The position adopted by the Russian Federation in the war against Iran, which was initiated on February 28, 2026, through coordinated attacks by the United States (U.S.) and Israel and spreading across the Middle East, as well as the policies it will pursue thereafter, has become a subject of considerable interest. In the international public sphere, it is frequently argued that Russia, together with China, has not provided Iran with the necessary support. Although Iran has separate strategic partnership agreements with both major powers, it is important to emphasize that these agreements do not include mutual defense commitments.
In addition to their cooperation at the global level, Iran has maintained long-term bilateral relations with Russia and China, particularly in energy, transportation, trade, and security. Moreover, it should be underlined that these three actors have conducted naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Indian Ocean since 2019. In such a conjuncture, rather than openly siding with Iran and confronting the United States, Russia and China have made more cautious statements advocating de-escalation of the conflict.
Russia’s distant stance is often explained by Moscow’s ability to benefit from rising oil prices. While energy geopolitics undoubtedly plays a role, it is more useful to first examine the dimensions of bilateral relations. Over the past decade, Iran has granted significant privileges to Russian energy companies in areas such as the exploration, extraction, and operation of oil fields concentrated in the southwestern regions of the country. Through agreements reached in recent years, Iran has further advanced its energy cooperation with Russia. In a statement on February 18, 2026, Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad indicated that the development of seven oil fields is ongoing within the framework of four separate contracts with Russian companies.[i]
In addition to energy cooperation, the parties share similar interests in security. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement concluded between the two countries in January 2025 envisages cooperation in critical areas, including security, intelligence, and the sharing of information and experience. However, it is important to emphasize that this partnership does not include any mutual defense commitment. It can be argued that Russia and China have refrained from entering into any agreements or obligations concerning collective defense with Iran. This situation can be explained particularly by Iran’s foreign and defense policies. Guided by the slogan “Neither East nor West, only the Islamic Republic,” Iran has refrained from directly joining any alliance not only with the West but also with Eurasian powers such as Russia and China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Iran joined in 2021, is a regional security organization focused on counterterrorism and border security and does not include any collective defense clause.
The attacks carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran constitute, without dispute, a clear violation of international law, and Russia’s criticism of these attacks directly contradicts the war it initiated against Ukraine. A few hours after the attacks on Iran, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, described the operation as “armed aggression against a sovereign and independent UN member state.”[ii] This position points to an international order in which international law, particularly by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, is violated and often disregarded in line with their own interests. In this context, it is important to underline that Russia, while calling for adherence to the fundamental principles of the United Nations, has simultaneously acted in contradiction with these principles through its actions in Ukraine and Georgia. The policies pursued by the United States and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council tasked with maintaining international peace and security, in fact endanger international peace, security, and stability. For this reason, Russia’s strong criticism of the joint U.S./Israel attacks on Iran and its call for compliance with international law are not widely perceived as credible or sincere within the international community.
It is also necessary to examine how this war affects Russia’s energy and security interests. Developments such as the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz and rising oil prices are frequently noted to align with Russia’s energy interests. Although Russia may gain additional revenue from oil sales during this process, further escalation of the war could create much greater and unpredictable risks for Moscow in the region. This crisis, which has already begun to affect global energy markets and the economy, is increasingly likely to reach a deadlock. As the war continues, it leads to irreversible destruction and moves further away from the prospect of peace.
To date, it can be argued that Moscow and Beijing have not exerted sufficient diplomatic effort to end this war and establish peace. Under current conditions, Türkiye appears to be the country making the greatest effort toward peace. The continuation of the war entails unpredictable geopolitical risks for Russia. One of the foremost risks is the potential overthrow and replacement of the regime in Iran. Such a scenario could lead to rapid and fundamental changes in the geopolitical balance within Russia’s near abroad. However, given the uncertainty about how and in what direction the regime in Iran might change, it may be assumed that, under current conditions, Russia does not face a significant loss of interests.
One common characteristic of actors such as Russia, China, and Iran is their opposition to Western hegemony, their desire to weaken it, and their efforts to construct a new “multipolar system.” In this context, it is useful to examine China’s stance in Russia’s war in Ukraine. While the war in Ukraine initially appeared to serve China’s interests by weakening the West in many respects, the prolonged conflict has begun to harm China’s interests as well, prompting Beijing to intensify its diplomatic efforts to end the war.
A similar situation currently applies to Russia regarding Iran. While the weakening of the United States due to this war—particularly in light of the intense domestic political pressure faced by President Trump—may appear to align with Russia’s interests, the prolongation of the war in Iran and the possibility of regime change may pose a threat to Russia’s interests. Therefore, it can be argued that Russia may adopt a “wait-and-see” policy similar to that pursued by China during the Russia–Ukraine War. Likewise, China can also be said to be acting cautiously in this war, following a policy similar to that in the Ukraine crisis. Consequently, to anticipate future developments in Iran, it would be highly beneficial to closely examine and analyze the course of the Ukraine crisis from its very beginning.
[i] “İran ve Rusya’dan ortak enerji hamlesi: 7 petrol sahası geliştiriliyor”, Mehrnews, https://tr.mehrnews.com/news/1934536/%C4%B0ran-ve-Rusya-dan-ortak-enerji-hamlesi-7-petrol-sahas%C4%B1-geli%C5%9Ftiriliyor, (Access Date: 23.03.2026).
[ii] “İran savaşı: Rusya İran’a neden yardım etmiyor?”, DW, https://www.dw.com/tr/i%CC%87ran-sava%C5%9F%C4%B1-rusya-i%CC%87rana-neden-yard%C4%B1m-etmiyor/a-76232698, (Access Date: 23.03.2026).
