The Thucydides Trap is a concept in international relations that describes the likelihood of crises arising from a rising power’s challenge to an established power, which may lead the two into war. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides, in his work describing the Peloponnesian War, noted that “the emergence of fear in Sparta, the established power, in the face of Athens’ rise made the Peloponnesian War inevitable.”
The figure who has brought the concept of the Thucydides Trap back into the spotlight today is Graham Allison. In his 2017 study, Allison argued that competition between a rising power and an established hegemonic power has often led to war throughout history.
The general logic of how the Thucydides Trap operates can be explained in three stages:
1. A new power rises rapidly.
2. The current global hegemonic power perceives this rise as a threat to itself.
3. As a result of shifting power balances on a global scale, mutual fear, miscalculation, an arms race, crises, and security concerns are increasing between the established power and the rising power.
4. This situation, in turn, increases the likelihood of war between the parties.
Today, while China is defined as the rising power, the United States (U.S.) is regarded as the current global hegemon. The ongoing trade wars, technological competition, the Iran-U.S./Israel conflict, the Taiwan issue, the geopolitical struggle in the Asia-Pacific, and competition over rare earth elements between the two countries are analyzed within the framework of the Thucydides Trap. The current international relations system has entered a transitional phase—a period marked by shifts in global hegemony and power transitions. In this process, the stakes regarding areas of competition between states have not yet been settled, and the pieces have not yet fallen into place. In short, the power struggle between regional and global powers is intensifying day by day.
When considering critiques of the Thucydides Trap, it is evident that not all power transitions in history have led to war. Following technological advancements, power transitions have also occurred without war. Today, in particular, the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons can prevent large-scale wars from breaking out. Additionally, increasing interdependence across various fields—especially the economy—can raise the costs of war, thereby creating a deterrent effect against major conflicts.
For this reason, the Thucydides Trap can be viewed not as an inevitable fate, but as a risk model that requires careful attention. Within an academic framework, the Thucydides Trap can be defined as a “theory of power transition” that argues how geopolitical and geoeconomic competition arising from shifts in the balance of power in international relations, combined with scientific and technological advancements, deepens the security dilemma and increases the likelihood of war among great powers.
The Peloponnesian War, which took place in ancient Greece between 431 and 404 BCE, was fought between Athens—the most powerful naval force of the era—and Sparta, which possessed the strongest land army. Although truces were occasionally established between the parties, the war lasted approximately 27 years. The victor of the war was Sparta, the hegemonic power of the time. Drawing a parallel with the present day, Athens corresponds to China as the rising power, while Sparta corresponds to the United States as the established hegemonic power. In the final stages of the war, Sparta established a powerful navy with military and financial support from the Persian Empire and broke Athens’ naval supremacy. As a result of the war, Athens was forced to surrender to Sparta.
To summarize the outcomes of the Peloponnesian War:
• Athens, the rising power, saw its dominance in the Aegean Sea and surrounding regions come to a complete end.
• Sparta, the established/hegemonic power, briefly became the strongest state in Greece.
• The Greek city-states were severely weakened economically and militarily.
• By the end of the long war, Athens was completely defeated, while Sparta suffered deep structural damage.
• Sparta’s military and economic weakening facilitated the rise of the Kingdom of Macedonia.
• During the reign of Philip II, father of Alexander the Great, control over the Greek city-states passed to the Kingdom of Macedonia.
Neither Athens nor Sparta achieved a lasting military victory following the Peloponnesian War. Since both powers had exhausted each other militarily and economically, the Kingdom of Macedonia capitalized on the resulting power vacuum. In this context, the ultimate winner was the Kingdom of Macedonia, which quickly established regional and global hegemony.
At the summit held in Beijing on May 14–15, 2026, between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Xi issued a warning: “Let us not fall into the Thucydides Trap.” In this context, the key message Xi sought to convey to Washington was that “in the event of a potential war, neither Beijing nor Washington would be the true winner.” Even if one side were to gain a relative advantage in a potential war, that advantage would not be permanent. According to Xi, a potential war between China and the U.S. could, much like the rise of the Kingdom of Macedonia, provide an opportunity for third parties to gain power in the long term.
In the context of the Thucydides Trap, if the rising power of the time, Athens, is likened to China, and the established hegemonic power, Sparta, is likened to the U.S., it is evident that the actor that emerges from the fray and reaps the ultimate benefit is the Kingdom of Macedonia. The fundamental question here is: Which state today can be associated with the influence of the Kingdom of Macedonia in the past? Following a potential U.S.-China war, which country will emerge as a third actor as a result of both nations exhausting each other’s capabilities? Türkiye, the Organization of Turkic States, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, or some other European state?”
Donald Trump requested a meeting with Xi Jinping in March 2026, but this meeting was postponed. The postponement was analyzed as stemming from Trump’s desire to secure a stronger position regarding Iran in order to sit at the negotiating table with China from a position of greater strength. However, since the expected success in the Iran War was not achieved, Trump was forced to attend the summit held in Beijing on May 14–15, 2026, from a relatively weak position. The Taiwan issue was particularly brought to the agenda at the summit. It was China that raised this issue. While in the past this topic was mostly raised by the U.S., this time China directly emphasized its own red lines. Xi clearly stated that Taiwan is a “strategic red line” for China. Overall, the summit revealed a tendency to keep the competition between the U.S. and China at a manageable level before it escalates into full-blown conflict. The parties preferred to act based on a concept of controlled competition rather than seeking full consensus.
Trump’s attendance at the summit in Beijing alongside a large number of wealthy businesspeople is significant in that it highlights the U.S. economy’s dependence on China and the influence of major capital groups on foreign policy.
Just as he did during his first term, Trump imposed tariffs on China in the early months of his second term; however, China’s retaliation deepened the trade war. The rising cost of products exported from China to the U.S. created inflationary pressure in the U.S., forcing Trump to back down. No power can establish lasting hegemony through protectionist policies and trade restrictions alone. China has risen through international institutions established by the U.S.—such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization—which were expected to operate in the U.S.’s favor, and by enhancing its competitive strength, it has begun to challenge the U.S. In the context of economic relations, China has reduced its imports of agricultural products from the U.S. (particularly corn and soybeans) by approximately 80 percent. This situation has negatively impacted American farmers. China, meanwhile, has begun importing these products largely from Brazil.
The United States and China are both competing and maintaining an interdependent economic relationship across numerous trade routes and logistics hubs, including the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. As of 2025, the trade volume between the two countries stands at approximately $445 billion. In the same year, U.S. exports to China amounted to approximately $106 billion, while imports from China totaled approximately $438 billion. This indicates a significant trade deficit in favor of China and to the detriment of the U.S.On a global scale, approximately 15% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is generated in the U.S., while approximately 30% is generated in China. The U.S.’s total economic size is approximately 30 trillion dollars, while China’s economic size stands at approximately 20 trillion dollars. Although these two countries may appear to be rivals, there is a multidimensional interdependence between them. To raise the standard of living for its population of approximately 1.4 billion and sustain its economic growth, China must engage in uninterrupted and sustainable import and export activities with all regions of the world, particularly the United States, which has a population of approximately 340 million. Consequently, a potential conflict between the two sides has the potential to produce consequences that could deeply affect both the U.S. and China, as predicted by the Thucydides Trap theory. Furthermore, a potential war between these two superpowers would not only deeply shake the two countries but also the global economy and the international system.
