directly involved in wars. The Beijing administration is aware that taking a direct side in regions with complex security dynamics and multiple actors, such as the Middle East, carries high long-term costs. Second, China’s global economic interests are a major determinant of this cautious approach. The Chinese economy relies heavily on global trade networks and particularly on energy supply chains passing through the Strait of Hormuz, which meets 45% of China’s energy needs.[8] Therefore, Beijing does not want a regional war to expand, destabilize energy markets, or jeopardize global trade routes. Third, from China’s perspective, positioning itself militarily alongside Iran could damage the balanced diplomatic relations it has spent years trying to establish.

Finally, one of the primary goals of China’s global strategy is to minimize the risk of direct military conflict with the US as much as possible. Providing overt military support to Iran could create a direct flashpoint between the US and China, further escalating tensions in already sensitive strategic areas such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, while maintaining its relationship with Iran, China seeks to avoid any risk of a direct military confrontation with the US. Ultimately, the cautious and limited reaction China has shown in the US-Israel-Iran War does not mean that its support for Iran has vanished, as some commentators suggest. On the contrary, this approach reflects the pragmatic and long-term strategic calculations of Chinese foreign policy. Beijing aims to protect its economic and diplomatic ties with Iran while avoiding becoming part of a direct military bloc in the global system, attempting instead to remain a balanced actor in the Middle East.

[1] “China reaffirms support for Iran as top diplomats hold phone call amid escalating tensions in Middle East”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-reaffirms-support-for-iran-as-top-diplomats-hold-phone-call-amid-escalating-tensions-in-middle-east/3846890, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026); “China urges secure energy supplies amid airstrikes by US, Israel, Iran”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-urges-secure-energy-supplies-amid-airstrikes-by-us-israel-iran/3847953, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).

[2] “Where are Iran’s allies? Why Moscow, Beijing are keeping their distance”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/5/where-are-irans-allies-why-moscow-beijing-are-keeping-their-distance, (Erişim Tarihi: 06.03.2026).  

[3] “Russia, China, Iran deploy ships for joint exercises in Strait of Hormuz”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russia-china-iran-deploy-ships-for-joint-exercises-in-strait-of-hormuz/3832330, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).   

[4] “What does the China-Iran 25-year agreement mean for Iranians?”, Atalayar, https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/what-does-china-iran-25-year-agreement-mean-iranians/20210406085637150650.html, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).  

[5] “25-Year Strategic Accord Under Negotiation With China “Not Secret”, Says Iran”, NDTV, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-says-25-year-strategic-accord-under-negotiation-with-china-not-secret-2257643, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).  

[6] “Chinese PLA releases satellite images showing US military buildup near Iran”, Azernews, https://www.azernews.az/region/254697.html, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).  

[7] “ABD istihbaratı: Çin, İran’a tam destek vermeye hazırlanıyor”, Son Dakika, https://www.sondakika.com/dunya/haber-abd-istihbarati-cin-iran-a-tam-destek-vermeye-19633307/, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).    

[8] “China in talks with Iran to allow safe oil and gas passage through Hormuz, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-talks-with-iran-allow-safe-oil-gas-passage-through-hormuz-sources-say-2026-03-05/, (Date Accessed: 06.03.2026).

Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk Tamer graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations in 2014. In the same year, he started his master's degree at Gazi University, Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies. In 2016, Tamer completed his master's degree with his thesis titled "Iran's Iraq Policy after 1990", started working as a Research Assistant at ANKASAM in 2017 and was accepted to Gazi University International Relations PhD Program in the same year. Tamer, whose areas of specialization are Iran, Sects, Sufism, Mahdism, Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific and who speaks English fluently, completed his PhD education at Gazi University in 2022 with his thesis titled "Identity Construction Process and Mahdism in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Framework of Social Constructionism Theory and Securitization Approach". He is currently working as an Asia-Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM.

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