As of 2025, Cuba is shaken by a deepening economic crisis, increasingly severe sanctions imposed by the United States (US), and diminishing sources of foreign income. In response to these pressures, the government strives to survive by both increasing ideological mobilization domestically and seeking alternatives in foreign policy. The May Day celebrations and the shift towards China in the tourism sector can be seen as two of the most current reflections of these efforts. Although these two developments may seem to relate to different domains, they actually reveal Cuba’s efforts to develop multifaceted resilience strategies in the face of a multidimensional crisis. Demonstrations of political unity and economic outreach have become integral parts of the Cuban government’s efforts to produce both ideological and pragmatic legitimacy.
On May 1, 2025, hundreds of thousands of Cubans gathered in Havana’s Revolution Square not merely to celebrate International Workers’ Day, but also to participate in what the state explicitly defined as an act of “revolutionary reaffirmation.”[1] The participation of Raul Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel in the march underscored that the rally held not only symbolic but also strategic value in terms of political legitimacy. Despite harsh economic conditions, the turnout in response to Díaz-Canel’s call revealed that the state’s ideological influence over the people remains strong.
During this period, the US stance has been positioned by the Cuban administration as the primary threat. The Trump administration’s new sanctions, which have further tightened the longstanding trade embargo, are framed by the Cuban government as acts of “imperialist aggression.”[2] Statements by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, implying that regime change in Cuba is imminent, and the accusation that the US mission chief in Havana is engaging in “subversive activities,” indicate that tensions have escalated not only economically but also ideologically and diplomatically.[3] Consequently, the May Day march was presented not merely as a celebration, but also as a reaffirmation of the public’s bond with the system and a mass endorsement of the country’s “anti-imperialist” stance. In this context, the Cuban government frames its domestic mobilization and foreign policy initiatives as “complementary strategies.” Calls for social solidarity are intended not only to unify the population but also to project an image of resilience to the outside world. This strategy is part of the regime’s broader effort to strengthen its legitimacy both at home and internationally. In doing so, the government constructs an integrated line of resistance through a fusion of ideological symbols and economic initiatives.
One of the most visible aspects of Cuba’s economic bottleneck in 2025 is the tourism sector. In the first quarter of the year, the number of foreign visitors to the country fell by 30%, significantly reducing foreign currency income. In response, the Cuban government has turned to China in an effort to compensate for the decline in traditional markets such as Canada, Russia, Italy, and Spain. The 50% increase in Chinese tourists in 2024 played a key role in Havana’s increased focus on China.[4]
Cuba’s tourism policy toward China is not limited to expectations of quantitative growth. China is positioned as a strategic economic and diplomatic partner. The dedication of the 2025 Tourism Fair to China demonstrates that this relationship holds not only economic but also symbolic and geopolitical significance. Developments such as visa-free travel for Chinese citizens to Cuba and the initiation of direct flights by Air China are concrete outcomes of this strategic rapprochement. Cuba aims to engage China not only as a source of tourists, but also as a potential investor and technological partner.
The Cuban government is attempting to use the economic and political pressure from the US not as a tool of isolation, but as a catalyst for internal unity. Both the May Day rally and the tourism fair address different audiences but convey the same core message: despite the blockade and sanctions, Cuba continues on its own path. Ideologically, this is framed as “preserving the revolution,” while economically the discourse focuses on “progress through foreign investment and partnerships.”
This dual approach illustrates how the regime combines ideological mobilization with economic rationality to overcome its internal legitimacy crisis. While the people are called upon to embrace the legacy of the revolution, the outside world especially China is presented with the image of Cuba as a viable investment partner. This strategy also aims to prove that the state is not merely a guardian of the past but an actor striving to shape the future.
Although Cuba’s pivot toward China amid crisis in 2025 is noteworthy, traditional leftist alliances in the region remain important. Relations with countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia continue on the basis of ideological affinity, but under current conditions, these partnerships have evolved into more pragmatic, mutually beneficial arrangements. Cuba’s post-revolutionary role as “leader of Latin America’s left” now appears as a model state capable of coping with crisis. Regime resilience, censorship mechanisms, public mobilization, and the development of diplomatic networks with alternative partners serve as examples for other governments in the region.
The crisis Cuba faces in 2025 is not merely an economic or diplomatic contraction but can be interpreted as a multi-layered challenge that once again tests the regime’s resilience. The state’s response to this process is based on hybrid strategies that combine ideological mobilization with external economic partnerships. The May Day rallies represent the regime’s desire to reproduce popular support symbolically, while the tourism and investment-based ties with China are seen as efforts to create a breathing space against external economic pressure. Additionally, digital censorship, rising migration waves, and reshaped relations with regional leftist alliances all point to the Cuban regime’s use of multidimensional tools for regime continuity. In this framework, Cuba can be considered not only a state striving to survive but also a political laboratory with the capacity to restructure crises.
[1] Fernandez, Alien. “Cuba Stages May Day Rallies as Tensions Mount with US”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cuba-stages-may-day-rallies-tensions-mount-with-us-2025-05-01/, (Date Accession: 03.05.2025).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Acosta, Nelson. “Cuba Pins Hopes on China to Help Save Sputtering Tourism Industry.” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/cuba-pins-hopes-china-help-save-sputtering-tourism-industry-2025-04-30/, (Date Accession: 03.05.2025).
