On July 16, 2026, officials from the European Union (EU) and five Central Asian countries met in Brussels within the framework of the 13th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue. In addition to developments in the Russia–Ukraine War, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, topics such as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, cybersecurity, and secure transportation corridors were discussed at the meeting.[i]
Rather than an isolated event, this dialogue is a continuation of the first EU–Central Asia Summit held on April 4, 2025. At the aforementioned summit, a comprehensive joint declaration was signed, providing for cooperation in social, economic, and climate fields, as well as addressing potential risks originating from Afghanistan and hybrid threats.[ii] Following this summit, emphasis was placed on holding a security-focused dialogue, a more active European role in the region, and efforts to deepen the strategic partnership. In this context, it is observed that EU–Central Asia relations are evolving from cooperation shaped solely around connectivity and transport corridors into an increasingly broader and multidimensional framework.
The EU’s approach to Central Asia has long been built on connectivity. Indeed, Central Asia’s geostrategic position between Europe and Asia, its energy resources, and critical minerals are the primary factors enhancing the region’s geo-economic significance. In particular, the EU’s search to reduce dependence on routes passing through Russia and the opportunities offered by the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor have made the issue of corridors one of the fundamental elements of EU–Central Asia relations.
Within this framework, an investment package worth 12 billion euros was launched at the Samarkand Summit under the Global Gateway initiative. With the visit of European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela to Uzbekistan on November 27, 2025, the partnership between the parties acquired an operational dimension. As Síkela stated, the EU–Central Asia partnership has moved from the potential phase to the implementation phase.[iii] This is because the commitments made in previous meetings are now turning into concrete projects. These projects include the development of road and port infrastructure, innovative digital tools, strengthening value chains for critical raw materials, and the Trans-Caspian transport corridor.[iv]
In this context, the following picture emerges: EU–Central Asia relations are gradually progressing towards an implementation-oriented and comprehensive strategic partnership. Accordingly, the intensification of political dialogue and the deepening of the partnership between the parties can be evaluated through different dimensions.
The approach and cooperation adopted by the EU towards Central Asia have assumed a more institutional character within the scope of the “Interregional Connectivity Agenda”. In order to coordinate the implementation of this agenda, the “Connectivity Agenda Platform” was launched on June 26, 2026. Within the priorities of this platform, three key dimensions stand out simultaneously: transport and border crossings, financing, and energy connectivity.[v] By bringing different fields under a single framework, the platform aims to implement the connectivity agenda in a more systematic and comprehensive manner.
In this framework, the 13th Brussels Dialogue can be evaluated as an important step supporting the connectivity agenda with the development of a high-level political partnership. The intensification of summits and political meetings indicates that the EU views Central Asia not only within the framework of bilateral cooperation, but increasingly within a political partnership where international issues are also addressed. Indeed, addressing security concerns arising from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Russia–Ukraine War at the Brussels Dialogue demonstrates that the security dimension of EU–Central Asia relations is becoming more visible.
Behind this change lie the previously discussed geopolitical conditions and the parties’ pursuit of diversification. Furthermore, the EU–Central Asia partnership is based on the mutual geopolitical and economic needs of the parties. While Central Asia provides the EU with access to critical natural resources and alternative trade routes, the EU provides these states with various financing and infrastructure support.[vi] Therefore, the strengthening of political partnership and the deepening of the security dimension can largely be evaluated as both a result of changing conditions and a conscious strategic choice. Indeed, regional security concerns originating from Afghanistan, transboundary crimes such as terrorism and illicit drug trafficking, and the impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on energy supply lines make Central Asia an important actor in terms of security. At the same time, alongside these developments, connectivity is no longer limited to the economic dimension and has begun to be closely linked with the concept of security.
In this context, the gains of a political and security-focused partnership are not merely economic. For Central Asia, this partnership, in addition to supporting the region’s multi-vector foreign policy, has the potential to increase its visibility and diplomatic weight in the international arena. For the EU, this partnership offers the opportunity to become a more visible and effective actor in Eurasia. However, this partnership does not mean that the EU will transform into a comprehensive security provider in the region. This is because Russia’s traditional role in the field of security in the region continues, while China’s role in security is also steadily increasing. Russia maintains its institutionalized military and security role in the region through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). China, besides its active role within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), contributes to anti-terrorism efforts through its activities on the border with Afghanistan.[vii]
In this context, rather than turning into a comprehensive security partnership, it is more likely that cooperation on specific security issues between the parties will continue. Therefore, the EU is expected to assume a complementary role in the region in areas such as border management, cybersecurity, and counter-terrorism. This framework is highly compatible with Central Asia’s multi-vector foreign policy understanding, and the partnership is not expected to radically alter the security architecture in the region. However, gradual progress in specific areas is more probable.
In conclusion, the 13th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue shows that EU–Central Asia relations, rather than straying from the connectivity axis, are increasingly being complemented by the political and security dimensions of this field. The increase in similar meetings and dialogues in recent years provides various advantages for both sides. However, the EU’s role in the region expands the room for maneuver in specific areas within Central Asia’s diversification strategy rather than replacing other actors. Thus, the EU–Central Asia partnership has the potential to gradually deepen in a functional sense. However, the real impact of this partnership will be measured not by the number of dialogues held, but by the concrete achievements made and projects implemented.
[i] “EU-Central Asia: 13th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue in Brussels”, European External Action Service, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/eu-central-asia-13th-high-level-political-and-security-dialogue-brussels_en, (Date Accessed: 21.07.2026).
[ii] “First EU-Central Asia summit, 4 April 2025”, Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/04/04/, (Date Accessed: 21.07.2026).
[iii] “Global Gateway in Central Asia: Commissioners advance economic partnerships and cross-regional connectivity during mission to Uzbekistan”, European Commission, https://shorturl.at/UBUCw, (Date Accessed: 21.07.2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “Brussels Opens New Chapter in Europe-Central Asia Connectivity”, News Central Asia, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2026/06/26/brussels-opens-new-chapter-in-europe-central-asia-connectivity/, (Date Accessed: 23.07.2026).
[vi] Ikboljon Qoraboyev ve Nazym Umirzakova, “A Geopolitical Europe in Action: Pragmatism and Partnership in EU-Central Asia Relations beyond the Samarkand Summit”, Caucasus Strategic Perspectives, https://shorturl.at/FmHCY, (Date Accessed: 23.07.2026).
[vii] Sanshiro Hosaka ve Toomas Hanso, “Between Giants: Central Asia Balancing China, Russia, and the Rest”, International Centre For Defence and Security, https://icds.ee/en/between-giants-central-asia-balancing-china-russia-and-the-rest/, (Date Accessed: 23.07.2026).
