Interview

Pakistan Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE) Research Associate Basit Ali: “The Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition Is Defensive and Operates Within International Law.”

Pakistan provides operational experience, trained personnel, and an established understanding of multinational naval coordination
The problem in Hormuz and the Red Sea cannot be solved without understanding regional dynamics.
The success and longevity of the Saudi-led maritime coalition would rest on deterrence, maritime security, and diplomacy.

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The Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) presents its interview with Basit Ali, Research Associate at the Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE) of the Pakistan Navy War College, on the significance of the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition for regional maritime security, Pakistan’s potential role within the coalition, and the prospects for its development into an effective and sustainable maritime security mechanism.

1. How do you assess the significance of the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition, announced on 30 July 2026, for security in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden?

As the war looms over Iran, the recent announcement of the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition is not an isolated measure but is intended to protect critical chokepoints. At the center is the closure of the Strait; incidents in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have sparked a new debate over a more regionally owned mechanism to keep these critical waterways open. I think the closure of the Hormuz reminded the world that maritime chokepoints remain at the heart of strategic competition, as it caused inflation worldwide.

My approach is meticulous in understanding the dynamics of regional security in the so-called MENA. Prolonged disruption of Hormuz caused a hike in petrol prices, disrupted supply chains, and affected international trade. The Saudi-led coalition at this point is not merely an alliance, but it carries wider strategic implications for regional maritime order. In its initial phase, 14 founding countries met, following a meeting attended by representatives of almost 43 countries, including the European Union, which also demonstrates broader concern about the security of these critical waterways.

From Pakistan’s point of view, I think the coalition is particularly important in the current strategic calculus, because the security of these critical chokepoints is directly intertwined with its economic interests. Pakistan’s economy is largely sea-dependent, and it depends on the uninterrupted sea lines of communication for trade and energy supplies. The Red Sea is critical for Pakistan’s economic interests as it connects with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe; therefore, Pakistan has consistently opposed attacks on commercial shipping and threats to freedom of navigation. Operation Muhafiz Ul Bahr was a practical demonstration of Pakistan’s commitment to protect its economic and national interests far in those contested waters. Pakistan, therefore, views this issue not only through the lens of Saudi-Pakistan relations but also as a matter of its national security.

The question that arises in my mind is about the significance and effectiveness of this Saudi-led coalition and whether it can move beyond political symbolism and develop operational capabilities. Several organizations are working in this wider region, including the US, China, and European arrangements. The added value of the Saudi-led coalition should therefore be its ability to bring regional countries closer under a unified maritime framework for maritime domain awareness, information sharing, intelligence, escort, and protection of commercial shipping. The nature of the organization is defensive, and it operates within international law, as its founding members have stated. If this coalition is viewed solely against Houthis or Iran, it could lead to further militarization of the Red Sea. If it is perceived as a tool of deterrence with diplomacy and de-escalation, it can be an exceptional factor contributing to regional maritime security.

2. Given Pakistan’s participation in the coalition, what role do you think it could play in strengthening the protection of commercial shipping and energy routes in these strategically important waterways?

Pakistan is a developing state and can make a meaningful contribution to the Saudi-led coalition because of its organized Navy and multinational maritime operations among all the participating countries. Pakistan is a member of several Combined Maritime Forces, like CTF-150 and CTF-151, and it also hosts the Aman Dialogue, in which almost 60 countries participated. Pakistan provides operational experience, trained personnel, and an established understanding of multinational naval coordination. Its role can include maritime surveillance, information sharing, reconnaissance, and protection of commercial shipping and participation in coordinated patrols.

The Pakistan Navy’s role in this wider region would be purely defensive and focused on protecting commercial shipping rather than offensive operations. Pakistan is clear on this point, and its consistency demonstrates freedom of navigation, international law, and the protection of civilian shipping. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also highlighted that attacks on its commercial shipping are unacceptable and that Pakistan is prepared to provide safety to its maritime interests across these contested waterways. The recent killing of three Pakistani sailors aboard the Tihamah has made this position clear: it can contribute to escorting shipping where necessary and to provide information fusion, maritime domain awareness, and coordination with other sister departments.

I think Pakistan, being a strong military power in the Muslim world, would make its contribution meaningful in its relationships with Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Iran, Egypt, and the Gulf States. The recent Mecca Pact between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia is a practical demonstration of a minilateral coalition, stating that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Pakistan is interested in stable regional security across the wider Indian Ocean region because of its archrival, India, which views itself as a regional security provider in the region. Pakistan should use this space to promote diplomacy, to support the defensive nature of this coalition, and to encourage mechanisms that can be an icebreaker for communication and de-escalation. Pakistan can play a responsible role with both regional and international organizations; this would allow its substantial contribution towards maritime security without being unnecessarily involved or dragged into a wider regional conflict.

3. Looking ahead, what factors do you think will be most important in determining whether the coalition can develop into an effective and sustainable framework for multinational maritime-security cooperation?

The most important thing will be clarity about the mandate and command structure of this coalition, because without proper institutional mechanisms, it cannot be assessed by the number of states that have joined it. The future of this coalition would rest on what constitutes the maritime threat, what activities the coalition is authorized to perform, and how forces will coordinate in times of crisis. What circumstances the navies would deploy in, and which capabilities would serve to respond to an attack. The structure, charter, command and control arrangements, and future work plan are discussed already, which shows a positive development. The real test would be how this coalition would turn into a practical and effective operational system, which would determine the future of the Saudi-led coalition.

The second important aspect is capability sharing and burden sharing, as every state varies in its naval capabilities. Some countries can provide naval platforms; others can provide maritime surveillance, intelligence, information fusion, reconnaissance, air assets, coast guard, and diplomatic support. Pakistan can contribute significantly where it has experience, like naval operations, maritime surveillance, and multinational coordination.

Another concern is that the coalition needs to share real-time information among the navies of participating countries. Commercial shipping companies, coast guards, and relevant international maritime organizations; this would make it more useful than a purely military alliance.

In a nutshell, political cohesion and regional diplomacy would determine the fate of this Saudi-led maritime coalition. The problem in Hormuz and the Red Sea cannot be solved without understanding regional dynamics. The conflict in Yemen, Iran, and Gaza has further disrupted these critical waterways, resulting in global inflation. A pure military alliance could further intensify the conflict and broaden its scale of conflict; instead, it should be used for diplomacy and de-escalation in the MENA countries. Pakistan’s position is clear in this context: to uphold international law, diplomacy, and regional de-escalation, as it is already involved in signing an MOU between the US and Iran to stop the war in Iran. The coalition should escort shipping as Pakistan did through Operation Muhafiz ul Bahr and leave space for diplomatic engagements. In my view, the success and longevity of this coalition would rest on deterrence, maritime security, and diplomacy; if it can maintain that balance, it would evolve as a sustainable maritime security arrangement.

Basit Ali
Basit Ali is a Research Associate at the Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC). He holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of the Punjab and a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the University of Peshawar. His research focuses on the geopolitics of South Asia, maritime security of Indian Ocean, and foreign policy. He is particularly interested in regional security dynamics and evolving strategic trends. He has been involved in research, policy discussions, and academic writing on contemporary international issues. His work aims to contribute to informed policy debate and practical understanding of security challenges
Banu YAKUBOVA
Banu YAKUBOVA
Banu Yakubova is a senior undergraduate student in the Department of International Relations at Kadir Has University, where she is also pursuing a minor in Social Justice and Policy Studies. As part of the Erasmus+ Exchange Programme, she studied for one semester at Sciences Po Lille in France. Her main research interests include Central Asia, foreign policy analysis, security studies, international law, and human rights. She is fluent in English, Turkish, Russian, and Turkmen, and is currently studying French.

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