Discussions surrounding a possible trilateral summit between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, which came to the fore in October 2026, have also brought the parties’ expectations for such a summit into focus. While Trump is primarily emphasizing issues such as arms control and nuclear risks, Putin may seek to reopen negotiations on Ukraine and NATO expansion. China, drawn into the negotiations between the United States and Russia, may find an opportunity to articulate its own expectations and principles.
The conferences held after World War II served as platforms for major powers seeking to reshape the international order in line with their own interests.[i] The Yalta Conference, held in February 1945, was one of the meetings that shaped the postwar political order in Europe at a time when the defeat of Nazi Germany was approaching.[ii] However, commitments concerning postwar elections and the principle of national self-determination failed to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence, particularly in Eastern Europe. This historical experience demonstrates that agreements reached by major powers in the name of stability may fail to safeguard the free will of the countries concerned.[iii]
Today’s circumstances, however, differ considerably from those of 1945. While the United States, Russia, and China do not share an alliance based on a common wartime experience, they compete across multiple domains, including global influence, technology, trade, and military superiority. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to interpret a potential trilateral summit as a pre-agreed plan to divide up the world. Nevertheless, such a summit could provide a negotiating platform on which the three countries might temporarily reconcile their strategic objectives. The principal danger is that, despite their disagreements with one another, the three countries could reach an understanding that disregards the interests of third countries. The most significant actor whose interests could be overlooked is Europe.
For Trump, a trilateral meeting would offer an opportunity to portray himself as a leader capable of ending wars, building peace, and brokering agreements among major powers. He may also seek tangible gains in areas such as trade, energy, sanctions, and nuclear arms control. Accordingly, it would be misguided to interpret Trump’s efforts to engage with Russia and China solely through the lens of Ukraine and European security. For Putin, meanwhile, the summit’s most significant benefit would be the weakening of Russia’s international isolation and Moscow’s renewed recognition as one of the principal powers shaping the future of European security.[iv] On Ukraine, Russia is not merely seeking a ceasefire; it also wants the war to end in a manner consistent with its own strategic objectives.[v] From Xi’s perspective, managing economic and technological competition with Washington is a primary objective. Moreover, in the rivalry between Russia and the United States, China could serve as a balancing actor by virtue of its principled foreign policy stance.
Indeed, China could expand its room for maneuver in foreign policy by negotiating at the same table as the United States and Russia.[vi] While maintaining its strategic relationship with Moscow, Beijing must also manage the costs of direct confrontation with Washington. Furthermore, Russia’s diplomatic objectives and China’s long-term interests do not always align. In fact, China’s principled position in defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty runs counter to Russia’s interests.[vii] Consequently, a trilateral summit could force China to adopt an explicit position on particularly sensitive issues such as Ukraine and nuclear disarmament. China’s principled approach to foreign policy is a source of discomfort for both Russia and the United States. Therefore, the considerable difficulty of reaching an understanding with China through diplomacy could push Russia and the United States toward a new accommodation of their own.
China also maintains a principled position on nuclear arms control. While the nuclear capabilities of the United States and Russia are broadly comparable, China’s nuclear arsenal is still in the process of development. Beijing therefore argues that, given the smaller size of its nuclear arsenal relative to those of the United States and Russia, the two countries should reduce their own arsenals first.[viii] For this reason, Washington and Moscow’s desire to bring Beijing into a trilateral arms control arrangement carries the risk of placing constraints on China’s future military capabilities.
Xi may seek symbolic gains by hosting the meeting, but he is unlikely to support a specific compromise on Ukraine or agree to restrictions on China’s nuclear capabilities. Beijing argues in favor of state sovereignty and inclusive approaches to resolving international disputes. Participating in a summit that excludes Ukraine would therefore risk contradicting China’s own rhetoric. Consequently, China could seek to redirect the meeting toward a broader agenda focused on strategic stability, economic relations, or the reduction of nuclear risks. The issues Beijing is willing to bring to the negotiating table, as well as those on which it chooses to maintain ambiguity, could determine the limits of any potential agreement.
In conclusion, discussions surrounding a Trump–Xi–Putin summit bring one of the fundamental contradictions of the international system into sharp relief: while major powers need cooperation to ensure global stability, any potential agreement risks disregarding the interests, security, and sovereignty of other states. The leaders of the three countries could establish a balance of interests through which they temporarily support one another’s objectives. Rather than laying the foundations for international peace, an agreement among major powers could divide the world into new spheres of influence.
[i] “Ukraine’s Peace Shouldn’t be Settled by Washington, Beijing and Moscow”, Jurist, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/10/ukraines-peace-shouldnt-be-settled-in-washington-beijing-and-moscow/, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[ii] “Putin Wants His Own Munich”, The Dispatch, https://thedispatch.com/article/putin-xi-jinping-trump-munich-summit/, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[iii] “Trump, Putin and Xi carving up the world at Yalta 2.0 is a terrible idea”, Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/10/22/if-trump-putin-xi-try-to-carve-up-world-yalta-fail/, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[iv] “Off the Record: Yalta 2.0 spells bad news for Europe in desperate need of a plan”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/25/off-the-record-yalta-20-spells-bad-news-for-europe-in-desperate-need-of-a-plan, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[v] “The Shenzhen Auction: What a Trump–Xi–Putin Summit Would Cost the Allies Who Aren’t Invited”, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/10/26/trump-xi-putin-shenzhen-apec-trilateral-summit-cost-allies/, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[vi] “Why Xi may have his own reasons to avert a US-Russia-China summit”, Merics, https://merics.org/en/comment/why-xi-may-have-his-own-reasons-avert-us-russia-china-summit, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[vii] “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, MFA-PRC, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367485.html, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[viii] “Arms Control, Not Ukraine, Should be on the Superpowers’ Agenda”, Counter Punch, https://www.counterpunch.org/2026/10/26/arms-control-not-ukraine-should-be-on-the-superpowers-agenda/, (Date Accessed: 27.10.2026).
