To evaluate the recent developments in India’s foreign policy, the Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) presents below the interview with Simran Walia, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India.
1. What are your thoughts on India’s foreign policy and, in particular, “strategic autonomy”?
India’s foreign policy has evolved from non-alignment to now focusing on strategic autonomy and becoming more self-reliant. India focuses on maintaining its independent decision-making power regarding important issues while also diversifying partnerships that advance their national interests. The Cold War era was purely focused on non-alignment, while strategic autonomy today is seen in India’s multi-alignment approach, that is, deepening cooperation with countries like the US, Japan, Australia and Europe and also maintaining its ties with Russia. Moreover, India is enhancing its presence in multilateral forums like the BRICS, SCO and the Quad. This sort of approach enables India to respond flexibly to a multipolar international order without being bound by formal alliances.
Strategic autonomy allows India to balance competing geopolitical interests while also safeguarding its security, economic and technological priorities. India has followed an issue-based approach and looks for partnerships that are more issue-specific and supports a free and open Indo-Pacific, strengthens defence partnerships while simultaneously promoting strategic inclusivity.
2. What are the limits of India’s military-security cooperation with Western countries in the Indo-Pacific region? In this context, how does New Delhi view the West’s increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific?
India has favoured greater engagement by Western countries in the Indo-pacific by countries like the US, France, the UK, Germany and the European Union, as it contributes to maintaining a free, open and rules-based regional order. India has expanded its defence cooperation through joint military exercises, logistics, maritime domain awareness and intelligence sharing. However, this cooperation is guided by India’s principle of strategic autonomy, which means that India prefers flexible and issue-based partnerships and not formal military alliances. This is where the limits of India’s military-security cooperation come in, that is, India’s reluctance to join alliance structures or be a part of the initiatives that are directed exclusively against China or that constrain its foreign policy choices.
India continues to avoid treaty alliances and seeks to balance deterrence with regional stability. India also emphasises ASEAN centrality and a multipolar Indo-Pacific, ensuring that the external engagement complements the regional security architecture.
3. Do you think India has found a balance between the US, European countries, Russia, and China?
India has largely succeeded in maintaining a balance among the US, European countries, Russia and China through its strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. Having said that, this balancing act has become quite complex. India has deepened its strategic and defence cooperation with the US and Europe, while maintaining its longstanding defence and energy ties with Russia. Despite border tensions with China, India continues to engage Beijing through diplomatic and multilateral forums like the BRICS and SCO, which reflects India’s preference for managing competition without foreclosing dialogue.
This balancing act also has some challenges, like the intensifying US-China rivalry, Russia’s dependence on China especially after the Ukraine war and geopolitical polarisation, which have narrowed India’s strategic space. Despite that, India has managed to pursue its independent foreign policy by engaging multiple partners based on converging interests rather than alliance commitments.
4. Do you think a NATO-style collective security organization could be established in the Indo-Pacific? If so, what would India’s stance be? Would it join? If the answer is no, why do you think it wouldn’t join?
The emergence of a NATO-style organisation in the Indo-Pacific is unlikely as the region is far more diverse than Europe, with differences in threat perceptions, historical experiences and strategic priorities. The Indo-Pacific partners prefer flexibility and focus on issue-based security partnerships like the QUAD, ASEAN-led mechanisms and AUKUS.
As far as India is concerned, India in any case would not join a NATO-style alliance as its foreign policy is now firmly focused on strategic autonomy, and it has avoided alliances that could limit or hinder its independent decision-making. India supports flexible partnerships that deepen maritime security and defence cooperation while maintaining an inclusive and multipolar Indo-Pacific.
In the current scenario, we have seen the growing prominence of economic security, such as AI, cybersecurity, quantum technologies and critical and emerging technologies in which India too is interested and invests through partnerships, which also again reflects issue-based partnerships to suit its national interests.
