To evaluate the implications of the Hormuz Crisis for the Strait of Malacca, the Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) presents below the interview with Satria Rizaldi Alchatib, PhD Candidate in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
1. In your opinion, what were the effects of the Hormuz Crisis on the Strait of Malacca? How do regional states view the possibility of coastal states (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) being paid fees for transit through the Strait of Malacca?
Malacca has always been a strategic security chokepoint – whether or not the crisis in Hormuz erupts, as the waterway represents another 20-30% of the global trade supply chain. I agree that Hormuz shifts global attention to Malacca, but ASEAN does not take significant material advantage at the cost of regional stability. This is not surprising, as the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) – shaped by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – were designed to do so – to ensure that restraint among member-states is intact.
2. It appears that the approach of coastal states — particularly Singapore and Malaysia — to the issue of fee payments differs from that of Indonesia. Singapore, in particular, appears to be firmly opposed to this. What do you think is the reason for this?
Despite dissenting opinions, there are no meaningful differences between coastal states – Indonesia’s minister’s statement was a mere spectacle (he clarified this) – it is technically illegal to impose a fee for passing vessels – but Indonesia can offer transhipment services – working with Malaysia and Singapore on this is a sensible option.
3. Can we say that Singapore’s foreign policy involves a delicate balancing act? How is Singapore positioning itself in the competition between the U.S. and China?
On Singapore, the country is (and has always been) pragmatic towards the US and China. The US-Singapore relationship has been relatively quiet – it welcomes the recent US-Iran truce while its trade relations with China are at a high point (High-Level Meeting between Wang Yi & Balakrishnan in May) despite geopolitical anxiety after Hormuz.
4. If the Trump administration begins to focus on the Strait of Malacca after the Strait of Hormuz, what would be the reaction or approach of the regional states? Can ASEAN countries maintain the balance between the U.S. and China in the event of a potential Malacca Crisis?
Trump was offered blanket airspace access by the Indonesian defense force but completely no follow-up. The recent Major Defense Cooperation Partnership (MDCP) was largely performative with no practical substance. I am a bit skeptical about the US return to Malacca given its “all-out approach” to the war with Iran.
ASEAN will always be open to constructive engagement with major powers – the US return to Asia would be courted through ASEAN-led mechanisms, including on matters of the Malacca Straits. ASEAN could use this to revive the importance of the East Asia Summit to convene the interests of both China and the US claims its centrality by restoring relations after a moment of tension.
