Analysis

The First South Korea-Central Asia Summit: From Dialogue to Strategic Cooperation

The upcoming summit represents a new stage in the increasingly institutionalized cooperation that has developed over the years in South Korea-Central Asia relations.
The summit is likely to produce outcomes that can generate mutual benefit, in line with the parties’ different yet frequently intersecting expectations.
The success of the summit will depend on striking a balance between a common regional framework and country-specific differences.

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In 2024, South Korea and the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) agreed to hold the first South Korea-Central Asia Summit. The summit, originally planned for 2025, was postponed to 2026 due to political developments in South Korea.[i] South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun subsequently announced that the summit would take place on 16–17 September 2026.[ii] This process indicates that the initiative is not a temporary diplomatic step but rather the product of a long-standing preparatory process.

The upcoming summit represents a new stage in the increasingly institutionalized cooperation that has developed over the years in South Korea–Central Asia relations. Indeed, South Korea has maintained diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian states since the 1990s. Having established bilateral relations with the region’s states, Seoul has developed cooperation and partnerships with each of the five countries across various fields. Relations gained a new, regional, and institutional dimension with the establishment of the South Korea–Central Asia Cooperation Forum in 2007. Following the forum, South Korea significantly expanded its presence in Central Asia, and two years later, in 2009, it carried its approach to the region into a more comprehensive foreign policy framework through the adoption of the “New Asia Initiative.” [iii]

In this context, the first South Korea–Central Asia Summit represents a new stage reached by relations that have developed over more than thirty years. Since 2007, the South Korea–Central Asia Cooperation Forum has served as an institutional dialogue mechanism that brings together deputy ministers and senior officials. Accordingly, the upcoming summit may elevate existing regional cooperation to the leaders’ level for the first time, thereby establishing a higher-level political framework. Rather than replacing existing bilateral relations, this could allow common areas of cooperation to be addressed within a more holistic framework, without undermining the national priorities of the five Central Asian countries.

The summit is likely to produce outcomes that can generate mutual benefit, in line with the parties’ differing yet frequently intersecting expectations.

For South Korea, these expectations can be linked to the policies it has pursued toward Eurasia and Central Asia in recent years. Indeed, the New Northern Policy developed under President Moon Jae-in in 2017 aimed to strengthen the country’s economic and diplomatic ties with Central Asia.[iv] This approach evolved into a more concrete policy framework with the K-Silk Road Initiative, announced in 2024 and focused directly on Central Asia. Under the initiative, various agreements were signed with Kazakhstan on critical minerals and with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on energy, infrastructure, and supply chains, with South Korea expected to contribute to these partnerships through its technological, infrastructural, and industrial capacity.[v]

This indicates that South Korea’s approach to Central Asia is oriented not merely toward securing access to regional resources, but toward developing a comprehensive model of cooperation based on mutual contribution. The upcoming summit may lay the groundwork for further deepening these forms of cooperation and developing new joint projects. At the same time, the summit may offer Seoul the opportunity to diversify its supply of critical minerals and energy, create new economic opportunities for South Korean companies, and sustain its relations with Central Asia on a more institutional and regular basis. This process may contribute to strengthening South Korea’s diplomatic presence in Central Asia and to increasing its leaders’ level political contacts with the region.

From the perspective of Central Asia, the summit may offer opportunities to diversify economic partnerships and to make greater use of South Korea’s technological, industrial, and investment capacity. In addition, South Korea’s experience in peacebuilding, disaster management, and security may create new areas of cooperation for the countries of the region. Indeed, the summit is expected to address issues such as security, joint training, and information sharing. These developments are also consistent with the multi-vector foreign policy approach that Central Asia has long pursued, allowing the countries of the region to further diversify their external economic and diplomatic relations while preserving their existing partnerships.[vi] At the same time, this cooperation may help the countries of the region move beyond relations based solely on raw-material exports, contributing to their goals in local production, processing capacity, and sectoral development.

One of the defining features of South Korea–Central Asia relations is the complementarity between the capabilities and needs of the two sides. Central Asia’s natural resources, infrastructure, and economic diversification needs, and geostrategic position correspond closely with South Korea’s accumulation of capital and technology, its production and processing capacity, and its demand for resources. This complementarity has significant potential not only to deepen existing cooperation but also to develop new joint projects in line with the needs and capacities of both parties. The upcoming summit may enable this potential to be addressed within a more institutional framework and to be transformed into long-term partnerships that generate mutual benefit.

In the short term, the success of the summit will be measured not by the number of memoranda of understanding signed, but by the extent to which these can be translated into concrete projects and sustainable investments. For this reason, the establishment of regular follow-up mechanisms after the summit, as well as continued coordination among governments, the private sector, and relevant institutions, will also be decisive. Such coordination will help ensure that agreed-upon projects move beyond the planning stage into implementation.

In the long term, whether the summit evolves into a lasting mechanism for cooperation will largely depend on the parties’ continued political will and regular contacts. At the same time, it is important not to regard the Central Asian countries as a homogeneous group. The countries of the region have differing economic needs, priorities, and capacities. Accordingly, the success of the summit will also depend on striking a balance between a common regional framework and country-specific differences.

In conclusion, the first South Korea–Central Asia Summit should not be viewed as a coincidental development, but rather as a natural outcome of relations that have been developing between the parties for many years. The summit also carries relations previously conducted largely through bilateral economic cooperation, toward a more institutional, regional, and comprehensive structure. Addressing existing partnerships developed across various fields under a regional platform may allow the parties’ complementarity to be assessed more effectively. However, whether this complementarity evolves into a regular and sustainable cooperation mechanism will depend on the extent to which it can be translated into concrete projects and on the balance struck between the parties’ respective interests.


[i] “S. Korea-Central Asia summit postponed to next year amid political fallout”, The Korea Times, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/amp/foreignaffairs/20250627/s-korea-central-asia-summit-postponed-to-next-year-amid-political-fallout, (Date Accessed: 13.08.2026).

[ii] “First S. Korea-Central Asia Summit Slated for Sept.”, KBS World, https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=199505, (Date Accessed: 1.08.2026).

[iii] “Silk Road of Steel: Central Asian Vector of South Korea’s Foreign Policy”, Eurasian Research Institute, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/amp/foreignaffairs/20250627/s-korea-central-asia-summit-postponed-to-next-year-amid-political-fallout, (Date Accessed: 13.08.2026).  

[iv] Aynı yer.

[v] Sung Ji Yeon, “Making The K-Silk Road a Reality”, Current Korea, https://www.korean-culture.org/eng/webzine/202407/index.html, (Date Accessed: 13.08.2026).

[vi] “Central Asia-South Korea Summit: Strategic Expectations and Goals”, The Caspian Post, https://caspianpost.com/analytics/central-asia-south-korea-summit-strategic-expectations-and-goals, (Date Accessed: 13.08.2026).

Banu YAKUBOVA
Banu YAKUBOVA
Banu Yakubova is a senior undergraduate student in the Department of International Relations at Kadir Has University, where she is also pursuing a minor in Social Justice and Policy Studies. As part of the Erasmus+ Exchange Programme, she studied for one semester at Sciences Po Lille in France. Her main research interests include Central Asia, foreign policy analysis, security studies, international law, and human rights. She is fluent in English, Turkish, Russian, and Turkmen, and is currently studying French.

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