For many years, the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy identity has been defined by the principles of democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and multilateralism. In particular, the “Normative Power Europe” approach developed by Ian Manners argues that the EU exerts influence in the international system not so much through its military capabilities as through its power to generate norms and disseminate values. However, the crises of recent years—and especially the new security environment that emerged following the Russia-Ukraine War—have once again brought to light the limits of normative consistency in EU foreign policy. An examination of the Union’s responses to various crisis areas reveals that normative discourse is often shaped by geopolitical distance, security costs, and the perception of direct threat. This indicates that EU foreign policy does not proceed entirely on the basis of normative principles; rather, it produces a behavioral model that varies according to the geographical and strategic proximity of crises to Europe. As the crisis area moves further away from the EU, the Union is able to apply normative sanctions more freely; however, when direct border security and migration pressures arise, strategic pragmatism takes center stage. Within this framework, discussions regarding “selective normativity” and a “conditional normative approach” in EU foreign policy are becoming increasingly prominent.
The crisis areas where the EU most readily employs its normative foreign policy tools are those regions where Europe does not face direct security costs. In such crises, the Union is able to more prominently invoke the rhetoric of human rights, democratic transition, the rule of law, and international law. Since these crises do not create short-term, direct pressure on European domestic politics, border security, or social stability, they provide the EU with a broader normative scope of action. This situation enables the Union to maintain its identity as a “global ethical actor” at a lower strategic cost.
The recent sanctions decisions targeting Iran, Sudan, and Israeli settlers in the West Bank are among the current examples of this approach. Regarding Iran, the EU continues to expand its sanctions mechanisms, particularly in response to human rights violations, the suppression of protests, and military support provided to Russia.[i] This approach demonstrates that the EU addresses the Iran issue not merely as a regional security matter but also within the context of upholding international norms. Similarly, sanctions targeting actors destabilizing the democratic transition process in Sudan highlight that the EU continues to act in accordance with its normative foreign policy reflexes.[ii] Although the civil war and political fragility in Sudan carry the potential for regional repercussions, the crisis has not yet generated a direct security threat for Europe. Consequently, the EU is able to adopt a more flexible stance on the Sudan issue by focusing on normative priorities such as democracy, constitutional order, and the protection of civilians. Sanctions targeting violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank can also be assessed within a similar framework. [iii]
The EU’s agreement in May 2026 on sanctions targeting individuals and entities involved in settler violence has been a significant example of its efforts to uphold international law and the two-state solution. However, it is evident that the EU has proceeded with considerable caution in this regard. The fact that the sanctions are directed not at the State of Israel itself but at specific individuals and groups demonstrates that the Union is striving to strike a careful balance between its normative rhetoric and diplomatic and strategic considerations. In particular, the reluctance of some member states to adopt tougher economic measures against Israel reveals that the EU’s normative foreign policy is also constrained by its own internal political dynamics. A common feature in these examples is that taking a normative stance does not entail high geopolitical costs for the EU. Crises in Iran, Sudan, or the West Bank do not create direct, intense migration pressure, border security issues, or threats to internal political stability for Europe. Consequently, the EU is able to maintain its normative identity more visibly in these areas.
In crisis areas where the perception of threat directly affects Europe’s internal stability, the EU appears to have developed more pragmatic and realistic responses. The examples of Syria and Afghanistan, in particular, are noteworthy in demonstrating how normative discourse can be sidelined in the face of strategic imperatives. Steps taken to normalize relations with Syria—a country subjected to diplomatic isolation for many years—and[iv] Brussels’ preparations[v] to discuss the issue of irregular migration with Taliban representatives stand among the most visible examples of the pragmatic shift in EU foreign policy.
For a long time, the EU adopted a position closely aligned with the call for regime change in Syria, relying on sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and political pressure as its primary tools. However, the chronic nature of the destruction caused by the war, the entrenchment of regional instability, and—in particular—the impact of irregular migration on European domestic politics have begun to bring about a noticeable shift in the EU’s approach. The recent increase in discussions regarding the revival of diplomatic and commercial ties with the Damascus government is viewed as a key indicator of this transformation. This is because, from the EU’s perspective, the Syrian issue is no longer merely a matter of human rights or democratic transition; it is also a matter of migration management, border security, and European internal stability. Similarly, regarding Afghanistan, a more functional security approach is increasingly replacing the normative one. Although the EU initially adopted a more distant and norm-based rhetoric following the Taliban’s return to power, concerns regarding irregular migration, the risk of radicalization, and regional instability have come to the fore over time. In this context, the prospect of holding technical talks with Taliban representatives in Brussels could have been viewed as a significant departure from the EU’s normative approach to foreign policy just a few years ago. However, given the current security environment, it appears that the EU’s primary priority is managing the potential repercussions of crises on Europe rather than the nature of the political regime in Afghanistan.
This does not mean that normative values have been completely abandoned in EU foreign policy; rather, the applicability of normative discourse has become directly linked to the geopolitical proximity of crises to Europe and the associated security costs. In other words, while the EU may adopt tougher stances on human rights and democratic norms in distant crisis zones, it can act in a more pragmatic and flexible manner in situations where its direct interests—such as migration pressure, border security, or internal political stability—are at stake.
In particular, the pressure that the issue of irregular migration has created in European domestic politics is one of the most significant drivers of this transformation. In recent years, the rise of far-right parties across Europe, the growing influence of anti-immigration rhetoric on mainstream politics, and the intensifying debates on social security have directly impacted the EU’s foreign policy choices. Consequently, the policies developed in crisis areas such as Syria and Afghanistan can be interpreted not only as foreign policy choices but also as an effort to preserve Europe’s internal political balances. Consequently, the examples of Syria and Afghanistan most clearly highlight the tension between normative principles and strategic realism in the EU’s foreign policy identity. This situation brings discussions of “selective normativity” in EU foreign policy into sharper focus and raises significant questions about the Union’s future foreign policy direction.
Consequently, the current transformation in EU foreign policy is reigniting a significant debate regarding the Union’s role in the international system. While it would be inaccurate to claim that normative principles have been entirely abandoned in EU foreign policy, it is evident that the manner in which these principles are applied is becoming increasingly conditional and strategic. Therefore, the future of EU foreign policy will depend on the nature of the new balance to be struck between normative principles and strategic interests. As security crises and migration pressures deepen in Europe’s immediate vicinity, it appears likely that strategic pragmatism will become more prominent in the Union’s foreign policy.
[i] “Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran”, European Council, 11.05.2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/11/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-directed-against-certain-persons-and-entities-in-view-of-the-situation-in-iran/, (Date Accessed: 12.05.2026).
[ii] “Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan”, European Council, 11.05.2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/11/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-activities-undermining-the-stability-and-political-transition-of-sudan/, (DateAccessed: 12.05.2026).
[iii] “L’Union européenne adopte des sanctions contre les colons israéliens violents”, Le Figaro, 11.05.2026, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/l-union-europeenne-adopte-des-sanctions-contre-les-colons-israeliens-violents-20260511, (Date Accessed: 12.05.2026).
[iv] “L’Union européenne normalise ses relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec la Syrie”, Le Figaro, 11.05.2026, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/l-union-europeenne-normalise-ses-relations-diplomatiques-et-commerciales-avec-la-syrie-20260511, (Date Accessed: 12.05.2026).
[v] “L’Union européenne annonce qu’elle va inviter une délégation de représentants talibans à Bruxelles pour parler de migrations”, Franceinfo, 11.05.2026, https://www.franceinfo.fr/monde/afghanistan/l-union-europeenne-annonce-qu-elle-va-inviter-une-delegation-de-representants-talibans-a-bruxelles-pour-parler-de-migrations_7998032.html, (Date Accessed: 12.05.2026).
