Analysis

Macron’s Africa Initiative “All Over Again”

It is possible to say that not all of Macron’s policies toward African countries have been unsuccessful.
Several countries on the continent have clearly shown their opposition to France’s Africa policy.
Rather than making fundamental changes to France’s Africa policy, Macron has read the reaction of countries in the Sahel.

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French President Emmanuel Macron embarked on an African tour in November 2025, which included visits to Mauritius, Gabon, Angola, and the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The timing of these diplomatic engagements and the destinations chosen should be seen to be quite noteworthy. Besides Francophone Gabon, the Élysée Palace decided to focus on Anglophone countries during this latest visit. Furthermore, the timing of the visit, which took place at a time when the continent was prominent in international diplomacy, has been interpreted as a reminder of France’s presence in Africa. Macron’s visits took place amid the European Union-African Union Summit in Angola and the G20 Summit in the RSA.

When evaluating Macron’s visit to Gabon, Angola, RSA, and Mauritius, several important points emerge. A number of criteria have been taken into account in terms of the countries selected for the November 2025 visit. Despite being a former colony, Gabon’s relatively good relations with France led to the selection of Libreville. For the remaining three countries, it is thought that the criteria for selection were the absence of colonial ties with France, their status as Anglophone countries, and the development of especially commercial relations with France. During his visit to Mauritius on the 20th of November, Macron underlined that France and Mauritius share a common vision regarding the problems and threats of the current era. He noted that bilateral cooperation and relations are based on multilateralism and respect for international law. While talking about a “win-win” situation and the renewal of relations in Gabon, he emphasized cultural ties and commercial relations in Mauritius. It also bears remembering that Bogo, who was considered France’s ally following the 2023 coup in Gabon, is no longer in power. Macron’s meeting with RSA leader Cyril Ramaphosa is significant for both figures, given that the RSA has been experiencing tensions with the US. Macron’s rhetoric during his visit suggests that he aims to draw these African countries closer.

The selection of these four countries and Macron’s rhetoric have been interpreted as a reorientation and reshaping of France’s policy toward African countries. Given that France has withdrawn its military forces from the Sahel, ended cooperation, and the burden this situation places on foreign policy, Paris appears to be aiming for a new arrangement in its relations. On the other hand, taking into account Macron’s and even his predecessors’ policies towards African countries, it can be seen that Paris has not changed its agenda on Africa; rather, different elements have been highlighted compared to previous years. It is clear that there is continuity in France’s policy on Africa, but during Macron’s recent visit, the focus shifted to aspects of this policy that had not been highlighted before, and a different narrative was preferred.

Macron has given various statements during his first years as president, indicating the direction of the current era. He stated to the international community that France’s Africa policy would be reorganized and relations would be revived. He explained that France would adopt an approach very different from its colonial legacy in order to attract the attention of African countries, and that Françafrique would be redefined in a way that would change the perception associated with that legacy and, consequently, the policy.

The goal of reforming Françafrique, announced during both of Macron’s terms, was also pursued by his predecessors Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. For example, Hollande made various attempts to conduct France’s policy toward Africa on the basis of equal and mutual relations. Meanwhile, Macron, who took office as president in 2017, stated that he wanted to turn a new page in bilateral relations. In his significant and widely discussed speech in Burkina Faso in 2017, he noted that Françafrique had come to an end and that it was no longer “France’s policy towards Africa.” The concept of Françafrique, introduced in 1963 by Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the first president of Ivory Coast, during the process of decolonization across the continent, refers to a shared destiny between France and Africa. It has also been used to support and further encourage close bilateral relations. However, after the Cold War and especially as the 2000s drew near, the concept’s content and perception changed, coming to be viewed negatively by both African and French public opinion. It had come to be used to describe the dark, problematic side of relations between Africa and France. It also had come to mean the development and exploitation of Africa’s underground wealth and human resources solely for the benefit of Paris.

In the context outlined above, certain events on the continent have also led France to highlight different dimensions and aspects of its relations. Some African countries have now abandoned cooperation with France in their foreign relations; some have even gone further and severed ties with Paris. Consequently, some countries on the continent have clearly demonstrated their opposition to France’s Africa policy. The best example in this context is the anti-French sentiment in the Sahel and France’s subsequent withdrawal from the region. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, both society and the state have opposed France’s policies and influence in the region. Bilateral defense agreements have been terminated, and the withdrawal of French troops and the handover of bases have been demanded. The juntas that came to power in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where coups took place in the respective order, reached the point of cutting ties with France, leading to France’s withdrawal from the Sahel in 2022 and 2023. This same trend was later followed by countries such as Chad.

France’s withdrawal in response to demands from Sahel countries and anti-French sentiment in this once-influential region has been interpreted as a failure to achieve its objectives in the Sahel, and thus, a failed policy. In particular, the withdrawal of its military forces from Mali and the termination of bilateral agreements by Mali’s new administration prompted comparisons to “Macron’s Afghanistan” or “Afghanistan 2.0.” The similarity drawn between the US’s unsuccessful withdrawal from Afghanistan without achieving its goals and the situation France faced in Mali served to underscore that terrorism and instability continue to persist in Mali.

With less than two years left in his presidential term, Macron had made approximately 40 visits to 26 African countries during his two terms. To say that Macron succeeded in his goal of improving relations with countries with which France has had contentious ties, such as Algeria, Senegal, and Rwanda, would not fully reflect the picture on the continent. For example, Rwanda, a Francophone country and former Belgian colony, has been developing its relations with the Commonwealth of Nations, while the United States has been mediating the signing of a peace agreement with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Similarly, efforts to normalize relations between Algeria and Morocco are continuing with US mediation. Senegal, meanwhile, has announced that foreign troops, including those from France, will withdraw from the country.

Therefore, the question arises as to what extent Macron has launched a “period of initiative” in various African countries. Since his first term, he has continued to promise change in relations with African countries. His choice of Anglophone countries alongside Francophone Gabon during his November 2025 visits, and his preference for statements reminiscent of Turkey’s rhetoric of a period of initiative, can be interpreted in this context. In addition, the recent events in the Sahel have had a significant impact on Macron’s latest visit. The visit took place at a time when African countries were being selective and acting “independently.” With the changing political, geostrategic, military, and economic conditions, Macron chose these countries. He also interprets this choice as part of his goal of change in relations.

When viewed through the perspective of strategic autonomy, Europeanization, and Africanization goals, it is possible to say that Macron’s policies toward African countries have not been entirely unsuccessful. Against the backdrop of these goals, the withdrawal from the Sahel can be interpreted as a temporary situation. Rather than making a fundamental change in France’s Africa policy, Macron has read the reactions of the countries in the Sahel. France still has military units in various African countries, and it remains committed to developing relations with African countries in different areas. Visiting Ghana and Nigeria around this time last year, Macron demonstrated that he is closely monitoring developments in the Sahel by improving relations with the Sahel’s neighbors. Nigeria can be given as an example that will lead to a better understanding of France’s policy towards Africa. In 2024, after a hiatus of about 20 years, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu had organized an official visit to France. Macron had also emphasized that Nigeria could take an active stance in international politics. He noted that Nigeria could reshape the defense and security structure in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region and that France wanted to be part of this environment, with the fact that Nigeria held the rotating presidency of ECOWAS during this period also being worth noting. Macron is particularly supportive of African countries having a greater presence and taking on more responsibility in international organizations, especially the UN and the World Bank.

Overall, Macron had already been looking to advance and develop relations with Anglophone countries such as RSA, Kenya, and Nigeria. In fact, he had even been criticized by some opposition groups in the French public due to his focus on Anglophone countries. Therefore, the inclusion of Francophone Gabon in the November 2025 visit shows that the Francophone world has not been forgotten in the face of such criticism. In addition, his example to ECOWAS in the context of stability, peace, and integration in the region shows that interest in the Sahel continues. Macron’s statement also sums up the situation: France has not taken a step back in Africa. France, aware of the situation on the ground, has restructured its relations.

Doç. Dr. Ceren GÜRSELER
Doç. Dr. Ceren GÜRSELER
Ceren Gürseler received her bachelor's degree from the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in 2003. She completed his master's degree in the Department of International Relations at Middle East Technical University and finished her master's studies in 2006 with "The Islamic Discourse of the Palestine Liberation Organization." She received her doctorate in 2015 from the Department of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University, and her doctoral thesis is "The Right to Self-Determination in African Customary Law." She has worked as an expert on Arab and African countries at the Eurasian Strategic Research Center, as an expert on African countries at the Ankara University Africa Studies and Application Center, and as an external relations expert at the Çankaya Municipality External Relations Directorate. She is an advisor on African countries and international law at the Ankara Crisis and Political Research Center. Since 2016, he has been working as an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University. She received the title of Associate Professor from ÜAK in 2024. Among the areas of study are African politics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, self-determination policies, climate change, environmental issues, and Heavy Metal music.

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