Chinese President Xi Jinping is reportedly preparing to be accompanied by a large delegation of corporate executives on his anticipated visit to the United States (US). It is uncommon for Xi to attend overseas visits with a major business delegation. Moreover, these preparations are taking place at a time when Chinese companies face mounting investment and security reviews in the US, and Beijing has been increasing its regulatory oversight over the private sector in recent years. It is reported that one of the delegation’s goals is to demonstrate China’s desire to support investment and commercial ties with the US and to offer potential economic gains to Washington.[i] Consequently, the reappearance of corporations as a visible component of leader diplomacy is significant for assessing the evolving functions companies can assume in interstate relations amid conditions of strategic competition.
Xi’s last US visit with a business delegation of comparable scale took place in 2015. That visit was attended by Alibaba founder Jack Ma and Tencent founder Pony Ma, alongside executives from Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. During that trip, China also signed a deal worth approximately $38 billion covering 300 Boeing aircraft. Xi further met with executives of American tech giants like Apple, Meta, and Amazon. In 2026, however, this diplomatic instrument is deployed within a distinctly different economic environment. Washington imposes high tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, while technology, investments, and the operations of certain Chinese enterprises in the US are increasingly restricted under a national security framework.[ii] Therefore, whereas the presence of corporations in leader diplomacy in 2015 was assessed alongside expanding trade and investment relations, in 2026 the function of corporations has gained greater importance in preserving viable economic domains that can be sustained within strategic competition.
Nevertheless, corporate executives accompanying head of state visits does not inherently imply that corporations have become effective actors in the diplomatic process on their own. US President Donald Trump’s visit to China in May 2026 was accompanied by 18 American business executives, including Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang and Elon Musk. However, Scott Kennedy from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that the executives in the hastily assembled American delegation played a limited role in the process, whereas the Chinese side might orchestrate the role of corporate executives much more deliberately during the upcoming visit.[iii] This distinction demonstrates that the importance of corporate diplomacy should be evaluated not merely by the number of companies escorting state leaders, but by the extent to which these actors contribute to setting the economic agenda and generating concrete outcomes.
The diplomatic visibility of companies is not confined exclusively to leader visits. In early September, a US-China Business Council (USCBC) delegation featuring senior executives from companies like Visa, Apple, Qualcomm, and Boeing met with Chinese officials in Beijing. During these contacts, the USCBC stated that it could act as a bridge between the government and the private sector and contribute to transforming political dialogue into concrete commercial outcomes.[iv] Consequently, besides being economic actors affected by the consequences of political decisions between states, companies also stand out as complementary channels that can help convey issues like market access, investment climate, and regulatory barriers into the dialogue between governments.
This function becomes more evident when considered together with Washington’s current approach to economic relations with Beijing. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer stated that Washington is not seeking a comprehensive trade agreement with Beijing and that the main goal is to manage the bilateral relationship.[v] Accordingly, the two countries established the Board of Investment and Board of Trade mechanisms in May 2026. However, due to the climate regarding Chinese investments in the US, expectations for achieving significant results from the first mechanism remain limited. Under the second mechanism, the parties are discussing around ten ‘‘non-sensitive’’ product categories, but they have not yet agreed on which products will be evaluated within this scope. This picture shows that US and China economic relations are not moving in the same direction across all sectors. While national security concerns limit economic interaction in areas like electric vehicles, technology, and critical minerals, the search continues to maintain commercial contact in agriculture and specific products not considered strategically sensitive. Thus, the current trend points to redefining the areas where economic ties can be sustained rather than completely expanding or severing them.
The changing position of the private sector in China is also important for understanding the role of companies in this process. The Private Sector Promotion Act, which entered into force in May 2025 and is China’s first basic law regarding the private economy, strengthened the legal framework regarding fair competition, investment and financing, technological innovation, and the protection of private companies’ rights. The regulation also aims to improve communication mechanisms between the government and companies. Supporting the overseas activities of private companies and strengthening the legal services related to these activities also form a part of the current policy framework.[vi]Therefore, it would be misleading to interpret the increased visibility of private companies in international economic contacts as these actors becoming independent from the state. On the contrary, while pursuing their own commercial interests, companies also operate within a broader policy environment shaped by China’s economic and technological goals.
In this framework, companies can assume a function that complements economic contacts between governments in a strategic competition environment. The participation of company executives in leader visits sends a political signal towards maintaining commercial ties while also contributing to bringing market access, investment conditions, and regulatory issues to the interstate agenda. As a matter of fact, it is stated that one of the goals of the upcoming Chinese delegation is to show the will to support investment and commercial ties with the US. In the current environment where comprehensive economic agreements have become difficult, companies can also play a role in developing limited commercial and sectoral collaborations. Therefore, the growing importance of corporate diplomacy can be seen as a result of economic consensus becoming increasingly possible only in limited areas, rather than a weakening of strategic competition.
The increasing diplomatic visibility of companies does not mean that they can independently determine the direction of US and China relations. Technology controls, tariffs, and investment restrictions imposed on national security grounds continue to determine the boundaries of economic activities. For this reason, companies can be evaluated as complementary actors that contribute to preserving the areas where economic contact can be maintained within the boundaries drawn by states, rather than as actors acting outside of strategic competition.
As a result, Xi Jinping’s preparation to go to the US with a large corporate delegation shows that strategic competition does not eliminate the diplomatic importance of companies, but rather changes the nature of this role. Under current conditions, corporate diplomacy gains a function aimed at managing the limits of economic decoupling within strategic competition and protecting sustainable areas of cooperation, rather than re-expanding economic integration. This situation also indicates that US and China economic relations might be shaped not through a complete break or rapprochement, but within a framework of a more selective engagement where strategically sensitive areas are restricted. The results of Xi’s visit to Washington, expected on September 24, 2026, could reveal the direction of this trend more clearly. The scope of the economic outcomes that may emerge from the talks will be important for assessing whether companies will turn into actors capable of expanding the limited areas of cooperation between the two countries, or whether their presence will remain merely a political signal that the economic dialogue continues.
[i] “China’s Şi to bring large CEO delegation on US visit, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/exclusive-chinas-Şi-bring-large-ceo-delegation-us-visit-sources-say-2026-09-04/, (Date of Access: 04.09.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] “USCBC Annual Board Delegation Visit to China”, The US-China Business Council, https://www.uschina.org/news-releases/uscbc-annual-board-delegation-visit-to-china/, (Date of Access: 04.09.2026).
[v] “Greer says agriculture, non-tariff barrier announcements likely during Şi visit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/greer-says-agriculture-non-tariff-barrier-announcements-likely-during-Şi-visit-2026-09-03/, (Date of Access: 04.09.2026).
[vi] “Private sector promotion act to advance quality development”, Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, https://en.moj.gov.cn/2025-08/25/c_1118961.htm, (Date of Access: 04.09.2026).
