Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Baku following her participation in the European Political Community summit held in Yerevan on May 4, 2026. During the meetings, a wide range of topics were discussed, from energy and the economy to infrastructure and security. On this matter, Meloni stated, “The more instability increases in our region, the more crucial it becomes to strengthen the reliable relationships we have. The relationship between Italy and Azerbaijan is one such reliable partnership.”[i] Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who visited Baku around the same time, also described Azerbaijan as a “reliable and valuable energy partner”.[ii]
When the statements of both leaders are considered together, it becomes clear that Europe’s interest in the South Caucasus—and particularly in Azerbaijan—is growing as part of the reconstruction of Europe’s post-Russia energy architecture. Consequently, Meloni’s visit to Baku not only demonstrates Italy’s interest in Azerbaijani gas; it also indicates that the EU’s energy order—which for many years was shaped around the Berlin-Moscow axis—has begun to shift toward a southern-axis geopolitical architecture centered on the Caspian-Anatolia-Adriatic corridor. Indeed, until the Russia-Ukraine War, European energy policy was shaped by the mutual dependence between Germany and Russia.
For Germany, Russian gas served as a tool to maintain industrial competitiveness and strengthen its political clout within the EU; for Russia, it provided an opportunity to access the EU market and deepen its political influence within the bloc. The concrete outcome of this mutual dependence was realized through the Nord Stream project. The 110 billion cubic meters of gas planned to be delivered to Germany via the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 projects exceeds the annual gas consumption of many EU member states.[iii] Given that natural gas is the EU’s primary energy source, the Nord Stream project demonstrates that Germany has become a hub for the distribution of Russian gas.
However, the war that began in 2022 has exposed the fragility of the Berlin-Moscow-centered European energy policy. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the risks posed by energy dependence; the shutdown of the Nord Stream system has shown just how vulnerable the physical infrastructure is; and fluctuations in energy prices have demonstrated that energy security also affects political stability, thereby proving that the single-hub northern model is unsustainable for Europe’s energy security. In the wake of this disruption, the EU has been compelled to turn toward alternative and politically more manageable secure corridors. At this point, Greece has emerged as a key energy gateway in Europe’s southeast, based on its investments in liquefied natural gas terminals, infrastructure around Dedeağaç, connection projects extending to Balkan countries, and its diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean.[iv] However, serving as an entry point in energy geopolitics is not the same as being a central actor that manages energy flows.
For a country to become an energy hub, it must not only possess a strategic location for transit but also be able to aggregate energy from diverse sources, support this energy with a large domestic market, and redirect it to other industrial centers in Europe. Considering these characteristics, it is clear that Italy is the strongest candidate to assume the energy coordination role long held by Germany in the north, due to its large domestic market, access to multiple sources, and capacity for intra-European redistribution. Indeed, over the past two years, Italy has been conducting intensive energy diplomacy with Algeria, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and most recently Azerbaijan, and is attempting to integrate North African gas via Algeria and Libya, as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity via Qatar and the Gulf states, and the Caspian Basin via Azerbaijan into the same energy equation. This multifaceted initiative demonstrates that the vacuum created by the disruption of the Berlin-Moscow axis, which had shaped a north-centered order in European energy geopolitics—can be filled from the south.
In this context, Meloni’s visit to Baku can be seen as an effort to complete a key link in the chain stretching from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea. This is because the shift in Europe’s energy geopolitics does not merely signify a transition from north to south; it also represents a transition from a Russia-centric, high-volume, politically fragile supply model to a diversified and geopolitically more reliable energy architecture. In this transformation process, Azerbaijan offers more than just being a supplier country for Europe; it provides an alternative source to Russia, a secure corridor that reduces the vulnerability of post-Russia European energy security, and infrastructure whose capacity can be increased if needed.
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz following the Russia-Ukraine War has also clearly demonstrated that the primary issue for Europe is no longer merely meeting the numerical energy deficit; rather, it is securing energy through routes that are more resilient to political crises, maritime security risks, and global price fluctuations. In this regard, Meloni’s emphasis in Baku that energy and connectivity are two sides of the same coin, Rome’s positioning of itself as a political and economic gateway for Caspian gas to Europe, and the introduction of Italy-Azerbaijan defense cooperation on the agenda[v], all indicate that Europe’s new energy strategy addresses both supply security and corridor security together, Consequently, the fact that Caspian gas flows uninterrupted through the South Caucasus to Türkiye and from there to the European domestic market has made Baku not only an energy-producing country but also one of the starting points of the south-oriented energy architecture that has taken shape in Europe since the end of the war.
At this point, it is important to note that Europe aims to shape a larger energy landscape that could be formed through Azerbaijan, alongside Azerbaijani gas. In particular, Azerbaijan is becoming a key actor in three respects regarding the shift of Turkmenistan’s natural gas route—which currently heads primarily eastward—toward the west, given that Turkmenistan possesses one of the world’s largest natural gas reserves. First, there is an existing and operational system through which Azerbaijani gas currently reaches Europe, and this infrastructure can be expanded. Second, Azerbaijan has been a partner working with European energy companies, pipeline consortia, and transit countries in the region since 1992, meaning it possesses institutional experience. Third, the strategic significance of the Southern Corridor could increase if new high-reserve sources, such as Turkmenistan, are connected to Azerbaijan. Consequently, Azerbaijan is not only a source country for Europe’s energy security but also a geopolitical hub capable of linking the broader energy landscape stretching from the Caspian Sea to Central Asia to Europe.
So, considering the possibility of integrating gas from the Caspian Basin—and, in the future, gas from Turkmenistan or, more broadly, hydrocarbons from Central Asia—into the system, through which reliable geopolitical route will resources from the Eurasian energy landscape be transported to Europe? The most concrete and viable answer to this question, in terms of existing infrastructure, political experience, and geographical continuity, is the Caspian-Caucasus-Türkiye-Europe route—that is, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. In other terms, Türkiye is the key point of the geopolitical route that connects Azerbaijan—one of the energy sources in the new Europe-focused energy strategy—with Italy, which aims to serve as a distribution and coordination hub within Europe; this route makes the system operational and facilitates the future integration of new sources like Turkmenistan into Europe. Consequently, alongside Europe’s growing interest in Baku, Ankara’s indispensability for Europe is becoming increasingly evident within the new energy axis taking shape in the post-Russia era.
In conclusion, it would be inaccurate to view Meloni’s visit to Baku merely as a diplomatic engagement between Italy and Azerbaijan. The visit can be interpreted as a reflection on the ground of the shifting balance of power in European energy geopolitics that began following the Russia-Ukraine War. Indeed, a structural transformation is underway: European energy geopolitics, which for many years was shaped through the Baltic region, is shifting toward the Caspian Sea; the likelihood of the role of energy coordination shifting from Germany to Italy—the strongest candidate in the south—is growing; and the southern corridor extending from Anatolia to Rome is emerging as the new axis of European energy security.
[i] Esmira Aliyeva & Saida Rustamova, “İtalya Başbakanı Meloni’den Bakü ziyareti: Enerji tedariki gündemde”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/2026/05/05/italya-basbakani-meloniden-baku-ziyareti-enerji-tedariki-gundemde, (Date of Access: May 12, 2026).
[ii] “Azerbaycan Cumhurbaşkanı Aliyev Kallas’ı kabul etti: Enerji ve stratejik ortaklık mesajı”, Haber Global, https://haberglobal.com/gundem/azerbaycan-cumhurbaskani-aliyev-kallasi-kabul-etti-enerji-ve-stratejik-ortaklik-mesaji-522671, (Date of Access: May 12, 2026).
[iii] “Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Halted”, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11138, (Date of Access: May 12, 2026).
[iv] “Guilfoyle: Greece emerging as key energy gateway to Europe”, Ekathimerini, https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/energy/1295669/guilfoyle-greece-emerging-as-key-energy-gateway-to-europe/, (Date of Access: May 12, 2026).
[v] “Aytan Farhadova, Italy’s Meloni visits Baku, talks energy cooperation with Aliyev”, OC Meida, https://oc-media.org/italys-meloni-visits-baku-talks-energy-cooperation-with-aliyev/, (Date of Access: May 12, 2026).
