China’s diplomatic approach to international crises in recent years is regarded as a significant indicator of Beijing’s growing role in global politics. By emphasising the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, dialogue and political resolution in multilateral forums, particularly the United Nations (UN), China strongly advocates for the resolution of international disputes through diplomatic channels.
The Russia–Ukraine War and developments in Gaza have brought China’s diplomatic approach to various international crises and its stance within the UN to the spotlight. However, Beijing’s emphasis in recent years on calls for dialogue and political solutions in various international disputes has also given rise to differing views on the role that China might play in the fields of conflict management and mediation.
In this context, the Ankara Centre for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) is pleased to present an interview with Ukrainian sinologist Vita Golod, who examines China’s UN diplomacy and its approach of “principled neutrality” in her recent study entitled “China’s UN Diplomacy on the Russo-Ukrainian War”. In this interview, Vita Golod assessed China’s diplomatic stance in the face of various international crises, its role as a mediator, and its understanding of multilateral diplomacy.
1. In your latest research, you define China’s principled neutrality as selective and context dependent. What does this tell us about Beijing’s evolving approach to international crises?
Based on my co-authored monograph, which analyses China’s official speeches and voting behaviour at the UN and compares Beijing’s positions on Ukraine and Gaza, I would describe China’s “principled neutrality” as less a fixed doctrine than a flexible diplomatic strategy. Beijing consistently refers to sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, dialogue and political settlement, but it applies these principles differently depending on the conflict and its own strategic interests. In the case of Ukraine, China has largely avoided attributing responsibility to Russia and has preferred abstention, procedural restraint and calls for negotiations. This suggests that Beijing is developing a model of diplomacy that allows it to preserve the image of a responsible and neutral great power while protecting important strategic relationships.
2. Your comparison of China’s positions on Ukraine and Gaza reveals significant differences in its rhetoric and voting behaviour. What factors determine when Beijing chooses diplomatic restraint and when it adopts a more assertive position?
The key factors are strategic exposure, partnership sensitivities and reputational interests. On Ukraine, Russia is an important strategic partner, so China is much more cautious: it avoids direct attribution of responsibility and usually abstains on resolutions that condemn or penalize Moscow. On Gaza, China has been much more assertive, supporting most major ceasefire-related resolutions and using more explicit language about responsibility and international humanitarian law. The comparison shows that China’s neutrality becomes more restrictive when important strategic relationships are involved and more flexible when a stronger position supports its broader diplomatic standing, particularly in the global South.
3. China increasingly presents itself as a potential mediator in international conflicts, while remaining cautious toward some emerging international mechanisms for conflict management. How do you assess China’s growing mediation role?
China has the diplomatic weight, economic influence and international standing to play an important role in conflict management, but there is a difference between supporting negotiations and acting as a genuine mediator. Effective mediation requires trust from all sides, willingness to accept political risks and, in some cases, pressure on partners. China is often reluctant to go that far. In Ukraine, for example, Beijing has promoted peace talks and political settlement while avoiding steps that could seriously damage its relationship with Russia. So, I would describe China as an increasingly important diplomatic facilitator, but still a cautious and selective mediator. Its credibility will depend on whether it is prepared to apply its influence even when doing so carries costs for its strategic partners.
4. Could China’s approach to neutrality and multilateral diplomacy become increasingly influential among Global South countries as the international system becomes more multipolar?
Yes, but probably not because global South countries will simply copy a Chinese model. China’s influence is more subtle. Its language of sovereignty, non-interference, dialogue, opposition to bloc politics and emphasis on development fits well with the foreign policy traditions of many global South states that want to avoid choosing between competing great powers. Many of these countries support basic principles such as territorial integrity while remaining cautious about sanctions, punitive mechanisms or political alignment. China therefore helps make strategic ambiguity and non-alignment more diplomatically acceptable. As the international system becomes more multipolar, this approach may become increasingly attractive because it gives states greater room for manoeuvre. China’s influence in platforms such as BRICS, G77+China, FOCAC and other multilateral forums strengthens this trend.
