The European Union’s (EU) latest strategy toward Turkey has become increasingly complicated, multi-layered, and flexible due to the transformations taking place in the global system. Rather than relying on a single policy approach, this strategy reflects a search for a delicate balance between geopolitical imperatives, economic interests, and normative values. In particular, the destabilizing impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the European security architecture, the relative fluctuations in the United States’ (U.S.) role as a global leader, and China’s economic and technological rise are forcing the EU to become a more autonomous, resilient, and strategic actor.
In this context, Turkey has gone beyond being simply a candidate country in the traditional sense to become an indispensable partner for Europe in terms of security, energy, and migration policies. Turkey’s central position in energy transit corridors, its key role in managing irregular migration, its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its influential stance in regional crises position it as both a significant opportunity and an actor that must be carefully handled by the EU. This double nature makes it necessary for the EU’s policy toward Turkey to adopt an approach that simultaneously includes both cooperation and constraints.
While the economic dimension of this strategic framework is based on a high level of interdependence, it is evident that this interdependence is taking on an increasingly specific and asymmetrical character. Turkey is not only an important production base and supply chain partner for the EU, but also a strategic partner that provides flexibility and cost advantages for European industry. In contrast, while the EU continues to be Turkey’s largest trading partner, it manages these economic relations within a more controlled and limited framework, with the aim of protecting the integrity of its internal market, enhancing industrial competitiveness, and reducing external dependence in strategic sectors.
Indeed, at a time when global supply chains are being reorganized, production security and supply chain continuity have come to the fore, and geo-economic competition has intensified, the EU continues to integrate Turkey into its production networks; however, it is shaping this integration through selective policies that also include protective tendencies in strategic sectors. This approach is directly linked to the EU’s efforts to reduce its external dependence, particularly in areas such as critical raw materials, semiconductors, and high-tech products. In this context, efforts such as “Made in EU” promote European production while mandating that specific standards be met in production processes and that a significant portion of the value added be generated within Europe. Thus, stricter criteria are being applied for production from third countries to be considered of European origin.
While these changes create opportunities for deeper integration into European value chains for Turkey, they also bring new compliance costs and structural risks that make it more difficult to secure a stable position within these chains. In this process, while Turkish industry finds opportunities to integrate more deeply into Europe-centered production networks, facilitate technology transfer, attract investment, and increase exports; on the other hand, the EU’s increasingly protectionist trade policies, technical regulations, and standards may limit Turkey’s competitive power. In particular, new-generation trade tools such as environmental regulations, carbon border adjustment mechanisms, and digital standards are making Turkey’s access to the EU market more complex and costly.
The out-of-date structure of the Customs Union prevents Turkey from automatically taking advantage of the free trade agreements the EU has signed with third countries, making it difficult for Turkey to access these markets under the same conditions. This structural asymmetry creates a trade imbalance that is not in Turkey’s favor and increases the risk of long-term incompatibility in economic relations. Although the EU refrains from making clear short- and medium-term projections regarding Turkey’s membership perspective, the possibility of an upcoming update to the Customs Union is emerging as a more specific policy area for the sustainability of economic relations.
On the political and institutional level, EU-Turkey relations are currently undergoing a serious period of deadlock. The fact that membership negotiations have effectively come to a standstill has served as a clear indication of the EU’s unwillingness to pursue its enlargement policy and has led to the relationship being framed in terms of a “strategic partnership” rather than the perspective of “full membership.” This shift also reflects a transition in the EU’s approach toward Turkey from a hierarchical and conditional model to a more flexible cooperation model based on strategic partnership. Within this new framework, Turkey is positioned as an actor with whom intensive cooperation takes place in specific areas, yet a certain distance is maintained politically and normatively. While cooperation has grown deeper in areas such as migration management, energy security, and the management of regional crises, a noticeable slowdown has been observed in the processes of political dialogue and institutional alignment.
Normative principles such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, which form the core values of the EU, continue to play a defining role in relations with Turkey; however, the application of these principles is gradually being balanced against geopolitical and strategic considerations. In other words, while the EU has not entirely abandoned this normative framework, it is showing a trend toward interpreting these values in a more flexible and selective manner in its relations with Turkey. This situation creates a clear area of tension between the EU’s claim to define itself as a “normative power” and the power-politics-based realities of the international system. On the one hand, the EU is seeking to preserve its normative identity; on the other hand, it is compelled to adopt a more pragmatic and profit-oriented approach due to geopolitical imperatives. Consequently, the future of EU-Turkey relations will be shaped by the delicate balance established between normative principles and strategic interests.
The security and geopolitical dimension of these relations is one of the most dynamic and determinative areas of EU-Turkey relations. Turkey’s geographical location, by forming a significant security line on Europe’s eastern border, makes it an essential partner for the EU. In particular, cooperation with Turkey in the context of managing irregular migration holds critical importance in terms of the EU’s internal political balances and public pressure. In this context, the migration agreement implemented since 2016 serves as a core mechanism for the EU in terms of border security, controlling irregular migration, and ensuring internal stability.
Turkey’s active and increasingly independent foreign policy in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea has at times led to conflicts of interest with the EU. Issues such as the sharing of energy resources, the determination of maritime zones, and competition over military presence and regional influence are the primary sources of these tensions. Nevertheless, rather than cutting ties with Turkey, the EU is pursuing a strategy based on managing crises and keeping tensions under control. This approach indicates that Turkey is viewed not as an excluded actor, but as a strategic partner that must be kept within a controlled sphere of interaction. Consequently, EU-Turkey relations constitute a geopolitical balance where cooperation and competition exist simultaneously.
At the heart of this multi-layered structure lies the EU’s dual perception of Turkey. On the one hand, Turkey is viewed as a significant opportunity due to its economic capacity, productive power, strategic location, and security contributions; on the other hand, it is considered a risk factor due to its political and institutional characteristics and regional policies. This dual perception has led the EU to adopt an approach based on selective cooperation and strategic partnership rather than full membership. This model allows for deeper cooperation and increased mutual dependence in certain areas, while enabling the maintenance of distance and the continuation of competition in others. The result is a multidimensional and flexible relationship model where cooperation and competition coexist simultaneously. Consequently, EU-Turkey relations can be assessed not as a direct expansion process nor as a completely severed relationship, but rather as a hybrid structure.
In conclusion, the strategy the EU has adopted in its relations with Turkey is based on a search for a multidimensional, flexible, and constantly evolving balance. This balance emerges at the intersection of global power shifts, regional crises, economic interdependence, and normative differences. The future direction of the relationship will depend on the interaction between the EU’s strategic autonomy objectives and Turkey’s ambition to become a regional power. If areas of common interest are widened and institutional dialogue mechanisms are strengthened, the relationship could evolve into a more formal and sustainable structure. Otherwise, the relationship will continue on the basis of controlled tension, limited cooperation, and selective engagement.
In this context, while Turkey’s membership in the European Union is theoretically possible, it is not expected to happen in the short or medium term under current conditions. The EU’s strategy toward Turkey, while not entirely eliminating the possibility of membership, has pushed this goal to the background and focused on models of strategic partnership and selective cooperation. In this new framework, Turkey is not caught between the goal of membership and exclusion, but rather finds itself in the position of a strategic partner with a weakened membership perspective yet high capacity for cooperation. Therefore, membership could only become a strong possibility again in the long term if fundamental changes occur both in the EU’s enlargement policy and in Turkey’s structural transformation.
