Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, assessing the high level of public support she enjoyed upon taking office as a strategic opportunity, called for an early general election on 8 February 2026 in order to consolidate her political position within the House of Representatives before any potential decline in her popularity could materialize. By opting for early elections only three months after assuming office as Japan’s first female prime minister, Takaichi undertook a significant political risk; nevertheless, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under her leadership emerged from the elections with a decisive victory, thereby securing strong political legitimacy.
This electoral triumph substantially weakened the domestic political constraints that had previously tempered the Takaichi administration’s ambitious and assertive positions in the fields of defense and foreign policy. In this respect, Takaichi’s ascent to power—marked during the campaign period by an explicit and uncompromising nationalist discourse on sovereignty and defense policies—signals not merely a change in leadership, but a critical juncture regarding how Japan will balance its postwar pacifist security norms, grounded in its constitutional framework, with intensifying regional security pressures. Consequently, this development inaugurates a process that warrants close scrutiny in terms of the balance of power in East Asia and the alliance system of the United States (US).
The trajectory of the electoral process was shaped not only by domestic political calculations but also by the broader international conjuncture and, in particular, by engagements established with the United States. Takaichi capitalized on the international visibility and strategic signaling generated by the explicit support of U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump’s declaration of his “full and unconditional support,” as well as his invitation to Takaichi to visit the White House prior to the finalization of the election results,[i] emerged as a symbolic factor reinforcing her legitimacy both in the eyes of the domestic public and within international circles. Nevertheless, the unusually overt nature of Trump’s endorsement during the campaign period also prompted cautious assessments in Tokyo, suggesting that such political proximity could, in the longer term, translate into expectations of concessions in specific policy domains.
As a concrete manifestation of this political rapprochement, it is anticipated that during the U.S.–Japan summit scheduled to take place in Washington on 19 March, President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will reach a consensus on a common framework aimed at strengthening the bilateral alliance. In this context, the summit agenda is expected to encompass critical issues such as the coordination of strategic approaches toward China and the discussion of Japan’s plans to increase defense expenditures within an alliance-based perspective. The meeting offers a crucial diplomatic platform enabling Trump to elevate the China file as a priority item ahead of his prospective engagement with Chinese President Xi Jinping, while simultaneously allowing Japan to elaborate on the role it seeks to assume within a more assertive defense strategy and to underscore its strategic significance within the alliance framework.
Within this strategic context, although public perceptions of Trump in Japan remain largely critical in nature, the United States’ position as Japan’s principal security guarantor vis-à-vis China, as well as its status as the country’s largest export market, has continued to foster a pragmatic framework in voter behavior. Accordingly, in the post-election period, one of the foremost priorities on Sanae Takaichi’s foreign policy agenda is the effective management of the Japan–U.S. alliance and the further consolidation of cooperation in both the security and economic domains.
Moreover, Takaichi aims to strengthen Japan’s intelligence production and analytical capacity in order to establish more effective and integrated cooperation not only with the United States but also with defense partners such as Australia and the United Kingdom. Within this strategic orientation, the creation of a centralized national intelligence agency is being planned.[ii] The messages conveyed by Takaichi regarding the deepening of defense cooperation with Western allies indicate that Japan is moving toward a more comprehensive form of strategic integration in its security policy.
At the same time, Tokyo appears to be embarking upon a more assertive restructuring of its security architecture. Since assuming office, Takaichi has adopted a firmer and more resolute line in security policy, and the broad support for her pledge to raise the defense budget to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by March—two years ahead of schedule—signals a marked transformation in societal perceptions of security threats.[iii] The 9.4% increase in defense expenditures approved by the Cabinet in December constitutes a concrete manifestation of this strategic reorientation.[iv]
The fact that the budget increase is grounded not merely in quantitative expansion, but also in the consolidation of the domestic defense industry and the prioritization of high-technology domains such as cybersecurity, space technologies, and long-range strike capabilities, demonstrates that Japan is aiming at a qualitative transformation of its security architecture.[v] In parallel with this process of transformation, Takaichi announced that the “Three Documents,” which constitute the foundational framework of the country’s security and defense policy, would be subject to review; it has been assessed that this process could also give rise to debates concerning constitutional amendments.[vi]
In her post-election press statement, Takaichi expressed her intention to reconsider Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which renounces war, and to introduce emergency provisions into the constitutional framework; she further raised the possibility of holding an early referendum in order to submit these proposed amendments to a public vote.[vii] At the same time, advancing a vision of a “strong and prosperous” Japan, Takaichi pledged to increase defense expenditures, relax existing restrictions on arms exports, and establish a more comprehensive legal framework to counter espionage activities.
Article 9 of the 1947 Peace Constitution, characterized by its pacifist renunciation of war, constitutes the fundamental normative framework defining the limits of Japan’s military capacity and its authority to use force. While the prevailing interpretation of this provision imposes certain constraints on the scope of collective self-defense and crisis intervention, shifts in the regional balance of power and growing military uncertainties are directing Tokyo toward the pursuit of a broader operational latitude. Accordingly, the constitutional amendment agenda does not merely signify a reconsideration of historical pacifism; it is also associated with the objective of strengthening deterrence capacity, establishing a more integrated defense structure with allies, and rendering Japan’s security policies more flexible in the face of strategic uncertainties.
Tokyo’s inclination to adapt its existing defense doctrine to evolving regional power configurations and to move toward a more proactive security posture constitutes the principal framework of the assessments conducted in Seoul following Takaichi’s electoral victory. Indeed, evaluations in Seoul have concentrated on two primary dimensions: the adoption of a more assertive line in security policy and the articulation of a conservative discourse on historical issues. At first glance, this profile raises the prospect of a more rigid and nationalist Japan from the perspective of South Korea. In particular, Japan’s renewed constitutional revision debates and its steps toward enhancing defense capabilities have elicited a cautious response within Korean public opinion, where historical memory remains deeply entrenched.
Nevertheless, the strategic context differs markedly from the power-political dynamics of the nineteenth century. While Japan seeks to manage the tensions generated by intensifying strategic competition with China, it simultaneously confronts a multilayered foreign policy and security test arising from U.S.-driven pressures related to security expectations and trade policies, as well as the geopolitical risks stemming from North Korea’s nuclear program. Under such conditions, opening a new line of tension with South Korea on the basis of historical disputes does not appear to constitute a rational choice from the standpoint of Japan’s national interests. At the same time, the evolving distribution of power in Northeast Asia and the perception of uncertainty regarding the United States’ regional commitments render closer security coordination between Seoul and Tokyo a strategic necessity.
From South Korea’s perspective, therefore, the core issue is not Japan’s strengthening per se, but rather the framework within which, and the extent to which, this enhanced capacity will be employed in alignment with shared security interests. Tokyo’s steps toward assuming greater responsibilities within the alliance framework may also entail corresponding expectations of burden-sharing directed at Seoul. Indeed, from President Trump’s standpoint, encouraging U.S. allies to engage in a comparable competitive dynamic regarding defense expenditures and alliance obligations can be regarded as a functional strategy that enhances Washington’s bargaining power while distributing financial responsibilities among its allies.
Another significant item on Takaichi’s foreign policy agenda is the preservation of the recent rapprochement process established in bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea. It is anticipated that, concurrently with the Japan–U.S. summit, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will pay a visit to South Korea in March and hold talks with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung. This engagement is expected to take place within the framework of “shuttle diplomacy,” based on reciprocal visits by the two leaders and aimed at institutionalizing diplomatic continuity on a more structured basis.[viii] Indeed, Lee’s visit to Japan on 13–14 January constituted the first link in this reciprocal diplomatic exchange.
This initiative may be interpreted not merely as a symbolic step to ensure the continuity of dialogue in bilateral relations, but also as a reflection of the effort to manage historical disputes, deepen cooperation in the security domain, and strengthen strategic coordination at a time when regional geopolitical balances are being reshaped. Particularly in a context marked by growing security uncertainties in East Asia and intensifying China–Japan competition, the regularization of high-level contacts between Tokyo and Seoul carries additional significance for reinforcing trilateral coordination within the U.S. alliance system.
Within the context of its strategic approach toward China, Tokyo is likely to seek to elevate the Korea–U.S.–Japan security coordination—originally shaped around the North Korean threat—into a broader geostrategic framework by integrating this mechanism with the objective of balancing Beijing. In contrast, the administration in Seoul has pursued a more cautious and balancing foreign policy that takes into account its economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing, and thus has maintained a certain distance from transforming the trilateral structure into an explicit security platform aimed at containing China. As a concrete reflection of this approach, during his visit to Japan in January, South Korean President Lee articulated a more inclusive vision of regional cooperation that also encompasses China. In this regard, divergences in strategic perspectives within the alliance are likely to become particularly pronounced with respect to China policy.
In conclusion, Takaichi’s decision to call early elections and the strong mandate she subsequently secured signal a period in which the boundaries of Japan’s postwar security identity are being reassessed. The increased legislative support reduces the likelihood that initiatives such as the expansion of defense expenditures, the revision of the constitutional framework, and the strengthening of a conservative line on societal issues will encounter significant domestic resistance; thus, it provides Takaichi with a broader margin of maneuver to advance her foreign policy objectives.
Nevertheless, this transformation does not imply that Japan is embarking upon a unilateral course of military activism; rather, it necessitates a multilayered search for balance amid intensifying strategic competition with China, the United States’ expectations regarding burden-sharing, and persistent uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula. Within this framework, the principal challenge facing Japan lies in its ability to manage its expanding deterrence capacity without undermining regional stability and while preserving strategic cohesion with its allies. The new period taking shape under Takaichi’s leadership thus represents a critical juncture that will determine how Japan redefines the boundary between its pacifist norms and a more proactive security posture, as well as the role it will assume within the evolving balance of power in East Asia.
[i] “Japan’s conservative leader bets big on Takaichi mania with snap election. Will her gamble pay off?”, CNN World, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/06/asia/japan-sanae-takaichi-election-intl-hnk-dst, (Date of Access: 17.02.2026)
[ii] “Takaichi’s election victory sets the stage for a rightward shift in Japan’s security policies”, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/japan-takaichi-security-economy-immigration-0d87101569c8ae10bca5435a731ae3bf, (Date of Access: 17.02.2026).
[iii] “Japan’s rock star leader now has the political backing to push a bold agenda. Will she deliver?”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/japans-rock-star-leader-now-has-the-political-backing-to-push-a-bold-agenda-will-she-deliver-274015, (Date of Access: 17.02.2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “What Takaichi’s Win Means for Japan’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Global Affairs, https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/what-takaichis-win-means-japans-foreign-policy-priorities, (Date of Access: 17.02.2026).
[vii] “Takaichi’s landslide victory leaves Seoul facing a more assertive Japan”, The Korea Herald, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10673808, (Date of Access: 17.02.2026).
[viii] “Japan PM Takaichi May Visit S.Korea in March”, Nippon, https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2026021201124/, (Date of Access: 17.02.2026).
