Violence in the Sahel is perceived as a fire that remains fixed on the map, but as the wind changes direction, the flames spread to new dry areas. A February 20, 2026 report discusses the expansion of the Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist terrorist group Jemaah Nusrah al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) towards the coastal belt as an “expansion dilemma” and points out that this trend does not appear to be limited to temporary attacks.[1] For coastal states, the danger lies not so much in the sum of individual attacks, but in the possibility of a shadow order gaining continuity on both sides of the border. At this point, as the crisis deepens, the security issue becomes a question of governance.
The driving force behind the offensive is the war economy, or crime economy, concentrated in the center of the Sahel, and the accumulation of operational experience. The emphasis on “unprecedented coordination” conveyed on February 19, 2026, suggests that the attacks in Burkina Faso were carried out simultaneously across a wide area and that this capacity makes it more likely to spread southward.[2] The issue here is not so much the organization suddenly descending on the coast, but rather the possibility of it establishing a rhythm in the border zones. Once a rhythm is established, the psychology breaks down and the state’s response time extends.
The first fracture line in the coastal belt can be read through population movements. The most recent picture we have shows that, as of December 2024, Benin is hosting tens of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, while a significant picture of internal displacement is emerging in Alibori and Atacora.[3] In border towns, the agricultural calendar, livestock routes, and market order have become part of the security equation. Even before the next attack occurs, daily life is becoming increasingly constrained.
The decisive factor in bringing violence to the coast is the translation of the attack into economic terms. In northern Benin, militant networks have prioritized the “economic warfare” method, extortion and kidnapping economies have expanded, and security pressure has produced a more severe picture throughout 2025.[4] This line increases the financial value of every step taken towards ports and trade routes. Consequently, the coastal belt is seen as a financial opportunity as much as a military target.
The strategic logic of expansion produces a regime of uncertainty that does not fit into the classic “land acquisition” model. What JNIM seeks here is a regime of pressure that reduces the state’s visibility as much as a control zone marked with thick lines on a map, pushing local communities to the negotiating table. This regime is often established through roadblocks, market clearances, or targeting convoys. What appear to be minor moves generate significant security fatigue in the background.
At this stage, geography facilitates this logic. Border parks and forest belts such as W-Arly-Pendjari provide natural corridors that simultaneously enable terrorist organizations to hide and move. These areas spread security forces, increase costs, and limit the local administration’s ability to make contact. When the state’s influence diminishes, the terrorist organization’s claims of so-called “punishment” and “protection” can become more visible propaganda material.
Increasing military pressure in the center of the Sahel is creating a driving force that accelerates the shift towards the south. The toughening security reflex in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger may create a sense of territorial control in some areas, but this sense is not sustainable in places where public services have been disrupted. The organization is exploiting this gap by promoting a narrative that amplifies local grievances and expands the gray area between loyalty and fear. The shift towards coastal areas actually aims to extend this narrative to a broader socio-economic base.
Landing on the coastline appears attractive to terrorist organizations in terms of logistical and financial diversity. Road trade, fuel flows, gold, and smuggling routes could open new channels to the conflict-crime economy in the Sahel. As these channels multiply, operational continuity strengthens, military losses become easier to compensate for, and the feeding of new units becomes possible. The growing risk here is not a single attack, but rather the establishment of an ecosystem that enables attacks. This is a tool they use to establish their own ambitions and ecosystems in these regions through religious ideologies.
The politics of borders make the picture more fragile. Tensions between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the new bloc forming in the Sahel could weaken joint monitoring and information-sharing mechanisms. When coordination weakens, borders cease to be a deterrent barrier and revert to being lines of regroupment. For coastal capitals, the real danger here is that violence ceases to be an external issue and becomes part of the daily agenda of domestic politics.
Therefore, the nature of the response directly intersects with the organization’s strategic calculations. When hardened reflexes lead to arbitrary practices in the field, the ground for propaganda expands and the security-society bond erodes. More selective operations, measures that ensure the accessibility of local justice, the continuity of public services, and the flow of economic life can make the normalization of violence costly. The idea of the state survives by promising an order that inspires confidence beyond a show of force. However, the claim that terrorist organizations are replacing the state by providing so-called justice and other public services overshadows the state’s existence.
Along with these factors, the rate of urbanization is higher in coastal countries, and this reality both facilitates and limits the organization’s maneuverability. Large cities may be an attractive stage for symbolic impact, but population density, camera networks, media visibility, and civil society reflexes increase the cost of low-profile organization. Therefore, methods such as infiltration, establishing supply lines, and producing small-scale pressure may come to the forefront in surrounding areas. This loop is completed when a gap is left between urban and rural security.
Seasonality and subsistence economies are also part of strategic logic. The rainy season can affect the usability of roads, the intensity of markets, and the mobility of security forces. The seasonal movement of herds along the border creates both economic vitality and mobility that is conducive to hiding in crowds. When conflict is superimposed on this pattern, the line between a village’s “normal” day and its “target” day becomes increasingly blurred.
The realm of information and legitimacy is the most sensitive layer of the struggle in the coastal belt. The terrorist organization constructs narratives that amplify local grievances, attempts to expose the state’s mistakes, and turns a minor incident into a major story. Traditional authorities, religious leadership, and local mediation channels are therefore of strategic importance. As the question of “who to trust” becomes clearer within society, the capacity for infiltration may diminish.
International partnerships play an important role in the equation. Education, intelligence sharing, and technological support for border security can be beneficial in the field, but if the public perception of external support is not well managed, polarization may increase due to a sense of “external intervention.” Coastal capitals are expected to renew their political communication language while increasing capacity, involve local actors in the process, and strengthen accountability. Otherwise, tactical success may open the door to erosion of legitimacy.
In conclusion, JNIM’s expansion beyond the Sahel demonstrates its strategic adaptation capabilities before its attack capacity. The struggle in the coastal belt is a fight to prevent violence from becoming a permanent order before reducing attacks. When early warning, local resilience, justice, and regional coordination gain strength, the cost of expansion increases and room for maneuver may narrow. Throughout 2026, the decisive question will be not only who has more firepower, but also who offers a more credible vision of statehood and promise of justice.
[1] Eric Topona, “L’expansion calculée du JNIM au-delà du Sahel”, Yahoo Actualités France, https://fr.news.yahoo.com/lexpansion-calcul%C3%A9e-jnim-au-del%C3%A0-165500589.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 24.02.2026).
[2] “Islamist militants show ‘unprecedented coordination’ in Burkina Faso attacks”, Arab News (Reuters), https://www.arabnews.com/node/2600670/world, (Erişim Tarihi: 24.02.2026).
[3] “Operational Update: Benin (December 2024)”, UNHCR Malaysia, https://www.unhcr.org/my/publications/operational-update-benin-december-2024, (Erişim Tarihi: 24.02.2026).
[4] “Economic Warfare Escalates as Militant Networks Expand in Benin”, ACLED, https://acleddata.com/2025/05/07/economic-warfare-escalates-as-militant-networks-expand-in-benin/, (Erişim Tarihi: 24.02.2026).
