The meeting held on 15 September 2026 between South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev demonstrates that relations between the two countries are entering a new phase centered on energy and critical minerals. During the meeting, 13 cooperation documents were signed, including a Memorandum of Understanding on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, with crude oil, science and technology, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals emerging as prominent areas of cooperation. The elevation of relations to the level of a “future-oriented comprehensive strategic partnership” shows that this rapprochement is not limited merely to expanding trade relations.[i] Within this framework, it can be said that the new structure emerging in South Korea-Kazakhstan relations is moving toward a more integrated economic partnership that encompasses not only resource trade but also technology and production capacity.
In fact, this transformation is not a sudden rapprochement that began in 2026, but rather the deepening of an economic foundation built up in recent years. In 2024, the two countries developed a partnership covering exploration, development, processing, and supply chains in the field of critical minerals.[ii] However, the importance of this cooperation is now increasing alongside the transformation taking place in global supply chains. Critical minerals are no longer merely tradeable raw materials; they have become one of the elements of economic security for the sustainability of strategic sectors such as batteries, semiconductors, artificial intelligence infrastructure, and energy technologies. This situation is also changing the nature of relations between countries that possess natural resources and countries capable of converting these resources into high value-added products.
In this respect, Kazakhstan represents an important partner for South Korea. While the country accounted for approximately 40 percent of global uranium production in 2025, it also holds significant resource potential in terms of lithium and other critical minerals.[iii] South Korea, despite its advanced technology and manufacturing capacity, requires external sources for the energy and raw materials needed by these sectors. Therefore, the relationship between the two countries is based on two complementary economic capacities: Kazakhstan’s resource potential and South Korea’s technology and processing capacity.
This complementarity is moving South Korea’s Kazakhstan policy beyond traditional resource diplomacy. If Seoul’s fundamental aim had been merely to access new mineral resources, the relationship could have been expected to develop solely around the extraction of raw materials and their export to South Korea. However, the current approach is oriented toward establishing a broader economic chain extending from exploration and extraction activities to refining, processing, and high value-added production. For this reason, it is possible to characterize South Korea’s approach as a kind of “value chain strategy.” In such a model, critical minerals do not constitute the final product of the relationship, but rather the starting point of a more comprehensive industrial partnership.
From Kazakhstan’s perspective as well, the strategic value of the relationship similarly does not stem merely from the opportunity to export more raw materials. Astana’s long-term interest lies in developing the technology, investment, and processing capacity that will enable its natural resources to generate higher value added domestically. At this point, South Korea stands out for Kazakhstan not merely as an alternative market, but as a technological partner capable of supporting its economic transformation. At the same time, the relations developed with Seoul are increasing Kazakhstan’s options in its external economic relations rather than replacing its existing partners. This can be regarded as an economic reflection of the multi-vector foreign policy approach that Astana has long pursued.
Developments in the field of nuclear energy make this diversification policy more visible. In May 2026, Kazakhstan signed an agreement worth approximately 16.5 billion dollars with Russia for the construction of its first nuclear power plant, with Russia’s state company Rosatom designated as the lead partner in the project. South Korea’s Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power was also among the candidates evaluated but was not the party selected.[iv] Nevertheless, the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding between South Korea and Kazakhstan in the field of peaceful nuclear energy a few months later is significant.
This situation shows that nuclear cooperation cannot be reduced merely to the question of which country will build a single power plant. Nuclear energy is a broad ecosystem encompassing technology, fuel supply, human resources, safety, maintenance, and new projects that may be developed in the future. Therefore, the role undertaken by Rosatom in the first power plant project does not mean that South Korea has been entirely excluded from Kazakhstan’s nuclear energy equation. On the contrary, Astana’s development of cooperation with different actors in different fields points to a search for preserving room for maneuver in the energy sector as well, without becoming dependent on a single partnership.
The extension of this bilateral model to the regional level became more visible with the first South Korea-Central Asia Summit, held on 16 September 2026. At the summit, attended by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, critical minerals and energy were positioned among the core areas of cooperation under the Seoul Declaration adopted there. What stands out in South Korea’s approach is that cooperation is oriented toward moving beyond individual infrastructure projects and toward building joint industrial capacity and value chains.[v]
This approach also gained an institutional dimension through the first South Korea-Central Asia Industry Ministers’ Meeting, held prior to the summit. The parties agreed that cooperation in the industrial field, including critical mineral supply chains, would be carried out through a regular mechanism.[vi] In this way, the resource-technology complementarity observed in the case of Kazakhstan is becoming one of the fundamental elements of South Korea’s broader Central Asia policy as well. The decision to hold leaders’-level summits biennially, with the next summit scheduled to take place in Astana in 2028, demonstrates the institutional will for this cooperation to gain continuity. This also shows that Central Asian states should not be viewed merely as objects of competition among great powers. Regional states are able to diversify their options in technology, investment, and markets by making use of the resources they possess, and to develop simultaneous partnerships with different actors.
In conclusion, the South Korea-Kazakhstan rapprochement points to a new partnership model in which the different but complementary economic needs of the two countries intersect. For South Korea, the diversification of critical mineral and energy resources supports economic security, while for Kazakhstan, South Korea’s technology and production capacity offers an opportunity for transition to a higher value-added economic structure. The extension of this approach to the regional level through the first South Korea-Central Asia Summit increases the potential for this model to evolve into a broader economic framework. However, the extent to which this potential is transformed into a lasting partnership will be determined not by the number of agreements signed, but by the degree to which these are converted into concrete investments, technology transfer, and local production capacity.
[i] “South Korea, Kazakhstan sign MoU on atomic energy, explore mineral trade”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-kazakhstan-sign-mou-atomic-energy-explore-mineral-trade-2026-09-15/, (Accessed: 17.09.2026).
[ii] “Strategic Partnership Upgraded as South Korean President Wraps Up Visit to Kazakhstan”, The Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2024/06/strategic-partnership-upgraded-as-south-korean-president-wraps-up-visit-to-kazakhstan/, (Accessed: 17.09.2026).
[iii] “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan”, World Nuclear Association, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/kazakhstan, (Accessed: 17.09.2026).
[iv] “Russia signs $16.5 billion deal to build first nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-signs-agreement-build-nuclear-power-plant-kazakhstan-2026-05-28/, (Accessed: 17.09.2026).
[v] “S. Korean, Central Asian leaders agree to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy”, Yonhap News Agency, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260916006651315, (Accessed: 17.09.2026).
[vi] “Korea and Five Central Asian Countries Hold First Industry Ministers’ Meeting to Discuss Multilateral Cooperation on Industry and Critical Minerals”, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources of the Republic of Korea, https://english.motir.go.kr/eng/article/EATCLdfa319ada/2732/view, (Accessed: 17.09.2026).
