The political debates within the European Union (EU) sparked by the migration crisis in Ceuta go beyond the issue of migration management and raise questions about the future of the Schengen system, one of the most significant achievements of European integration. Italy’s decision to implement border controls on travelers arriving from Spain in response to the Ceuta Crisis, and the Madrid government’s reciprocation, have sparked a new debate in Europe over the conditions under which internal border controls may be implemented. The Schengen system, which allows approximately 450 million people to move freely among 29 countries, is now facing a new challenge: a migration crisis arising at the external borders has spilled over into political disputes among member states.[i]
The key factor that has raised the significance of the Ceuta Crisis from a Schengen perspective is that, despite the absence of a shared land border between Italy and Spain, the Italian government has used the crisis as a pretext for border controls. Under EU law, border controls within the Schengen Area are intended to be temporary and exceptional; recourse to this mechanism is permitted only in the event of a serious threat to public order or internal security. Conversely, the decision regarding Ceuta fueled concerns that the scope of these exceptions could be expanded for political reasons. For this reason, the current crisis is viewed not merely as a dispute between Italy and Spain, but within the context of the exceptional mechanisms of the Schengen system gradually becoming ordinary policy tools.
In fact, the spread of internal border controls within the Schengen Area did not begin with the Ceuta Crisis. For about 11 years, Germany has been conducting border checks at its borders with some of its neighbors for various reasons and these measures are scheduled to be extended for another six months, through March 2027.[ii] France has also continued the border controls it introduced following the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks for security reasons, and is using this mechanism to limit secondary migration flows as well. Countries such as Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden are also implementing internal border controls for various reasons. Consequently, it appears that border controls in Europe, which were intended to be temporary, are becoming a long-term measure for some countries.
Spain’s decision to begin implementing similar controls against Italy, however, adds another dimension to the problem. While Madrid’s policy of retaliation is politically understandable, it has the potential to introduce the principle of reciprocity among member states into the Schengen system. The fundamental purpose of Schengen is to remove border controls between member states from the realm of reciprocal political retaliation and instead anchor them in common European rules. For this reason, when one country responds to another country’s border controls with the same method, it creates the risk that the system will shift from a shared understanding of the law to a concept of bilateral retaliation.
Another important issue brought to light by the Ceuta Crisis is that immigration policy is increasingly becoming one of the defining factors in European domestic politics. The rise of far-right and anti-immigration political movements in Europe is leading center-right and even some center-left governments to adopt tougher policies on immigration. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s hard-line policies on immigration indicate that, ahead of the upcoming 2027 elections, political competition in Europe will continue to be shaped by issues of immigration and border security.
The approach adopted by Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in response to the Ceuta Crisis, however, shows that the hardening stance on immigration is not limited to far-right or conservative parties. The fact that Frederiksen, who comes from a social democratic political tradition, supports tough immigration policies, such as the establishment of deportation centers in third countries, indicates that ideological boundaries in European politics are becoming increasingly blurred when it comes to immigration. This situation shows that anti-immigration policies in Europe have moved beyond being merely part of a specific political ideology’s platform and have spread to a broader political spectrum.
On the other hand, the use of border controls as a political tool by countries facing migration pressures can have negative consequences in the long term even for the states implementing these policies. The decision Italy made regarding Spain in the wake of the Ceuta Crisis may come back to haunt Rome in the event of a future migration crisis at its own external borders. With a coastline of approximately 8,000 kilometers, Italy is one of the countries at the center of the Mediterranean migration routes. Indeed, the fact that more than 8,000 migrants arrived in Lampedusa in just three days in 2023 indicates that crises in which Italy may need European solidarity could recur.[iii] For this reason, when countries facing migration pressure at their external borders hold each other accountable, this can also weaken the solidarity mechanisms they may need in the future.
The fundamental contradiction revealed by the Ceuta Crisis becomes evident here. On the one hand, European countries are calling for stronger protection of external borders, the implementation of common asylum and return policies, and the sharing of the migration burden among member states. On the other hand, when domestic political pressures increase, national governments turn to unilateral border controls rather than common European mechanisms. This situation results in the implementation of policies that weaken solidarity at the national level while calling for solidarity at the European level.
Consequently, the Ceuta Crisis has brought into sharper focus the long-standing tension in Europe’s migration policy between national interests and common European policies. Growing public pressure on migration issues and the rise of far-right parties may be driving governments toward high-profile measures such as border controls. However, the widespread adoption of these measures carries the risk of eroding the principle of free movement, one of the fundamental principles of European integration, through the introduction of exceptions. If measures that are intended to be temporary and exceptional become permanent, the Schengen Agreement may, even if it continues to exist legally, effectively evolve into a more fragmented structure.
Ultimately, the Ceuta Crisis is testing not only Europe’s capacity to manage migration but also the political and legal resilience of the Schengen system. Italy’s decision regarding Spain and Madrid’s response to it raise the possibility that internal border controls could evolve from a security measure into a tool for political pressure and retaliation. The European Commission’s limited influence over these practices, however, may enable member states to make increasingly broader use of exceptional mechanisms.
For this reason, the real threat posed by Ceuta does not stem solely from the current border controls. A more significant concern stems from the possibility that this practice could set a precedent that could be invoked in similar crises in the future. If member states begin to use Schengen controls as a mechanism for mutual pressure due to migration, elections, or bilateral political disputes, this could lead to a gradual erosion of the principle of free movement. The joint management of Europe’s external borders, the harmonization of asylum and return policies, and the provision of genuine solidarity to countries facing migration pressures have therefore become one of the fundamental conditions not only for migration policy but also for the preservation of the Schengen Area. When viewed from this perspective, the Ceuta Crisis poses a significant test of the extent to which one of the most tangible achievements of European integration can be safeguarded in the face of national political interests.
[i] Ayuso, Silvia. “Ceuta, un peligroso precedente que debilita el espacio Schengen.”, El País, https://elpais.com/internacional/2026-08-23/ceuta-un-peligroso-precedente-que-debilita-el-espacio-schengen.html, (Accessed: August 23, 2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
