The Iran war has once again intensified the debate on energy security. The fact that an average of 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products were transported daily through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025 already sufficiently explains the place of this route in global maritime trade.[i] The Iran war has once again hardened the debate on energy security. The tension experienced today has not only disrupted the technical balances of energy markets but has also brought back to the table a fundamental question that countries have postponed for decades. For how much longer can an economy tie its vital energy needs to a few narrow straits, a few producer countries, and fragile maritime routes? The weight of this question increases as the war continues.
The paradox here is highly striking. In the short term, the war is increasing the geopolitical weight of fossil fuels once again by driving up oil and gas prices. Many governments, as an initial reflex, are activating strategic reserves, seeking urgent supply agreements, and even reconsidering the use of coal and liquid fuels in some places. In the medium term, however, it produces the opposite result. The greater the crisis becomes, the more visible the security cost of a fossil fuel order dependent on external sources becomes. For this reason, the Iran war is both strengthening the age of oil and accelerating the desire to move beyond it. The paradox emerges precisely here.
The possibility that this war may accelerate the energy transition is related not only to environmental politics but also to the logic of security. For many years, the advocacy of renewable energy was constructed mainly through the language of the climate crisis, carbon reduction, and sustainable development. In recent weeks, however, a completely different language has come to the forefront. Solar, wind, nuclear energy, storage technologies, and grid resilience are now being defended more strongly under the heading of national security and strategic autonomy rather than under the heading of the environment. For states dependent on energy imports, the main issue is not only to achieve cleaner energy, but also to establish a system that is less vulnerable to external shocks. The Iran war is functioning as a harsh warning that accelerates this thinking.
On the European front, this reality is being felt more clearly. Statements made in recent days indicate that the Middle East-based energy shock may exert more visible pressure on the European economy in April and May.[ii] The possibility of supply tightening in products such as diesel and jet fuel demonstrates that war cannot be understood solely through oil prices. For Europe, the problem is not only the increase in barrel prices, but also the impact on the refined products chain and industrial production. In such periods, renewable energy, storage, energy efficiency, and electrification policies cease to be matters of environmental sensitivity and turn into instruments of economic resilience.
A similar concern is also coming to the forefront in Asia. Japan, South Korea, and many import dependent economies are highly dependent on oil and LNG flows originating from the Middle East. In times of war, this dependence returns in the form of inflation, exchange rate pressure, and industrial costs. The recent emphasis by officials of the Bank of Japan on inflation risks despite pressure on growth shows how energy crises constrain monetary policy.[iii] Such examples suggest that the transition to renewable energy is regarded as important not only for achieving climate targets but also for making monetary policy and industrial planning more predictable.
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to interpret this process as a simple linear progression. War may accelerate the energy transition, but it does not do so automatically. This is because, in times of crisis, governments often seek short term stability before taking long term transformation steps. For this reason, greater emergency oil purchases, new LNG contracts, temporary returns to coal, refinery incentives, and the use of reserves are not surprising. The Iran war is producing the same reflex. In other words, while security pressure gives strategic value to renewable and nuclear options on the one hand, it also increases the urgent importance of the fossil fuel system on the other. Therefore, the accelerated transition will not proceed in a straight line. Forward moves and reversals will continue to coexist for some time.
Nevertheless, the structural direction is changing. According to IRENA data, renewable capacity increased by 585 gigawatts in 2024 and accounted for more than 90 percent of total capacity growth.[iv] This data shows that the transition had already been progressing before the outbreak of war. Therefore, it can be stated that the Iran war was not the factor that initiated this process, but rather a development that gave it a new meaning. Renewable energy is no longer treated merely as an environmental necessity. It is now defended with harder geopolitical justifications because of its capacity to create domestic resources, reduce external dependence, limit price volatility, and produce strategic autonomy. This suggests that the energy transition may move beyond the realm of ideological debate and become more firmly embedded at the center of state reasoning.
The security paradox of oil becomes particularly evident at this point. As the war demonstrates how indispensable oil is, it also shows how costly it is to remain dependent on it. Every contraction in Hormuz, every delay in tanker routes, and every increase in prices make the centralized structure of the fossil fuel system more visible. Solar and wind energy have their own problems. Critical minerals, supply chains, grid investment, and storage issues still create major challenges. Nevertheless, the most important advantage of this system is that it is not dependent on a few military chokepoints. For this reason, the security pressure generated by the war has begun to present the energy transition as a strategic necessity rather than merely a moral issue.
In conclusion, the Iran war will not initiate the energy transition on its own, but it may become a strong driving force that accelerates it. In the short term, the geopolitical weight of oil and gas will increase, and states will act with an emergency supply reflex. Viewed from a broader perspective, however, war makes the security cost of an externally dependent fossil fuel order visible. The real acceleration may emerge precisely here. Renewable energy, nuclear capacity, storage, grid modernization, and energy efficiency policies may, in the coming period, move to the center of debates on security and sovereignty beyond climate targets. The current power of oil may further strengthen the determination to reduce oil dependence in the energy order of tomorrow. The most striking legacy of this war will probably be shaped here.
[i] “Strait of Hormuz”, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz, (Date Accessed: 03.04.2026).
[ii] “Europe Must Prepare for ‘Long-Lasting’ Energy Shock, EU Energy Commissioner Tells FT”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/europe-must-prepare-long-lasting-energy-shock-eu-energy-commissioner-tells-ft-2026-04-03/, (Date Accessed: 03.04.2026).
[iii] Leika Kihara, “BOJ Keeps Rate-Hike Door Open Even as Iran War Squeezes Firms”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/boj-raise-rates-with-eye-iran-war-fallout-central-bank-official-says-2026-04-03/, (Date Accessed: 03.04.2026).
[iv] “Record-Breaking Annual Growth in Renewable Power Capacity”, International Renewable Energy Agency, https://www.irena.org/News/pressreleases/2025/Mar/Record-Breaking-Annual-Growth-in-Renewable-Power-Capacity, (Date Accessed: 03.04.2026).
