After the Cold War, although the cohesion of the Western alliance was tested by various crises over time, in recent years the fractures emerging in transatlantic relations have become increasingly visible and profound. As long as the unilateral foreign policy tendencies of the United States (US) do not align with the normative claims of the European Union (EU), marked divergences occur within the West regarding both strategic priorities and approaches to regional issues. This divergence leads not only to the intensification of geopolitical competition among major powers but also to a questioning of the coherence of normative values within the international system. Chronic conflict areas such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the Cyprus Question stand out as contemporary examples exposing the internal contradictions of the Western world, revealing how selective the EU’s discourse on a two-state solution can be in practice.
The US-EU divergence, which became pronounced in the Western world with Donald Trump, has in recent years undergone a concrete test over the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In contrast to the US’s pro-Israel policy of isolation, the decision of many European countries to enter the process of recognizing Palestine has signified both a rupture in transatlantic relations and the unveiling of double standards within the West. Following the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Portugal, the recognition or preparation for recognition by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, Liechtenstein, and New Zealand in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly will result in 157 of the 193 member states recognizing Palestine, thereby increasing the number of recognizing countries within the EU from 12 to 17. This development demonstrates that the two-state solution, which Israel is attempting to eliminate on the ground through settlement policies, has been symbolically revived at the international level.[i]
The recognition of Palestine by France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Malta, and Monaco, when combined with the steps of G7 countries such as Canada and Australia, has revealed a diplomatic tendency in Europe increasingly autonomous from the US.[ii] Although these decisions derive legitimacy from the destruction in Gaza and the reactions to illegal settlements in the West Bank, they are unlikely, for the time being, to contribute directly to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The reservations of Germany, Italy, and Hungary maintain Europe’s fragmentation, yet countries such as Spain and Denmark indicate that the continent can act independently of Washington. Indeed, this situation illustrates that even within the West itself, a common understanding of “the West” has been lost, and that reactions to US unilateral policies are shaping approaches that may be described as “beyond the West.”
However, this process also exposes the deep contradiction between the EU’s normative claims and its policies in Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the EU defends the “two-state” solution as “the only legitimate option” in Palestine, it conversely imposes in Cyprus a “one-state” solution that is unilateral, centered on the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), and reinforces Greek Cypriot dominance. This approach reflects not only the double standard the EU applies within itself but also the effort to tilt strategic balances in the Mediterranean against Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In his speech at the UN General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, reiterated his call for the recognition of the TRNC with the emphasis on “two distinct peoples and two distinct states” alongside the recognition of Palestine by some EU member states; recalling the failure of the federation model, he asserted that the two-state formula is the only realistic path to a lasting settlement.[iii]
President Erdoğan’s call has created not only a significant rupture with respect to Greece but also a critical fracture concerning the cohesion of the EU. Under the pressure of Greece and the GCASC, the EU rejects in Cyprus the very two-state solution it defends in the Palestinian question; this undermines the credibility of its normative power. Emphasizing that Turkish participation is indispensable in energy projects and that their exclusion “cannot succeed,” President Erdoğan declared that Turks would never become a minority and invited the international community to recognize the TRNC. The fact that his speech followed immediately after the postponement of the Erdoğan-Mitsotakis meeting further demonstrated Ankara’s determination to establish a new strategic line in the Eastern Mediterranean.[iv]
The secret procurement of “Barak MX” air defense systems from Israel by the Greek Cypriot administration has deepened the crisis of confidence on the island. The justification by GCASC Defense Minister Palmas –that these acquisitions are necessitated by the presence of “40,000 Turkish soldiers”– in fact reveals that the Turkish side’s deterrent presence constitutes the most crucial element safeguarding stability. That the 460 km-range radars of the Barak MX are capable of monitoring Türkiye’s south indicates that this militarization is intended not merely for defense but also to exert pressure on Türkiye and the TRNC. Consequently, the TRNC’s demand for equal status and a two-state solution has gained further legitimacy in the face of these developments. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s message that “we will intervene if the balance is disrupted” underlines not only deterrence but also the necessity of establishing regional stability on the basis of equality.[v]
According to Forbes’ assessment, although this process may not generate a new “missile crisis,” GCASC’s unilateral militarization policies are undermining the prospects for a solution.[vi] The impasse of the “Great Sea Interconnector” (GSI) project, due to financial and geopolitical obstacles, further illustrates that the EU’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy centered on the Greek Cypriot administration is unsustainable.[vii] Taken together, these developments reinforce the TRNC’s legitimate claims not only in the domain of security but also in the spheres of energy and diplomacy.
The statements made by TRNC President Ersin Tatar prior to his meeting with UN Secretary-General Guterres demonstrate that the Greek Cypriot side is unwilling to cooperate even on humanitarian matters, and that in the issue of property it seeks solutions exclusively in its own favor. President Tatar stressed that, following the Annan Plan and the Crans-Montana process, the federation model has been closed, and that “two sovereign states” constitute the only realistic solution.[viii] Likewise, debates in the United Kingdom have brought the issues of direct flights and recognition back to the agenda. The Daily Telegraph’s article entitled “Still a Divided Island” noted that the UK, as a guarantor power, could assume a more active role, yet the pro-Greek Cypriot pressures of the Cypriot diaspora in Britain constrain London’s room for maneuver.[ix]
When evaluated within the current conjuncture, the first possibility is that the growing sustainability crisis of energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean will lead to the increasing strategic importance of the TRNC. In particular, the inability of the GSI project to advance due to financial burdens, corruption investigations, and disputes over maritime jurisdiction has rendered the Greek Cypriot administration’s EU-backed energy plans fragile. Considering Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russia, Ankara’s continental shelf claims and the TRNC’s geographical position emerge as factors that cannot be overlooked. While this may not translate into the direct recognition of the TRNC by EU countries, it could compel them to indirectly engage with the Turkish side in the context of energy routes and diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, alongside Türkiye’s objective of becoming an energy hub, the TRNC could de facto rise to the status of a “mandatory stakeholder.”
The second possibility takes shape in the realm of security. The military cooperation developed between the GCASC and Israel, along with the deployment of Barak MX systems on the island, not only heightens the security concerns of Türkiye and the TRNC but also amplifies the risk of instability on NATO’s southern flank. Within the current geopolitical environment –marked by the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East– Western actors do not desire a new crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, unilateral Greek Cypriot militarization is likely to be questioned in certain allied capitals. In this context, Türkiye’s role as guarantor becomes more critical, while the TRNC’s security arguments are expected to receive greater international consideration. Thus, as the federation model remains a failed formula, the TRNC’s insistence on a two-state solution in the present conjuncture may emerge not only as the legitimate expectation of the Turkish side but also as the more realistic alternative for regional stability.
In conclusion, the sharp inconsistency between the Western world’s insistence on a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian issue and its advocacy of a one-state solution centered on the GCASC in Cyprus undermines not only the credibility of normative values but also contributes to deepening instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. This double-standard approach weakens the EU’s claim to strategic autonomy while making the legitimate demands of Türkiye and the TRNC in the fields of security, energy, and diplomacy more visible. Under the current circumstances, the federation model has ceased to be a realistic option; the two-state solution has become not only the rightful expectation of the Turkish side but also the most rational alternative for regional peace. Therefore, the ability of the international community to demonstrate a sincere and consistent stance depends on implementing in Cyprus the same principles it upholds in Palestine and on recognizing the TRNC as an equal-status actor.
[i] Simone de la Feld, “France and Four Other EU Countries Ready, States That Recognise Palestine Almost 160”, EUNews, https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/09/22/france-and-four-other-eu-countries-ready-states-that-recognise-palestine-almost-160/, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[ii] “European Nations Recognize Palestine at UN, Deepening Rift With Washington”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20250923/561e8036fca94cd49930d7eec2ac084a/c.html, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[iii] Manolis Kostidis, “Erdogan Calls for Recognition of Turkish-Occupied Northern Cyprus as an Independent State”, Ekathimerini, https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1281755/erdogan-calls-for-recognition-of-turkish-occupied-northern-cyprus-as-a-state/, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[iv] “Erdogan Calls on UN Member-States to Recognize the Occupied North Cyprus”, Keep Talking Greece, https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2025/09/23/erdogan-calls-un-member-states-to-recognize-north-cyprus, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[v] “Activist Flotilla Seeking to Break Israeli Blockade of Gaza Says Drones Attacked Its Boats”, Asharq Al-Awsat, https://english.aawsat.com/world/5189729-activist-flotilla-seeking-break-israeli-blockade-gaza-says-drones-attacked-its-boats%C2%A0, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[vi] Paul Iddon, “Israeli Air Defense Probably Won’t Spark Another Cyprus Missile Crisis”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/09/20/israeli-air-defense-probably-wont-spark-another-cyprus-missile-crisis, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[vii] Kaki Bali, “Greece-Cyprus-Israel Subsea Power Link Faces Major Obstacles”, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/greece-cyprus-israel-subsea-cable-energy-great-sea-interconnector-graphics/a-74024610, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[viii] “Tatar Brands Christodoulides ‘Racist’ and ‘Extension of ELAM’ Before UN Talks”, Philenews, https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/local/turkish-cypriot-leader-cooperation-concerns-un-chief/, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
[ix] “An Island Still Split”, The Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2024/07/22/an-island-still-split/, (Access Date: 24.09.2025).
