Russia’s current military-strategic orientation rests not on single-front defense but on a multi-layered and multi-geographic deterrence architecture. While institutionalizing the nuclear threshold in Eastern Europe, it delivers symbolic signals through tactical markings and comprehensive exercises that obscure troop movements on the ground. Simultaneously, it pursues a network-centered influence strategy in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America by means of technology transfers, joint training, and alternative payment systems that circumvent sanctions.
This structure is reinforced by doctrinal adaptations centered on drone-artillery synergy and mobility within the new combat environment, where armored units have become increasingly vulnerable. It also enhances resilience against supply shocks through the consolidation of energy-finance-defense linkages. In doing so, Russia seeks to secure decision-making superiority in times of crisis by combining a “controlled escalation” capacity –capable of rendering Western containment efforts costly– with overseas asymmetric partnership belts, while turning its defense industry into a central instrument of political communication.
This strategy is further supported by large-scale exercises that go beyond classical defense concepts, serving both as demonstrations of technological capacity and as symbolic messages to international audiences. The recent emergence of an unprecedented square-shaped tactical marking on Russian Armed Forces vehicles along the Zaporizhzhia front illustrates Moscow’s intent to diversify its operational disposition on the battlefield, thereby reducing external observers’ analytical capabilities and reinforcing the perception of a “renewed offensive resolve.”[i] Given that each symbol, selected by cryptology units, identifies individual brigades, this symbolic innovation reflects not merely a logistical transition but rather a strategic repositioning effort aligned with Russia’s pursuit of flexibility in its frontline priorities.
At the core of this new symbolism are the “Zapad-2025” exercises, conducted jointly with the Belarusian Army and personally attended by Vladimir Putin. Held between 12–16 September 2026 and involving approximately 100,000 troops and 10,000 pieces of equipment, the drills were officially characterized as defensive but in practice functioned as a show of force against the growing military activities of NATO members such as Poland and Germany.[ii] Putin’s on-site inspection of the main phase at the Mulino training ground in the Nizhny Novgorod region, together with Andrey Belousov and Yunus-bek Yevkurov, underscored Russia’s intent to demonstrate not only military capacity but also political will integrated in the field.[iii] His personal review of next-generation equipment while wearing a field uniform inscribed “President RF” further highlighted the exercises’ role in presenting the technological advances of the Russian defense industry to international audiences.
Behind these ostentatious exercises lies Russia’s strategic reading of the changing nature of power relations on the battlefield. In contemporary conflicts, armored units are no longer the “strike force” of the frontline but have instead become among the most vulnerable elements under air threats. This reality has driven Russia away from tank-centered classical doctrines toward new concepts based on mobility and dispersed deployment. The prevalence of kamikaze drones and heavy artillery fire has diminished the primacy of armor superiority, while Russian specialists, in emphasizing the agility of their own tanks, have tacitly acknowledged this doctrinal shift. In this context, the resilience of unmanned systems such as the “Geran-3” against Radio-Electronic Warfare measures underscores Russia’s technological adaptation capacity and demonstrates that its construction of strategic resistance against the West relies not solely on quantitative military presence but also on qualitative modernization.[iv]
Russia’s multidimensional strategy is not confined to the European front; by diversifying its military engagements in regions such as Asia and Latin America it is moving to build a global balancing architecture against the West. The secret payment network it established with Vietnam via Rusvietpetro stands out as a new model that both helps Moscow evade Western sanctions and consolidates arms sales in Asia. This system is based not on direct cash transfers for the “Su-30” fighter jets and “T-90S” tanks acquired by Vietnam, but on repayment through credits drawn from shared oil revenues; in doing so it effectively bypasses the international banking system and creates a long-term, closed-circuit “energy-finance-defense bridge.”[v] Behind Vladimir Putin’s much-praised “balanced” foreign-policy posture, therefore, lies an objective to create a reliable regional market for Russian weaponry.
Similarly, the holding of the “Laros-2025” exercises in Laos on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of diplomatic relations can be read as part of Moscow’s strategy to become not merely an arms exporter but a permanent on-the-ground training and exercise partner in Southeast Asia. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the joint conduct of all phases of combat formations by units from the Eastern Military District and the Lao People’s Army is an explicit indicator of this goal.[vi] The wide array of equipment displayed at the opening ceremony –from sniper rifles to robotic warfare platforms– moves Russia’s regional military presence from symbolic posturing to operational reality. This may be interpreted as part of a strategy to create a new “balancing pole” within the Asia-Pacific security architecture.
As an extension of the same strategic logic, the conduct of exercises in Belarus under Zapad-2025 –during which tactical decision-making and planning processes for nuclear weapon use were reportedly practised– signals, as Pavel Muraveyko has emphasized, that Russia has moved toward de facto integration of nuclear deterrence through Belarus along NATO’s border.[vii] The overt deployment of the Oreshnik mobile missile system for the first time and the rapid construction of a new base exceeding two square kilometres in Belarus demonstrate Moscow’s resolve to place operational nuclear capacity in the region rather than merely issue symbolic threats. These developments indicate that Belarus has ceased to be a passive buffer and is being transformed into Russia’s nuclear forward line, producing a qualitative change in the strategic balance on NATO’s eastern flank.
Another extension of Russia’s global military projection strategy is Venezuela. The “Sovereign Caribbean 200” exercise on La Orchila in September 2025, which involved some 2,500 troops, 12 warships, 22 aircraft and roughly 20 boats, was explicitly designed as a show of force directed at the United States (US), which deploys vessels to the Caribbean.[viii]Vladimir Padrino’s statement that the drills were a response to the US deployment and Nicolás Maduro’s announcement of mass mobilizations indicate that Moscow’s influence has reinvigorated Caracas’s deterrent capacity. The parade of Russian-built “Su-30MK2” fighters equipped with “Kh-31” anti-ship missiles shows that even inventories weakened by economic crisis can be employed to generate a strategic threat perception.
If these trends deepen in the coming period, it is highly likely that Russia’s military strategy will harden in two directions. First, the consolidation of the nuclear deterrence architecture built through Belarus and the forward deployment of tactical nuclear capabilities may create a permanent crisis threshold on NATO’s eastern flank. While this would institutionalize Moscow’s “controlled escalation” doctrine to offset potential conventional vulnerabilities, it could also evolve into a strategy designed to compel Western capitals to make rapid concessions in the event of a border crisis. In such a scenario, the bases established in Belarus could be positioned not merely for defensive purposes but as forward offensive platforms deployable in times of crisis, thereby turning into a permanent source of instability within the European security architecture.
Second, the possibility should not be overlooked that Russia’s exercise and technology transfer programs in the Asia-Pacific and Latin American axes may, in the medium term, evolve into formal defense pacts. The development of joint combat capabilities with countries such as Vietnam, Laos, and Venezuela provides Moscow with the opportunity to construct multi-regional “asymmetric partnership belts” aimed at breaking the West’s containment strategy. If this trend continues, it is plausible that within the next few years Russia will seek permanent military base agreements or long-term security arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. Such a scenario would not only entail the expansion of geopolitical spheres of influence but also the construction of a new global deterrence architecture directed against the West.
Overall, Russia’s current military-strategic orientation reflects a goal of moving beyond a regional defense conception to establish a globalized and multi-layered deterrence architecture. On the one hand, this strategy aims to institutionalize the nuclear threshold along NATO’s borders and generate a constant potential for crisis within the European security framework, thereby narrowing the West’s room for maneuver. On the other hand, through the establishment of technology-transfer mechanisms, joint exercises, and alternative financial networks in the Asia-Pacific and Latin American axes, it seeks to render containment policies increasingly costly. In this way, Moscow strives both to strengthen its ability to generate uncertainty and pressure in decision-making processes in order to gain strategic initiative against the West, and to institutionalize its spheres of global influence by transforming its defense industry into an instrument of political as well as military leverage.
[i] “Polkovnik Obyasnil Poyavleniye Novogo Znaka na Tekhnike VS RF Pod Zaporozhyem”, Vfokuse, https://vfokuse.mail.ru/article/polkovnik-obyasnil-poyavlenie-novogo-znaka-na-tehnike-vs-rf-pod-zaporozhem-67949981/, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[ii] Dimitriy Kramarenko, “Putin Osmotrel Obraztsy Voyennoy Tekhniki na Ucheniyakh ‘Zapad-2025’”, URA, https://ura.news/news/1052996838, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[iii] “Prezidentu Rossii Pokazali ‘Buldoga’, ‘Kayo-T4’, ‘Ulan-U2’ i Druguyu Tekhniku na Vooruzhenii Armiy”, 1.Ru, https://www1.ru/news/2025/09/17/prezidentu-rossii-pokazali-buldoga-kaio-t4-ulan-u2-i-druguiu-texniku-na-vooruzenii-armii.html, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[iv] Varvara Koshechkina, “Polkovnik Nazval Osobennosti Peredannykh na Front Tankov T-90M ‘Proryv’”, Lenta, https://lenta.ru/news/2024/05/07/proryv/, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[v] Timur Savin, “Rossiya Snabzhayet Vyetnam Oruzhiyem v Obkhod Sanktsiy: Strany Obkhodyat Sistemu SWIFT, — AR”, Fokus, https://focus.ua/world/724874-zakupki-oruzhiya-u-rossii-vetnam-naladil-novuyu-shemu-obhoda-sankciy, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[vi] “Rossiya i Laos Nachali Sovmestnyye Voyennyye Ucheniya”, Caliber, https://caliber.az/post/rossiya-i-laos-nachali-sovmestnye-voennye-ucheniya, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[vii] “Raketnyy Kompleks ‘Oreshnik’ Vpervyye Razvernuli za Granitsami Rossii”, 1.Ru, https://www1.ru/news/2025/09/16/kompleksa-oresnik-vpervye-razvernuli-za-granicami-rossii.html, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
[viii] Mauricio Torres, German Padinger ve Michael Rios, “In Show of Force to Trump, Venezuela Launches Military Drills and Displays its Russian Fighter Jets”, CNN World, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/18/americas/venezuela-military-drill-russian-jets-intl-latam, (Access Date: 19.09.2025).
