Following the 2026 Ankara Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one of the hottest topics of discussion on the global security agenda has been how the Alliance will respond to globalized hybrid threats that transcend its traditional geographical boundaries. In this context, the question of at what level and in what institutional dimensions NATO will develop cooperation with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region has come to the forefront.
In recent years, actors such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have gained significant momentum in integrating with NATO in the areas of security, cyber defense, and defense industry. However, it has been observed that India, one of the largest military and demographic powers in the region, is maintaining a distance from this institutional rapprochement and seeking its own unique strategic positioning. The clearest indication of this is that the four Asia-Pacific countries mentioned above began participating in NATO leaders’ summits from 2022 onwards, while India did not participate in these summits. Nevertheless, while avoiding institutional military integration with NATO, India prefers to keep strategic dialogue channels open between the parties.[i]
India’s security-oriented relations with the West are conducted not institutionally through NATO, but through more flexible and region-specific formats. The most concrete example of this is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) mechanism, which dates back to 2007 but was revived and given an institutional character in 2017. Within the framework of QUAD, India maintains active cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia. Following the establishment of formations such as QUAD in 2017 and AUKUS in 2021, the question of whether NATO-like alliances will be established in the Asia-Pacific region has become a more frequent topic of discussion.
According to many defense analysts, the next step after security-defense formations like QUAD and AUKUS could be the establishment of a collective defense organization in the Asia-Pacific region.[ii] To emphasize from the outset, as evidenced by India’s hesitant approach to attending NATO leaders’ summits, it can be said that New Delhi would not be willing to participate in a similar defense alliance in the Asia-Pacific region and would likely stay away from it.[iii] This is primarily explained by India’s geopolitical relationships with Russia and China, as well as the balance of power in Pakistan and South Asia.
NATO’s new partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are raising concerns that the polarization and bloc formation seen in Europe will spread to the Asia-Pacific region. This concern is most strongly voiced by China.[iv] Similarly, India opposes regional polarization and is concerned about the arrival of Cold War mentality in the region. Furthermore, India objects to Western involvement in its relations with both Pakistan and China, taking a clear stance on this issue. Instead of establishing a strong defense alliance with Western actors in the Asia-Pacific region, India aims for a more peaceful security approach and adopts a more cautious stance in its relations with NATO. This is because India is one of the actors that would be most affected by NATO’s deeper integration into the region. Increased NATO engagement in Asia could lead to renewed conflict between India and China.
From a Eurasian geopolitical perspective, the convergence of Russia, China, and India for leadership of the Global South against the Western-centric hegemonic world order could pave the way for a vision of an “Asian Century” that could shift global balances. However, historical mistrust, border disputes, and power struggles between these three giant actors are causing a covert Cold War to unfold in the heart of Eurasia.[v] However, since this is not possible, the geopolitical vacuum in Asia is causing Western actors and security institutions to become engaged in the region. NATO’s recent increased integration with the Asia-Pacific region is also seen as a result of this implicit competition among Asian actors and the power vacuum in the region.
New Delhi’s cautious approach to NATO is directly related to the country’s historical pursuit of strategic autonomy and complex regional equations. Firstly, India has a long-standing defense partnership with Russia. Due to military-technical cooperation dating back to the Cold War era, India is reluctant to join a Western military alliance that would directly confront Russia. Secondly, India, which experiences constant tension with China and Pakistan along the Kashmir and Himalayan borders, strongly opposes Western actors becoming involved in these conflicts or these issues being escalated into a global bloc.
Perhaps the most tangible, practical, and future-shaping aspect of the relationship between India and NATO, and of India’s strategic positioning, is in the field of defense industry and advanced technologies. While New Delhi avoids entering into an institutional/organic military alliance with NATO, it is increasingly deepening its integration with Western allies when it comes to defense technologies.
Consequently, India’s relations with NATO and its member states are evolving beyond traditional military exercises, reaching a new dimension centered on joint defense industry production and critical technologies. New Delhi’s primary motivation in this area is to reduce its long-standing dependence on Russia for defense supplies and to counterbalance China’s asymmetric superiority in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cyber warfare. Ultimately, while maintaining a distanced stance towards NATO and pursuing a policy based on “strategic autonomy,” India views cooperation with the West in defense and military modernization as an “operational necessity” and pursues a pragmatic “selective partnership,” taking into account geopolitical balances.
[i] “India, Nato To Hold Strategic Talks; Focus On Regional Security, China”, Live Mint, https://www.livemint.com/economy/india-nato-to-hold-strategic-talks-focus-on-regional-security-china-11674756071422.html, (Date of Access: 15.07.2026).
[ii] “NAIPTO-Toward a Eurasian, Transoceanic Multilateral Collective Defense Alliance”, Hudson, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/naipto-toward-a-eurasian-transoceanic-multilateral-collective-defense-alliance, (Date of Access: 15.07.2026).
[iii] “NATO’nun Asya-Pasifik’teki Genişlemesi ve Rusya’nın Tepkisi”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/natonun-asya-pasifikteki-genislemesi-ve-rusyanin-tepkisi/, (Date of Access: 15.07.2026).
[iv] “Beijing urges NATO to discard ‘Cold War mentality, stop hyping up China threat narratives’”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/beijing-urges-nato-to-discard-cold-war-mentality-stop-hyping-up-china-threat-narratives/3992795, (Date of Access: 15.07.2026).
[v] “Çin-Hindistan İşbirliğinde Asya Yüzyılı”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/cin-hindistan-isbirliginde-asya-yuzyili/, (Date of Access: 15.07.2026).
