Analysis

The NATO Summit in Ankara: Strategic Uncertainties, Security Crises, and Türkiye’s Rising Role

Türkiye is emerging as a strategic actor at the center of NATO and the European security architecture.
NATO membership remains one of the key factors enhancing Türkiye’s strategic weight at both the regional and global levels.
With its developing defense industry, military capabilities, and geopolitical position, Türkiye is a critical actor for European security.

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This post is also available in: Türkçe

The international system has faced many security crises simultaneously in recent years. The Russia-Ukraine War, ongoing instabilities in the Middle East, the United States (US)/Israel-Iran War, China’s rise, and the deepening strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region are reshaping global power balances.

Regional and global instabilities, crises, and wars continue to deeply affect the international system. In the shadow of these developments, “global power balances have not yet been clearly shaped.” “The continuation of uncertainties regarding the future of global power distribution is reducing the predictability of the international system and deepening strategic uncertainties.” Therefore, today’s international relations indicate a “transition period” where the current power balances are being reshaped and uncertainties are increasing.

Especially the fact that the United States has to compete with actors like Russia, China, and Iran on different fronts simultaneously has further intensified discussions about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, the 36th NATO Summit, to be held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, will be a critical platform where not only the alliance’s security policies but also the future of Europe’s defense architecture and transatlantic relations will be discussed. The fact that the summit will be held in Ankara will be noteworthy in terms of highlighting Türkiye’s strategic weight within NATO and its central role in European security on the international stage.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO operated as one of the fundamental elements of the Western security architecture. The expectations that the alliance would lose its function after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not materialize. On the contrary, NATO has continued its expansion toward Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic region by incorporating a large number of former Warsaw Pact members. However, the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the Russia-Ukraine War that began in 2022 have marked the beginning of a new era in European security. These developments have led to a re-examination of issues such as NATO’s deterrence capacity, the sharing of defense burdens, and Europe’s military capabilities.

Increasing Defense Spending in Response to Rising Security Risks from Usual Comfort

Throughout the Cold War and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “deterrence” provided by NATO has been one of the fundamental pillars of the European security architecture. Thanks to the Alliance’s collective defense capacity, European countries have been able to maintain their security without directly engaging in military conflict with the Soviet Union and later Russia. This situation has created an important “comfort” zone not only for European countries but also for the United States.

NATO’s deterrence has provided European countries with relatively “low-cost high security guarantees.” European countries have limited their defense spending instead of investing in comprehensive military capabilities and have largely met their security needs under the NATO umbrella. Thus, many European countries have had the opportunity to direct their economic resources toward social welfare policies and economic development instead of defense. Similarly, the United States has also benefited from the deterrence provided by NATO, maintaining European security to a large extent without the need for direct military intervention, and has had the opportunity to develop its defense industry and military capacity thanks to the contributions of its allies to the alliance.

However, the “comfortable living” conditions in both European countries and the United States have begun to erode over time. Especially the discussions about Ukraine and Georgia potentially joining NATO in the future during the Bucharest Summit held in April 2008 were perceived by Russia as a direct security threat. The Moscow administration viewed NATO’s eastward expansion to include former Warsaw Pact countries as contrary to its security interests and began to adopt harsher policies to halt this process.

Russia’s increasingly hardline stance against NATO expansion has significantly altered the European security environment. Especially the Russia-Georgia War, the annexation of Crimea, and ultimately the Russia-Ukraine War have led to a questioning of the security perceptions that have been valid in Europe for many years. These developments have brought into question the adequacy of NATO’s security understanding based solely on “deterrence.” Thus, over the years, the effectiveness of the “low-cost security deterrence mechanism” has begun to weaken day by day, and the issue of “financial burden sharing within the alliance has increased tensions.” The continuation of the Russia-Ukraine War and concerns that Russia may pose broader threats to Europe’s security in the future have made it necessary to increase defense spending in NATO.

The Transformation of NATO and the Future of European Security

At NATO’s founding, the concept of collective defense against the Soviet threat was decisive. Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance became the cornerstone of European security and operated as the military organization of the Western world under U.S. leadership.

Although NATO’s future was questioned following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Alliance adopted a strategy of expansion rather than dissolution. A significant portion of the former Warsaw Pact countries were admitted to NATO, thereby expanding the Alliance eastward across Europe. This process also proceeded in parallel with the European Union’s (EU) expansion policies.

However, beginning in the 2000s, Russia’s resurgence and China’s rise on a global scale led to the emergence of new balances in the international system. In particular, Russia’s intervention in Georgia (August 2008), its annexation of Crimea (March 2014), and its large-scale military operations against Ukraine (February 2022) have necessitated a reassessment of NATO’s security strategies.

One of the key challenges facing NATO today is how to share the burden of rising defense costs. The United States has long called on its European allies to increase their defense spending. While the U.S. administration seeks greater financial burden-sharing as part of efforts to enhance NATO’s military capabilities, European countries are concerned about uncertainties regarding the future of U.S. security commitments.

For this reason, it is expected that issues such as NATO’s defense spending, deterrence against Russia, China’s rise, and NATO’s future strategic direction will take center stage at the Ankara Summit.

Türkiye-NATO Relations: From Strategic Partnership to a Central Role

Since joining NATO in 1952, Türkiye has been one of the alliance’s most important members. Its geographical location, military capabilities, position at the crossroads of trade routes, and proximity to crisis regions have made Türkiye an indispensable actor for NATO.

During the Cold War, Türkiye was primarily viewed as a country safeguarding the alliance’s southeastern flank. However, recent developments in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean have further heightened Türkiye’s strategic importance. Following the Russia-Ukraine War, issues such as Black Sea security, the protection of energy routes, the importance of logistics hubs, and the maintenance of regional stability have brought Türkiye’s role to the forefront.

Within the NATO context, there have been serious disagreements and crises from time to time between Türkiye and both the United States and European countries. Prominent examples of these disagreements include the 1964 Johnson Letter and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Türkiye following the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. Additionally, the supportive policies of many EU and NATO members toward terrorist organizations such as the PKK/YPG/SDG—which pose a threat to Türkiye’s national security—have also caused tensions between Ankara and its Western allies.

The Grand National Assembly of Türkiye’s (TBMM) rejection of the March 1, 2003 resolution and the subsequent events led to a serious crisis of confidence in Turkish-American relations. Furthermore, Türkiye’s exclusion from the F-35 program and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions against Türkiye are among the most significant examples of recent issues between Türkiye and the United States. Undoubtedly, these issues are not independent of Türkiye’s relations with NATO. 

Nevertheless, “NATO membership retains its strategic importance for Türkiye.” Being part of the Alliance provides Türkiye with the opportunity to have a say in decision-making mechanisms and to exercise its veto power. For example, had Türkiye not possessed veto power, the relations and membership processes of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (GRC) with NATO might have taken a different course. Furthermore, Türkiye’s NATO membership strengthens its strategic and diplomatic position vis-à-vis Russia, thereby enhancing Ankara’s political clout at both the regional and international levels. In this regard, NATO membership offers Türkiye significant advantages not only in countering external threats but also in influencing developments within the Alliance. In short, “NATO membership also protects Türkiye against potential threats from other Alliance members.” Therefore, from Türkiye’s perspective, the costs of remaining outside NATO are higher than the costs of being part of the Alliance. Furthermore, NATO membership continues to be one of the key factors that enhance Türkiye’s strategic weight at the regional and global levels.

Türkiye-EU Relations and the New Reality in the European Security Architecture

Discussions regarding European security can also be considered in the context of Türkiye-EU relations. In recent years, EU member states have sought greater cooperation in the defense sector due to security threats originating from Russia. However, efforts to enhance Europe’s security capabilities have brought Türkiye’s role back into focus.

With its growing defense industry, military capabilities, and geopolitical position, Türkiye is a critical actor for European security. Nevertheless, the fact that Türkiye’s EU accession process has stalled, the Customs Union has not been updated, and no progress has been made on visa liberalization indicates that structural issues between the parties persist.

The security environment that emerged following the Russia-Ukraine War has, however, made Europe’s strategic need for Türkiye more apparent. While European countries value Türkiye’s contributions in the security domain, they simultaneously maintain disagreements on political issues. This situation creates a significant contradiction within the European security architecture. In the coming period, whether Europe views Türkiye solely as a security partner, a strategic partner, or a necessary actor for cooperation will be one of the key factors determining the future of both Türkiye-EU and Türkiye-NATO relations.

Conclusion

The profound changes and transformations taking place in the international system are fueling unpredictability and uncertainty regarding NATO’s future. This situation has negatively impacted NATO’s strategic coherence and institutional effectiveness, leading the alliance to face multidimensional strategic dilemmas. The number of issues sparking debate regarding disagreements within the alliance is growing by the day. Strategic dilemmas facing NATO:

• The erosion of NATO’s deterrence,

• The reluctance of both the U.S. and European countries to give up their accustomed comfortable lifestyles,

• The question of how much of the financial burden of defense will be borne by whom, 

• The Russia-Ukraine War,

• China’s rise, and

• Wars in the Middle East. 

It does not appear likely that these discussions will translate into concrete policy proposals at the 36th NATO Summit to be held in Ankara. Hosting the Summit in Ankara will provide an opportunity to reassess Türkiye’s position within NATO and its role in European security.

Today, Türkiye is no longer merely a border country safeguarding NATO’s southern flank. Türkiye, which exerts influence across a broad geopolitical area stretching from the Black Sea to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Eastern Mediterranean, is evolving into a strategic actor at the heart of NATO and the European security architecture. Consequently, an approach that excludes Türkiye’s role in discussions about the future of European security appears increasingly unsustainable from the perspective of Europe’s security. 

Doç. Dr. Mustafa ÖZALP
Doç. Dr. Mustafa ÖZALP
He was born on December 25, 1983, in the village of Uzakçay, Akdağmadeni district, Yozgat. ÖZALP completed his primary education in his village of birth, and his secondary and high school education in Ankara. At the end of 2004, he went to Austria for higher education. ÖZALP, who has a Turkish immigrant background as his parents lived in Vienna, held various positions in many civil society organizations, especially Turkish civil society organizations, during his years in Vienna. ÖZALP completed his undergraduate and graduate studies in Political Science at the University of Vienna in Austria between 2005 and 2015, and he finished his doctorate in international development at the same university. ÖZALP, who started working as a faculty member at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Yozgat Bozok University in June 2016, served as the director of the Akdağmadeni Vocational School of the same university from 2016 to 2019. ÖZALP is also a founding faculty member of the Department of International Relations at Yozgat Bozok University, which opened in 2016, and he is still working in this department. ÖZALP, who received the title of associate professor in International Relations in 2021, has published four books, two of which are in German, edited two books, one of which is in German, contributed to five book chapters, and published articles in over twenty international peer-reviewed journals. ÖZALP's academic research areas include energy integration in the Turkic world, trade corridors, and transportation diplomacy, as well as the Turkistan region, European energy policies, the Arctic region, energy security, global warming, climate change, and migration. ÖZALP, who speaks German at an academic level, is married and the father of a daughter.

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