Two critical diplomatic engagements that took place in China in May 2026 are noteworthy not only in terms of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda but also in light of the evolving nature of the international system. The meetings between[i]Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump during the latter’s visit to Beijing from May 13–15, 2026, and the subsequent invitation[ii] of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing on May 19–20, 2026, highlight a new trend increasingly evident in Chinese foreign policy: high-profile leader diplomacy and efforts to establish diplomatic centrality.
Undoubtedly, discussions regarding China’s rise or the international system’s gradual shift toward a multipolar structure are not new. For a long time, the literature on international relations has addressed the erosion of American hegemony, shifts in the distribution of power, and debates on the post-unipolar system. However, what has drawn attention recently is that China is no longer merely an actor observing this evolving system from the outside or supporting it through its economic capacity, but is actively seeking to shape it as one of the system’s diplomatic and political centers. In other words, the issue is not merely a shift in the distribution of power, but a transformation in the role China seeks to assume within this new system.
The Xi Jinping-Donald Trump meeting is highly symbolic in this regard. While the meeting’s agenda featured classic power-politics topics such as technological competition, the Taiwan issue, trade tensions, and Indo-Pacific security, the truly striking aspect is the way the meeting was staged. Beijing’s hosting of Trump with a lavish diplomatic protocol reflects China’s claim to be a diplomatic hub in the global power competition.
This marks a clear departure from the low-profile and cautious diplomatic approach that has long formed the foundation of post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. The famous “hide your strength, bide your time (taoguang yanghui)” approach of the Deng Xiaoping era demonstrates that China developed a diplomacy based on strategic patience and careful invisibility during its rise.[iii] For nearly four decades, while deepening its economic integration into the international system, China avoided direct claims to geopolitical leadership, presenting itself more as a pragmatic, cautious, and technical actor. However, under Xi Jinping, this approach has been seen to be gradually changing and evolving.
This transformation becomes more meaningful when viewed through the lens of role theory. According to role theory, states act not only in accordance with their material power capabilities but also within the framework of the roles they assign themselves within the international system.[iv] In this context, it can be argued that for a long time, China assumed more limited roles, such as a rising yet cautious power, a responsible economic partner, or a representative of the developing world. Today, however, it is evident that Beijing has begun to position itself increasingly as a system-shaping, balancing, and even rule-setting actor in certain areas. Yet these roles are not merely a matter of states’ self-definitions; they are also shaped by the extent to which other actors accept this role and adjust their positions accordingly. From this perspective, it is noteworthy not only that China is striving to position itself in this manner but also that other major powers have begun to engage with Beijing within this framework. Trump’s visit to Beijing and Putin’s subsequent move to Beijing with the aim of deepening strategic coordination with China demonstrate that the international role China is seeking to assume is increasingly recognized by other actors as well.
Another important point here is that it is not only China’s capabilities that are changing, but also its behavioral repertoire. This is because being a great power does not merely mean possessing economic or military capabilities; it is also linked to the ability to make that power visible, to generate diplomatic centrality, and to become a key shaper of meaning in international politics. For this reason, diplomatic actions during the Xi Jinping era can be interpreted as an example of a great power policy based on visibility. China is no longer merely a growing economy but has become an actor that performatively displays its great power identity.
Putin’s invitation to Beijing immediately following his visit to Trump is also a key component of this strategic performance. Beijing thus projects the image of a geopolitical hub capable of both negotiating directly with Washington and maintaining strategic coordination with Moscow. In particular, the sharp rupture in Western-Russian relations following the Russia-Ukraine War has provided China with significant diplomatic maneuvering room. During Putin’s visit, key topics included energy cooperation, alternative financial mechanisms, technology sharing, and economic coordination in response to Western sanctions.
At this point, it is not sufficient to explain the shift in China’s foreign policy behavior solely through realist power politics. It can also be argued that China is acting as a strategic learner that has been carefully observing the international system for many years. Beijing has carefully analyzed the United States’ hegemonic capacity in the post-Cold War era, the costs of Western interventionism, the consequences of Russia’s revisionist moves, and Europe’s strategic fragmentation. Consequently, the more visible and assertive Chinese diplomacy emerging today can be viewed as the result of a long-term strategic learning process rather than a sudden shift in direction.
In this context, the current global environment presents significant opportunities for China. The Russia-Ukraine War, energy crises, global economic and political fragilities, political polarization within the West, and fluctuations in U.S. foreign policy are making it easier for Beijing to carve out new diplomatic spaces for itself. China’s recent diplomatic behavior indicates that it views the uncertainties within the system not as risks but as strategic opportunities. This also suggests that Beijing no longer perceives the international system as a fixed hierarchy centered solely around American power. Instead, China is seeking to enhance its diplomatic centrality by leveraging the spaces created by the current power fragmentation and geopolitical fractures. In other words, China no longer appears to be merely an actor seeking to capitalize on the economic opportunities offered by the system, but rather a power striving to turn the gaps emerging within the system into strategic advantages.
The resurgence of leader-centered diplomacy is also significant in this context. In particular, the shift during the Trump era from institutional diplomacy toward personal contacts between leaders and high-profile summits has fostered a more personalized diplomatic culture in international politics. China’s increasingly leader-centered diplomacy in recent years can also be interpreted within this context of transformation. However, it is evident that China is not merely adapting to current diplomatic trends but is also transforming this new diplomatic language into a tool of its own great power strategy.
In conclusion, the leader-centered active diplomacy pursued by China during the Xi Jinping era reveals a shift in Beijing’s perception of its role within the international system. China is no longer merely an emerging economic actor; it is acting like a superpower that generates diplomatic centrality, engages in geopolitical balancing, and seeks to have a say in the system’s future. While this does not yet indicate that the international system has become entirely China-centric, it does reveal that interpreting the system solely through the lens of American power is becoming increasingly inadequate. For in today’s international politics, the issue is no longer merely which state is the strongest, but which actor possesses the capacity to influence the system’s direction and generate new diplomatic meanings.
[i] “Chine-Etats-Unis: un sommet sans accrocs, mais non sans arrière-pensées”, Le Monde, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2026/05/16/chine-etats-unis-un-sommet-sans-accrocs-mais-non-sans-arriere-pensees_6689869_3232.html?search-type=classic&ise_click_rank=4, (access date: 17.05.2026).
[ii] “Vladimir Poutine attendu en Chine quelques jours après le séjour de Donald Trump à Pékin”, Euronews, https://fr.euronews.com/2026/05/16/vladimir-poutine-attendu-en-chine-quelques-jours-apres-le-sejour-de-donald-trump-a-pekin, (access date: 17.05.2026).
[iii] Xuetong, Y. (2014). From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(2), 154.
[iv] Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 245-246.
