Analysis

The China-Russia Rapprochement: New Dimensions of Cooperation

The two states are taking determined steps toward a multipolar world order.
The rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing represents far more than a traditional security alliance.
The strategic communication between the PRC and Russia is not confined to their responses to shared threat perceptions.

Paylaş

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At a time when the balance of power in the international system is being fundamentally reshaped, bilateral contacts between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have acquired a remarkable degree of stability and depth. In recent years in particular, the two states have developed a partnership model grounded in mutual trust, framed by expanding diplomatic relations and shared strategic objectives. Although the relationship occasionally produced a competitive environment in the post Cold War era, it has now taken on the character of a strategic partnership between two major powers acting jointly in pursuit of a multipolar world order.

China and Russia are making a concerted effort to increase their influence on the world stage by pursuing cooperative projects in a variety of fields, including energy, global governance, economics, and security. In this regard, cooperation between the PRC and Russia has become an institutionalized kind of connection rather than an uncommon occurrence, as seen by their coordinated statements, diplomatic engagements, and comparable reactions to regional happenings.

One of the most recent and concrete examples of this deepening bilateral relationship was the 20th Strategic Security Consultation Meeting held in Moscow on 2 December 2025. Convened with the participation of Russia’s Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the meeting elevated the two states’ strategic security coordination to a higher level. The parties secured new agreements, strengthened their strategic mutual confidence, and held thorough discussions on important topics pertaining to their strategic security interests, according to a statement released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This meeting is also significant in terms of putting into practice the agreements previously reached at the leadership level. One of the prominent and noteworthy items in the discussions was the formulation of a joint stance on Japan. The PRC and Russia announced that they had reached a high level of consensus regarding Japan and declared that “strategic alignment” had been achieved on this issue.[i]

During the consultations, not only Japan but also the situation of war in Ukraine was brought to the agenda. The PRC and Russia stated that they were likewise in agreement on this issue, demonstrating their intention to develop an alternative discourse and strategy in response to the West’s interventionist posture. It was stressed in Wang’s bilateral discussion with Lavrov, his Russian colleague, that both nations must work together to stop activities originating in Japan that jeopardize regional peace. These words imply that Russia and the PRC are forging a joint security perspective not just in their bilateral relations but also at the regional level.

Another noteworthy point is that China’s rhetoric is not confined to its dialogue with Russia; in its meetings with Western states such as the United Kingdom and France, Beijing has likewise voiced its criticisms of Japan.[ii]

China’s position may also be viewed by certain groups as an effort to shift a regional issue beyond its immediate geographical boundaries and to apply significant diplomatic pressure on Japan globally. The solid backing from Russia for this approach indicates that both nations are collaborating not just in defense but also in diplomatic and propagandistic efforts.

The strategic communication between the PRC and Russia is not confined to their responses to shared threat perceptions; this dialogue must also be understood as part of both states’ efforts to redefine their positions within the international system.[iii] This discourse developed particularly in relation to Japan is not merely a reiteration of historical disputes; it also manifests as an expression of the desire to construct political legitimacy over regional memory.

Wang Yi also assessed the visa-free travel arrangement initiated between China and Russia as both a concrete and symbolic reflection of their comprehensive strategic partnership in this new period. It was stated that this regulation will not only facilitate interpersonal mobility between the two countries, but will also function as an important instrument likely to deepen societal convergence, cultural interaction, and the various stages of multidimensional cooperation.

Lavrov, on the other hand, emphasized that the reciprocal visits conducted between the two leaders in 2025 contributed to the further institutionalization and consolidation of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia. Lavrov reiterated Russia’s dedication to the ‘One China’ principle, emphasizing that they will keep backing the PRC’s stance on Taiwan, which is based on national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, it was mentioned that the year 2026 which will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the China Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation will be a vital point for enhancing high level interactions between the two nations, broadening their partnerships, and strengthening their strategic ties. [iv]

In conclusion, the strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia is not merely a platform where their security interests intersect; it is also the product of a political vision shaped by historical meanings, national identities, and global narratives. The joint responses formulated toward Japan indicate that both actors are attempting to project their contemporary grievances onto the international political arena and to construct a new normative order. In this context, the growing closeness between Moscow and Beijing signifies much more than a typical security partnership. This initiative will increasingly come to light in the years ahead as a call for a new narrative and structure that challenges the international discourse shaped by the West.

[i] “China, Russia conduct strategic alignment on issues related to Japan”, Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1349611.shtml, (Date Accessed: 03.12.2025).

[ii]“China, Russia ‘reach consensus’ on issues concerning Japan”, NHK World Japan, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20251203_07/, (Date Accessed: 03.12.2025).

[iii]“China, Russia discuss Ukraine, reach ‘consensus’ on Japan during Chinese minister’s Visit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-russia-discuss-ukraine-reach-consensus-japan-during-chinese-ministers-2025-12-03/, (Date Accessed: 03.12.2025).

[iv] “China, Russia to advance strategic coordination toward higher quality”, China Daily, https://www.chinadailyasia.com/hk/article/624708, (Date Accessed: 03.12.2025).

Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN
Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN
Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN graduated from the Department of International Relations at Anadolu University and completed her first master’s degree in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University. She defended her second master’s thesis titled “Cooperation Between Kazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative and Green Energy Projects: Opportunities and Risks” in the Political Science and Public Administration master’s program at Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy University. In 2025, she was awarded the Overseas Graduate Scholarship of the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Türkiye and is currently pursuing her PhD studies at Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University in Ukraine. In addition, Keçialan is studying New Media and Journalism at Atatürk University and works as a Eurasia Research Expert at ANKASAM (Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies). Her primary areas of interest are Eurasia, with a particular focus on Central Asia. She speaks English and Russian, has a basic command of Ukrainian, and is learning Kazakh.

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