Recent events in Mali raise the question of whether the shifting paradigm in the Sahel will give way to the “established” paradigm. The Tuareg separatist movement—one of the principal drivers of instability in Mali, or, in other words, the foremost among the country’s “structural” problems—has once again risen up against the central government. In line with the old paradigm, radical Islamist terrorist organizations are also cooperating with the Tuaregs to recapture various cities. Once again, a state from outside the region is taking the lead in addressing the crisis.
While France had previously been involved in Mali’s struggle against separatist elements and terrorist organizations, attention in the 2026 spiral of instability has now turned toward the Africa Legion, reportedly affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defence and considered the successor to the Russian paramilitary group Wagner Group. The fact that various demands of the Tuaregs continue to pose a challenge to Bamako, coupled with the persistent presence of terrorist formations particularly in northern Mali, demonstrates that these issues remain intractable despite external support from diverse international actors; thus, indicating a necessity for a paradigm shift in strategic approaches compared to the past.
Coordinated attacks took place on April 25, 2026, in various cities, including the capital Bamako, as well as Kati, Mopti, and Gao. The al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jamal Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg rebels have claimed responsibility for the attacks. The two groups have publicly acknowledged for the first time that they are collaborating and coordinating with one another.
The aim is to overthrow Goïta, who came to power in a coup in 2020. In addition to demands for self-determination, they are calling for the withdrawal of the African Legion from the country. The groups managed to enter the capital, Bamako, and Defense Minister Sadio Camaro was killed in the attacks. The attack on Kidal was extensive and led to the withdrawal of Malian forces and Russian troops from the city. Kidal is currently under the control of the separatist Tuareg group, the Azavad Liberation Front. The Front continues its advance toward other cities in northern Mali.
Despite attacks by rebels and terrorist groups—including the one that claimed the life of Defense Minister Camaro—and their takeover of certain cities, the government appears to maintain control over most major cities and state institutions. The military junta, which seized power through a coup under the pretext of safeguarding sovereignty, ensuring stability, and protecting Mali’s interests rather than those of France or ECOWAS, has also garnered public support by promising to resolve Mali’s chronic problems. Consequently, the government is facing increased scrutiny during this period. On the other hand, the junta continues to enjoy the support of a segment of society.
It is not only the future of coup leader Goïta that is under scrutiny, but also the role of Russian militias in Mali and the region, as well as the future of the Sahel Confederation. The future of Mali—and of Niger and Burkina Faso, with whom it forms the confederation—in resolving these chronic issues depends on the steps they take to address the current crisis.
The Confederation formed by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso was interpreted as a sign of a new paradigm in the region, particularly in terms of Sahel policies and African policies in general. Among the concrete indicators of this new landscape are the three countries’ decision to harshly criticize and withdraw from ECOWAS, which they had founded; their subsequent formation of a security- and defense-focused alliance among themselves, followed by the establishment of a confederation; Mali’s abrupt severing of ties with France, a country with which it shares a long-standing historical relationship; and its explicit preference for cooperation with Moscow across various fields rather than with Paris.
In addition to Russia, Türkiye has also come to the fore due to its prominent ties in the Sahel. A key answer to the question “Why a new paradigm?” is the fact that the governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso came to power through coups. In terms of Africa’s established paradigm, this constitutes an example of a change in government through unconstitutional means. Under the established paradigm led by the African Union and ECOWAS, sanctions were imposed on the three countries in question, and their membership was suspended. The three countries, arguing that ECOWAS serves France’s interests and security rather than Africa’s, announced that they would ensure their own security through the alliance they established. This effort was first implemented as an alliance and later as a confederation.
Mali has faced criticism and sanctions from ECOWAS during the coup process but has resisted this stance. In addition to policy disagreements, this stance stems from the fact that the extent of ECOWAS’s support for Mali in its fight against separatists and extremist elements remains a matter of debate. Mali has accused ECOWAS of leaving it alone in the fight against terrorism. ECOWAS’s imposition of sanctions against the coup in Mali has pushed the already strained relations to the breaking point. Bamako has accused ECOWAS not only of failing to address the issue of terrorism but also of abandoning its founding principles and operating under the influence and control of foreign countries.
ECOWAS, whose legitimacy has once again come under scrutiny following the withdrawal of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali—amidst heavy criticism—and their subsequent formation of a confederation as an alternative to strategic alliances, issued a statement following the attacks in Mali that alluded to regional cooperation and, by extension, the unity of West Africa. It called on all countries in the region, their security forces, regional mechanisms, and societies to coordinate their efforts in combating the attacks, which they characterized as a “threat to the security and stability of West Africa.”
In the “absence” of ECOWAS, Mali will continue to receive support not only from Russia but also from the Sahel Confederation. As expected, the bloc has announced that it will continue to support Mali in its fight against terrorist and separatist groups.
Russia’s failure to provide the security and stability that Mali seeks raises the possibility that the junta might seek cooperation with other countries. In this context, Türkiye stands out. Currently, cooperation between the two countries is particularly prominent in the security sector. The signing of a security agreement to train presidential guard forces and Türkiye’s export of drones to Mali are examples of this. It is noted that drones played a significant role in the recapture of the city of Kidal from insurgents in 2024. Türkiye’s participation in the counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, alongside Mali, is crucial. Burkina Faso and Niger also maintain close military ties with Türkiye. All three countries are acquiring drones and have close ties with Türkiye’s defense industry.
In addition to Türkiye, another key player in relations with Mali is the United States. The Donald Trump administration is showing special and distinct interest in Mali, deviating from conventional African policy. Indeed, there are various indications that U.S.-Mali relations are set to be revitalized. Relations had been negatively affected by coups and Mali’s cooperation with Russia. Currently, however, sanctions against certain Malian figures have been lifted, and Washington is pursuing a policy focused on security and counterterrorism. In particular, reports suggesting that intelligence sharing will resume have increased. Thus, compared to past U.S. administrations, it is evident that Trump does not prioritize democracy and human rights. Washington has stated that it seeks to develop relations not only with Mali but also with Niger and Burkina Faso, the other members of the Sahel Confederation.
The developments in Mali briefly summarized above bring to mind the spiral of instability of the 2010s. For similar reasons, security in the country has come under significant threat, and the central government has lost control in the north. The Tuaregs and their organization, the Azavad Liberation Front, citing the failure to implement their demands for autonomy, have advanced as far as the capital, Bamako, in collaboration with terrorist groups operating freely in the Sahel to achieve their secessionist goals.
Anti-French sentiment in the country has grown since the process that began with the ouster of Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in 2020. Paris has been criticized by anti-French groups for allegedly protecting Keita and failing to intervene against extremists or separatists in the north. In 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that French military forces would withdraw from Mali due to the severing of ties with the junta that came to power through a coup.
Anti-French sentiment in Mali and Paris’s decision to withdraw have brought about significant political and military developments. The most important of these developments has been the conclusion of Operation Barkhane, which has been the subject of debate, particularly in Africa. This operation is a continuation of the Serval Operation, which began in 2013 with the aim of preventing terrorist groups and Tuareg factions from seizing control in Mali. Consequently, it has also negatively impacted the Takuba Operation, in which European forces played a leading role. European Union member states did not see a viable way to continue the operation.
Ultimately, another point of interest is not only where instability in Mali will lead but also how the associated cycle of threats will be resolved. In past instances, cooperation between the Tuaregs and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups was put on hold due to differing objectives. Therefore, whether the same development will occur today will depend on the extent to which the objectives of the two groups align. While it is anticipated that Russia will continue its activities amid criticism, Türkiye will also continue its policy of developing relations with Mali through various methods, such as mediation and diplomatic support. It should be recalled that Ankara has reiterated its support for Mali following these recent attacks. The Sahel Confederation faces a familiar yet formidable threat. Given its institutional and military weaknesses, this organization may require the support of ECOWAS.
