Since the beginning of the 21st century, energy has ceased to be merely a trade commodity and has become the primary instrument of interstate power struggles. This transformation is most acutely felt in Eurasia. Large-scale panel analyses[i]covering fourteen Eurasian economies clearly demonstrate that energy dependence is not merely a matter of supply security; it is a systematic source of vulnerability that creates exchange rate pressure, erodes governments’ fiscal capacity, and restricts foreign policy autonomy.
The net external balance gap between net exporters (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia) and net importers (Moldova, Belarus, Türkiye) is approximately 339 percentage points.[ii] This figure is not merely a statistic: it represents the accumulated weight of the foreign exchange pressure and debt obligations that importing economies endure each year. The strong inverse relationship between resource revenues and energy dependence (r = −0.803)[iii] reveals that energy exporters have built not only a commercial advantage but also a sustainable capacity for political influence.
Türkiye occupies the most multifaceted position within this landscape. Historically, approximately 45% of its natural gas imports have originated from Russia; this reality has formed the material basis of the “dual integration paradox,” forcing Türkiye to maintain relations with both its NATO allies and Moscow. TANAP and TurkStream confer upon Türkiye the status of a transit hub. However, this situation transforms Türkiye’s position within the dependency relationship rather than eliminating it. By 2026, Türkiye’s total installed renewable energy capacity will have surpassed the 41 GW threshold, confirming that this capacity increase has now reached the stage of demonstrating the potential to partially replace imported gas dependency.[iv]
However, this infrastructure advantage now comes with a significant security burden. Twelve attack attempts on Ukraine’s TurkStream and Blue Stream facilities in March 2026 concretely demonstrated that pipeline infrastructure can be directly targeted in an active conflict environment. In May 2026, following the discovery of an explosive device near the TurkStream route in Serbia, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban convened an emergency defense council; Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar shared the “critical importance of pipeline security” with the public alongside his Hungarian counterpart.[v] When these two developments are considered together, it becomes clear that pipeline infrastructure has now become a direct target of geopolitical conflict.
At the same time, Eurasia’s energy map is undergoing a broader reshaping. Russia is attempting to compensate for losses in Western markets and establish Russia-China energy trade as the dominant route in Eurasia by constructing a new pipeline infrastructure with an annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters to China.[vi] On the Western front, the EU has committed, under the REPowerEU Roadmap, to banning all Russian LNG imports by the end of 2026 and pipeline gas by September 2027;[vii] European Commission President von der Leyen has characterized Europe’s decision to phase out nuclear energy early as a “strategic mistake” in this process.
On May 1, 2026, Russia’s suspension[viii] of the transit of Kazakh oil to Germany via the Druzhba pipeline has made route diversification not merely a preference but a necessity for Kazakhstan. The impact of this disruption on the Schwedt refinery, which supplies fuel to Berlin, concretely illustrates how the politicization of energy routes extends right to the heart of Europe.[ix]
Developments in the Strait of Hormuz add a new dimension to this geopolitical landscape. Following the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict that erupted in February 2026, reopening the Strait has become one of the main priorities of international diplomacy. On April 13, the U.S. announced a counter-blockade targeting ships bound for Iranian ports, while the U.K. and France launched multilateral initiatives for safe passage and insurance mechanisms.[x] This situation demonstrates that energy transit points generate macroeconomic costs not only through price volatility but also via insurance, freight rates, diplomatic oversight, and alternative land/pipeline route options. Meanwhile, despite the EU’s plan to ban Russian LNG imports by 2027, market reports indicating that Europe’s Russian LNG imports continued to rise in the first quarter of 2026 highlight just how complex managing this dependency is.[xi]
The summit held on May 15, 2026, between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has injected fresh momentum into the Middle Corridor agenda: rail freight traffic between Türkiye and Kazakhstan increased by 35% in 2025, while transit time along the Caucasus route was reduced to 13 days.[xii]Furthermore, the $5.4 billion in support committed by the Asian Development Bank in March 2026 for Kazakhstan’s modernization program is a concrete expression of international institutional confidence in the Middle Corridor’s infrastructure. These figures confirm that the Middle Corridor has now gained legitimacy not only politically but also operationally as a competitive alternative to the Northern Corridor.
These developments give rise to concrete priorities for energy-importing Eurasian economies: increasing renewable energy capacity is not merely a matter of climate policy but a necessity for safeguarding macroeconomic stability and foreign policy autonomy. The Central Corridor’s importance in regional energy logistics is solidifying; Türkiye’s $2 billion INRAIL railway loan, announced to the public in March 2026, is accelerating the strategy to shift transit focus beyond the pipeline.
The region’s future may be shaped not by natural gas price negotiations, but by which country can remain independent of the pipeline. This independence, however, depends on whether regional countries can strengthen their negotiating capacities through common institutional frameworks—beyond market diversification and technical energy efficiency.
[i] Lebrand, M., Vasishtha, G., & Yilmazkuday, H. (2024). Energy price shocks and current account balances: Evidence from emerging and developing economies. Energy Economics, 130, 107278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107278
[ii] IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Nisan 2026; World Bank, World Development Indicators (gösterge: EG.IMP.CONS.ZS). 339 yüzde puan farkı ve r=−0,803 korelasyon katsayısı, 14 Avrasya ekonomisine ait cari denge/GSYİH ve enerji ithalat yoğunluğu verileri kullanılarak yazarın kendi hesaplamalarına dayanmaktadır.
[iii] Aynı yer
[iv] Türkiye Elektrik İletim A.Ş. (TEİAŞ), Türkiye Elektrik Sistemi — Kurulu Güç İstatistikleri, Nisan 2026. https://www.teias.gov.tr/, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.06.2026).
[v] “TürkAkım boru hattı yakınında bulunan patlayıcı Sırbistan ve Macaristan alarma geçirdi”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/06/turkakim-boru-hatti-yakininda-bulunan-patlayici-sirbistan-ve-macaristan-alarma-gecirdi, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.06.2026).
[vi] “China’s Quiet Pivot to Central Asian Gas Putin left Beijing last week without a Power of Siberia 2 deal. The reason is partly in Turkmenistan”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/chinas-quiet-pivot-to-central-asian-gas/, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.06.2026).
[vii] Avrupa Komisyonu, REPowerEU Plan: Implementing the REPowerEU Action Plan, COM(2023) 231 final; Avrupa Komisyonu basın açıklaması, “Phasing out Russian gas: Commission proposes new measures,” Mayıs 2026. https://shorturl.at/FQoTG, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.06.2026).
[viii] Resmi gerekçe “teknik kapasite” olsa da analistlerin tamamı kararın siyasi niteliğine dikkat çekmektedir.
[ix] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), European Gas Watch: Russia LNG Import Trends 2026, Mayıs 2026. https://ieefa.org/eu-gas-flows-tracker, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.06.2026).
[x]UK House of Commons Library, Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz, CBP-10636, Nisan 2026; U.S. Central Command, “U.S. to Blockade Ships Entering or Exiting Iranian Ports”, 12 Nisan 2026.
[xi] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), European Gas Watch: Russia LNG Import Trends Q1 2026, Mayıs 2026. https://ieefa.org/, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.06.2026).
[xii] Times of Central Asia, “Erdoğan Ziyareti Kazakistan’ın Orta Koridor Stratejisini Vurgular”, 15 Mayıs 2026; Asya Kalkınma Bankası, basın açıklaması, Mart 2026.
