The diplomatic coordination Iran initiated with Russia and China in response to Europe’s threat to reactivate United Nations sanctions (snapback) if no progress is made in nuclear negotiations can be considered as a clear manifestation of the blocs forming in the new power architectures of the 21st century.[i] The trilateral meeting held on July 21, 2025, in which Iranian diplomats met with their Russian and Chinese counterparts in Tehran to develop a common diplomatic position against the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) countries, shows Tehran’s intention not only to establish a line of resistance against the West but also to integrate its own security strategy with Eurasian geopolitics.
This development is not limited to technical negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program or the uranium enrichment limits discussed within the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Rather, it raises an important question regarding where the legal boundaries of international sanctions begin and end, the binding nature of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and the extent to which major powers transform these resolutions into political instruments. In particular, the unilateral sanctions policies of the United States (US) and Europe’s tendency to adhere to these policies are deepening their long term erosive impact on international legal norms.
In this context, Iran’s coordination with China and Russia may not only be a defensive reflex; it may also represent construction of alternative normative platform to the West’s sanctions-based foreign policy. The gradual erosion of US’s deterrent power in the Middle East and its guiding influence over regional security architectures offers regional actors like Iran greater room for manoeuvre while also legitimising Russia and China’s strategic presence in the region.
The increasing institutional coordination between the China-Russia axis demonstrates the strengthening of “non-Western institutionalisation models” not only in the security sphere but also in areas such as energy security, digital infrastructures, defence industry transfers, and non-SWIFT financial systems. Iran’s ongoing dialogue with these two actors offers clues about the regional implications of this institutionalisation and may also contribute to the formation of new Eurasia-centred multilateralism orders in future.
Therefore, these developments herald not only short-term diplomatic crises but also long term global normative and structural changes. In this new equation, Iran could evolve not only into a country resistant to sanctions but also into a significant actor contributing to the redefinition of regional axes in a new international order where Western hegemony is limited and multipolarity is institutionalised.
Iran describes the threat of sanctions by the E3 countries as a “political tool without legal basis.” This approach could be adopted not only by Iran but also by other states at risk of facing sanctions in the future. This could pave the way for questioning the legitimacy of sanctions based on UNSC resolutions and the emergence of alternative “legal blocs.” It is possible that countries like China, Russia, and Iran could develop diplomatic discourse and institutions that would go beyond sanctions passing mechanisms and reshape the definition of “international legitimacy.”
Iran views the snapback threat not only as a security issue but also as a threat to its economic isolation and energy access. Therefore, it is likely to deepen its integration with Moscow and Beijing through alternative corridors, energy agreements, and joint military production projects in Eurasia. By assigning new strategic functions to projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Tehran could use them both as sanctions bypass and geoeconomic integration platforms. In this process, strengthening its connections with countries like India, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan could make Iran a more persistent player in regional projects.
The E3 countries’ threat of a snapback could exert political pressure on Iran in the short term; however, it will become increasingly difficult for this pressure to produce direct results. Iran has built a capacity to resist such threats through its long-standing economic adaptation mechanisms to sanctions, its shadow fleet, trade agreements with third country companies, and its domestic defence industry. Therefore “secondary targeting” measures (e.g., pressure on Russian, Chinese, and Indian companies doing business with Iran) will be more decisive in future Western sanctions. This could create risks of further divergence in EU-Asia trade lines.
High level contacts held in Moscow and Tehran in recent months demonstrate that the China-Russia-Iran trilateral is building a security dialogue that is not merely cyclical but also capable of institutionalisation. Such trilateral consultation mechanisms can be expected to evolve into separate forums within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or be integrated into the expanding security sessions of the BRICS+ format. These new forums could lay the foundations for multi-centred crisis resolution architectures that offer alternatives to the Western-centric understanding of security.
Turkey’s selection as host of the Istanbul talks between Iran and the E3 creates an opportunity for Ankara to strengthen its role as a trust-building intermediary between the Middle East and Europe. New crises along the Iran-EU-US line could pave the way for Turkey to increase its regional initiatives, both in terms of energy security and cross-border security policies. Furthermore, during this period, Türkiye could seek more cooperation with Iran in the areas of nuclear, defence, and transportation.
As a result, Iran could become a pioneer of a multipolar diplomatic model by strengthening diplomatic solidarity with China and Russia against the threat of Western snapback. Opening UN sanctions mechanisms to discussion could open international law to multi-centred interpretations in the future and strengthen alternative security forums. Turkey could further solidify its position as a reliable host and regional balancing actor in managing crises along the Tehran Brussels line.
[i] “Iran turns to Russia and China to discuss European threat of sanctions ‘snapback’”, France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20250721-iran-turns-russia-and-china-discuss-european-threat-sanctions-snapback, (Access Date: 24.07.2025).
