Analysis

Corridor War: The TRIPP Crisis in South Caucasus

The TRIPP project is the most concrete example of the privatization of geopolitics.
The fundamental obstacle to the peace process is the deepening constitutional crisis linked to Armenia’s implementation of constitutional changes.
The Washington Agreement is a structural transformation move that places the South Caucasus at the center of the global power struggle.

Paylaş

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The South Caucasus, referred to as the “Balkans of Eurasia,” is undergoing a comprehensive geopolitical transformation in the final quarter of 2025. The “Washington Agreement” summit on August 8, 2025, ended the thirty-year “frozen conflict” paradigm and initiated a phase of “cold peace” characterized by intense commercial competition.[i] The Agreement has built the peace process on concrete economic interests and infrastructure projects rather than abstract legal norms; it has shifted the axis of struggle from “territorial sovereignty” to strategic “corridor governance.” In this new ‘operational’ doctrine, peace is an essential “risk management tool” for the sustainability of global trade flows.

The concrete manifestation of the geo-economic era is the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)” project. TRIPP, which provides a market-oriented solution to the “Zangezur Corridor” issue, is the most concrete example of the privatization of geopolitics.[ii] The project envisages the construction and security of the transit line connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan being transferred to a US-based consortium for 99 years. This hybrid “concession” structure offers a mechanism that transforms the classic concepts of Westphalian state sovereignty and is reminiscent of the early management models of the Suez and Panama Canals.

The fact that the pipeline’s security will be provided by US-based private security units (affiliated with contractor companies such as Halliburton, Bechtel, or Constellis) has introduced the concept of “corporate geopolitics” to the region.[iii] This structure is a strategic deterrent designed against Russia and Iran. Any potential intervention in the TRIPP line would be considered not only a diplomatic crisis but also a direct attack on American commercial interests, enabling Washington to establish an effective security umbrella in the region through the private sector without entering into a binding military commitment. [iv]

The mere initialing of the peace agreement demonstrates that its legal binding force is contingent upon Armenia implementing constitutional amendments. This situation highlights how sensitive and fragile the process is. The fundamental obstacle to the peace process is the deepening constitutional crisis. Azerbaijan’s principle of “legal certainty first” is forcing the Armenian leadership to sever ties with its irredentist past. This pressure is a structural challenge to the fundamental philosophy of national identity. At the heart of the problem lies the Declaration of Independence dated August 23, 1990, which envisions the “Reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh,” as referenced in the introductory section of the Armenian Constitution.

Baku interprets this constitutional reference as a constitutionally guaranteed “land claim” and emphasizes that, unless the constitution is amended, any future government has the potential to appeal to the Constitutional Court to annul the agreement. Although Prime Minister Pashinyan defends this change as necessary for the survival of the state, the vast majority of the Armenian people oppose this perceived external pressure. A strategic paradox has emerged here. If Pashinyan does not hold a referendum, the agreement cannot be signed, and diplomatic avenues will be exhausted. If it is rejected, Azerbaijan will strengthen the international legitimacy for a possible military intervention, arguing that the Armenian people have rejected peace. This debate has been taken to the level of the liquidation of national identity by the opposition led by the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The Washington Agreement and the TRIPP project pose a serious challenge to Russia’s historical influence. Russia faces the risk of losing the logistical control role it holds under the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement to American companies.[v] The Kremlin is avoiding military intervention and instead deploying asymmetric and economic pressure tactics. The systematic slowing of trade flows at the Verin Lars border crossing point, citing “phytosanitary” issues with Armenian agricultural products, is a clear example of economic pressure that exploits Armenia’s logistical dependence on the Russian market.

The use of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) legislation (particularly Article 29.1) is creating diplomatic pressure based on the incompatibility of delegating customs controls to a third party with the principles of the union. Meanwhile, Iran perceives the TRIPP project as a threat to national security and a potential “NATO Corridor.” This threat has pushed Iran toward a pragmatic rapprochement with Azerbaijan, with which it has historically had tense relations (Aras-2025 joint military exercise). This situation serves as a clear regional warning against the involvement of Western powers in the region.

Armenia has accelerated its process of aligning with NATO standards by diversifying its military supply chain from Russia to France (CAESAR howitzers, GM200 radars) and India (Akash-1S systems, Pinaka rocket launchers). However, the regional military balance strongly favors Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan maintains its superiority through its military integration with Turkey under the “Shusha Declaration” and its high-tech inventory (LORA missiles, Barak-8 systems). Armenia’s new acquisitions serve a “punitive deterrence” strategy aimed at increasing the cost of a potential conflict rather than changing the strategic balance.

The start of TRIPP construction in late 2026 makes the coming period a strategically critical “window of vulnerability.” The success of the agreement will weaken Russian hegemony and change the flow of the Middle Corridor. However, failure of the constitutional referendum or internal political instability carries the risk of dragging the region back into pre-2020 instability. The Washington Agreement is a structural transformation move that places the South Caucasus at the center of the global power struggle, and the final outcome of the process will be determined by the internal political dynamics and strategic preferences of regional actors.


[i] “Opinion: Washington Meeting and the Shifting Geopolitics of the South Caucasus”, Think-Tanks.az, https://think-tanks.az/eng/archives/1320, (Date Accession: 22.11.2025).

[ii] “Zangezur or bust: A US corridor scheme meets an Iranian red line”, The Cradle, https://thecradle.co/articles/zangezur-or-bust-a-us-corridor-scheme-meets-an-iranian-red-line, (Date Accession: 22.11.2025).

[iii] “U.S. contractors reap the windfalls of post-war reconstruction”, ICIJ – International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, https://www.icij.org/investigations/windfalls-war/us-contractors-reap-windfalls-post-war-reconstruction-0/, (Date Accession: 22.11.2025).

[iv] “The US strengthens its position in the South Caucasus: Peace Declaration and the ‘TRIPP’ project”, Aze.Media, https://aze.media/the-us-strengthens-its-position-in-the-south-caucasus-peace-declaration-and-the-tripp-project/ (Date Accession: 22.11.2025).

[v] “Russia Claims Trilateral Agreements With Armenia, Azerbaijan ‘Still Valid’”, Azatutyun.am, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33499730.html, (Date Accession: 22.11.2025).

Kürşat İsmayıl
Kürşat İsmayıl
Kürşat İsmayıl obtained his Bachelor's degree from Hacettepe University, Department of History between 2017 and 2021, and subsequently a Master's degree in Russian and Caucasian History. His Master's thesis was titled "Foundations of Azerbaijani Modernization: The Thought World of Mirze Kazımbey and Abbaskulu Ağa Bakıhanov." He is currently continuing his doctoral studies in International Relations at Hacı Bayram Veli University. He is proficient in Azerbaijani (Mother Tongue), Turkish, English, and Russian, and also has knowledge of Ottoman Turkish.

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