Relations between the United States (U.S.) and Europe have once again entered a period of tension during Donald Trump’s second term as president. Strategic differences in transatlantic relations have become more apparent, particularly following disputes over tariffs and security crises that have emerged around the Strait of Hormuz. Germany, which serves as the economic and political engine of the European Union, has also been directly affected by this process and is experiencing differences of opinion with Washington on a number of issues.
However, the differences of opinion between Germany and the U.S. are not new. One of the most significant examples of this is the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder refused to participate in the Iraq War and, together with France and Russia, adopted a united stance against the military operation. The joint statement issued by Berlin, Paris, and Moscow has gone down in history as one of the most significant examples of multilateral diplomacy in international politics at the time.
During the Schröder administration, Germany pursued a pragmatic foreign policy that sought to balance national security interests with Europe’s strategic interests. Within this framework, close relations were established with Russia in many areas, particularly energy and the economy, with the aim of contributing to European security through mutual dependence. Looking back from today’s perspective, the changing international landscape demonstrates that this policy was based on rational justifications in the short term.
However, Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and, in particular, the Ukraine Crisis that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 created a new rupture in Europe-Russia relations. Consequently, the previously established cooperation mechanisms have largely lost their functionality, and Europe has been forced to align more closely with the United States on security matters. The Russia-Ukraine War, which began in 2022, has further accelerated this process, fundamentally reshaping Europe’s security architecture.
In the new world order, it seems inevitable that countries with a strong state tradition, such as Germany, will assume a more assertive geopolitical role. In this regard, the steps Berlin has taken in recent years to enhance its military capabilities are noteworthy. While the war in Ukraine has entailed significant costs for Germany in terms of energy security, it has also created important opportunities that could strengthen Europe’s political and geopolitical leadership. Germany’s ability to maintain and strengthen its role as Europe’s economic and political locomotive will depend on its performance in the face of current security crises.
Indeed, the German government’s allocation of historic levels of funding to defense spending in its 2027 budget draft is a concrete indication of the changing geopolitical reality. The shutdown of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline following the Russia-Ukraine War has prompted Germany to seek alternative energy supply routes; investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, meanwhile, have demonstrated that energy security has become a fundamental element of the national strategy. In addition, security crises in the Gulf region and instability around the Strait of Hormuz are placing additional pressure on the German economy in terms of energy costs.
The “Zeitenwende” (turning point) strategy, which has entered Germany’s foreign policy literature during this process, aims not only to increase defense spending but also to position Berlin as a more decisive actor in Europe’s geopolitical future. Security concerns are transforming Germany not only into an economic power but also into one of Europe’s leading geopolitical centers.
Another key dimension of Germany’s evolving geopolitical strategy is the increasingly evident strategic competition with the United States over Europe’s energy security. Although Washington and Berlin remain allies under the NATO umbrella, divergences are emerging in their approaches to Europe’s future energy architecture. Following the cutoff of natural gas flows from Russia and the shutdown of the Nord Stream pipelines, the U.S. has become one of Europe’s primary energy suppliers by significantly increasing its LNG exports. While this development has contributed to Europe’s energy supply security in the short term, it has also increased the European economy’s dependence on U.S. LNG and created cost pressures on the international competitiveness of Germany’s energy-intensive industries in particular.
For Berlin, energy security does not merely mean ending dependence on Russia; it also requires the development of a diversified energy strategy that avoids excessive reliance on any single external supplier. In this regard, Germany is focusing not only on developing its LNG infrastructure but also on renewable energy sources, the hydrogen economy, and strengthening cooperation with alternative energy partners such as the Gulf states and Norway. Thus, energy security transcends being merely an economic issue and becomes one of the key tools in the struggle for geopolitical influence. In this context, the competition emerging between the U.S. and Germany can be viewed not as a conflict between two allies, but rather as a reflection of differing visions regarding how Europe’s energy order will take shape and to what extent Europe’s strategic autonomy will be secured.
The phrase “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”—attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, and frequently cited in the literature on international relations—is regarded as a symbolic assessment summarizing the Alliance’s fundamental strategic approach during its founding period. This perspective played a decisive role in shaping the European security architecture throughout the Cold War. However, the transformations taking place in the international system—Russia’s re-emergence as a revisionist power, China’s rise on a global scale, and Germany’s efforts to increasingly convert its economic capacity into political and military power—make it necessary to reassess this historical understanding of security.
The European Union, which after the end of the Cold War was largely based on a U.S.-centered approach to security, now faces multidimensional security threats. As the possibility of conventional war returns to the forefront, proxy wars, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and sabotage attempts against critical infrastructure are emerging as key elements of hybrid warfare. In this context, not only Russia but also China—with its global economic and technological capabilities—has become a key geopolitical actor in Europe’s security calculations. Consequently, the security paradigm that centered on containing Germany during NATO’s founding era has given way to a new geopolitical reality in which Germany assumes greater responsibility for European security.
The existence of external threats necessitates cooperation with other external actors. For this reason, Europe’s security architecture must be strengthened not only within the NATO framework but also through various regional partnerships. The defense cooperation developed between Germany and the United Kingdom is a significant example in this regard. Similarly, deepening strategic relations with Türkiye is also gaining increasing importance for Berlin.
Thanks to the progress it has made in the defense industry in recent years, the domestic technologies it has developed—particularly unmanned aerial systems—and its growing military production capacity, Türkiye has become one of the countries attracting Europe’s attention. In addition, Türkiye stands out as a key diplomatic actor in the international system due to its geopolitical location, which connects Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Ankara’s strategic importance is further enhanced by its ability to engage in dialogue and undertake mediation efforts in various crisis regions.
From Berlin’s perspective, partnership with Türkiye is now viewed not only as a key component of bilateral relations but also as an essential part of Europe’s long-term security architecture. Should Germany fail to develop this cooperation, it is likely that other European states will establish more comprehensive strategic partnerships with Ankara. For this reason, Türkiye is a key actor that cannot be overlooked in Germany’s new geopolitical assessments. As a result, the trade and strategic disputes that have emerged between the U.S. and Europe during Trump’s second presidential term are reshaping Europe’s approach to security and foreign policy. Germany is at the center of this transformation; it is enhancing its defense capabilities while restructuring its energy security and developing new strategic partnerships. It is anticipated that cooperation to be developed in the coming period with countries experienced in the defense sector—such as Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and, in certain areas, Pakistan—will be among the key elements of Europe’s new security architecture. As the multipolar international system strengthens, it is assessed that Germany will continue to redefine both its leadership role within Europe and its global geopolitical position.
