The new U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, dated May 7, 2026, highlights the transformation in the geographical and operational nature of the global terrorist threat. The collapse of the ISIS physical infrastructure centered in Iraq and Syria does not mean the threat has ended. On the contrary, it has ushered in an era where organizational structures have spread to areas with weak governance, such as Africa and Central Asia, in more dispersed, flexible, and less visible forms. Consequently, the concept of “ungoverned spaces” has been placed at the center of Washington’s new security framework. The document notes that ISIS remnants are turning toward Africa and Central Asia, exploiting the vacuums there, and that a resurgent threat is emerging in areas such as the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique, Sudan, and Somalia in Africa.[i]
This approach signals a clear departure from the large-scale, interventionist, and nation-building-centered model of the post-9/11 era. Rather than defining the fight against terrorism through major ground operations aimed at regime change or state reconstruction, the U.S. now aims to conduct it through a light military footprint, intelligence sharing, and the development of joint force capabilities. The prominence of criticism of the “endless war” in the strategy indicates that the U.S. security bureaucracy seeks to shift from a global policing role to a more selective, cost-limited, and target-oriented approach to intervention. This does not, in essence, imply a withdrawal. Rather, it introduces a security logic that is preventive and shifts the burden to partners, thereby preventing the threat from gaining operational capabilities.
Central Asia is becoming critical in this new equation regarding the post-Afghanistan security architecture. The Taliban’s control over Afghanistan has not eliminated the ISIS-Khorasan threat but has shifted regional actors’ perception of risk to a more complex terrain. For Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, the issue is no longer limited to border security. Radicalization, militant mobility, propaganda via diaspora networks, uncertainties stemming from Afghanistan, and great power competition all intersect along the same axis. Assessments of ISIS-Khorasan’s Afghanistan-based presence reveal that this group is viewed as one of the most dangerous ISIS branches in terms of its capacity for external attacks against the West and the region.
For this reason, the U.S. approach to Central Asia may be shaped not so much by direct military deployment as by intelligence, border security, regional capacity-building, and partnership networks. From Washington’s perspective, the Tajik-Afghan border, Uzbekistan’s careful diplomacy with Afghanistan, the fragile social structure in Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan’s broad geopolitical balance are all parts of the same security landscape. The primary concern here is not that Central Asia will become a new battlefield, but rather that Afghanistan-based organizational networks will use the region’s fragile social and economic fault lines to develop external operational capabilities.
In the African context, the Sahel plays a pivotal role. Military regimes along the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso axis, an anti-Western sentiment, France’s waning influence, Russia’s growing security presence, and the territorial gains of jihadist terrorist organizations have made the region one of the most sensitive issues in U.S. strategy. In the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa maintain a presence along border areas where state authority is weak. In Somalia, al-Shabaab possesses the capacity for a protracted insurgency intertwined with local clan dynamics. In Sudan, the civil war environment is deepening security vacuums. Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado region, meanwhile, creates a distinct vulnerability in terms of energy investments, coastal security, and ISIS-linked activity. As of 2026, the Sahel, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin continue to serve as the primary hubs for jihadist violence and terrorist attacks in Africa.[ii]
The U.S. strategy of maintaining a light footprint and adopting a burden-sharing approach in Africa raises serious questions about sustainability. Expecting states with limited capacity, facing a crisis of legitimacy, or with weakened social bonds to shoulder a greater counterterrorism burden can sometimes exacerbate problems on the ground. Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist groups and ISIS offshoots are deriving legitimacy in many countries through local conflicts, ethnic tensions, economic vulnerabilities, and the harsh practices of security forces. Therefore, military capacity transfer alone may struggle to produce lasting results unless supported by addressing local legitimacy and governance issues.
Although Central Asia and the Sahel may appear geographically distant, they are interpreted through the same security logic in Washington’s new strategy. Weak state capacity, transnational militant networks, the risk of developing external operational capabilities, great power competition, and the transformation of local crises into global security issues emerge as common themes in both regions. This situation demonstrates that American counterterrorism thinking has shifted from a perception of a single-source threat to one of fragmented, multi-regional, and network-based threats. No single new center has replaced the Iraq-Syria axis; the threat operates within loosely connected security vacuums.
The strategy’s strength lies in its avoidance of the burden of nation-building, its focus on local partners, and its prioritization of intelligence and targeted capacity-building. However, its weaknesses are also evident. The excessive securitization of local political issues, the sidelining of human rights and governance problems, the imposition of excessive responsibilities on weak states, and the possibility of intensified great power competition must be taken into account. While the concept of “ungoverned spaces” is analytically functional, it sometimes oversimplifies complex local realities. When a region is viewed as a vacuum, the political demands of the communities living there and their relationships with the state can be overshadowed by security terminology.
In conclusion, the U.S.’s new counterterrorism strategy indicates that the terrorist threat is now understood not as a singular, Iraq-Syria-centered area, but as part of a fragmented security belt stretching from Central Asia to the Sahel. Within this belt, post-Afghanistan uncertainties, the state crisis in the Sahel, organizational continuity in the Lake Chad Basin, chronic insurgency in Somalia, the war vacuum in Sudan, and fragility in Mozambique are interconnected issues. The future of the fight against terrorism lies not only in military operations but also in strengthening weak state capacities, enhancing local legitimacy, and ensuring the sustainability of regional partnerships.
[i] “2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy”, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/2026-USCT-Strategy-1.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.05.2026).
[ii] “The Widening Scope of Africa’s Militant Islamist Threat.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2026a-mig-widening-militant-islamist-threat/, (Erişim Tarihi: 07.05.2026).
