The geopolitical crisis triggered by the Russia–Ukraine War has forced global supply chains into a deep structural transformation. As the traditional Northern Corridor has lost its functionality due to sanctions and escalating risks, a strategic logistical vacuum has emerged across Eurasia. This vacuum is now being filled by the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the Middle Corridor), which remains outside the scope of sanctions. Azerbaijan’s integration as a full member of the Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State (OADBIT) transforms this economic necessity into an institutional architecture.[i] This development elevates Baku from a mere transit country to a strategic bridge linking both shores of the Caspian Sea, positioning it as a key geo-economic hub of Eurasia.
Global logistics systems are facing a serious reliability crisis due to extensive sanctions against Russia and rising insurance costs. This crisis has pushed international companies to adopt trade “de-risking” strategies aimed at reducing exposure to political risks. Shipments through the Northern Corridor have experienced significant declines due to these risks. Following 2022, the volume of freight transported through the Northern Corridor decreased by 51 percent due to sanctions and security concerns arising from the Russia–Ukraine War.[ii] This geopolitical rupture has positioned the Middle Corridor as the main alternative for Eurasian trade. The Central Corridor’s key strategic advantage is that it offers complete resilience against the threat of sanctions by not passing through Russia or Iran. Azerbaijan’s participation in OADBIT is the strongest diplomatic proof that the corridor is progressing not only in terms of physical infrastructure but also on the basis of shared institutional security and standardization.
The Middle Corridor has become a new arena in which global and regional powers compete for economic influence and connectivity, and the objectives and areas of rivalry among these actors will determine the corridor’s future effectiveness. For the People’s Republic of China, the primary goal is to enhance the resilience of the Belt and Road Initiative and reduce its logistical dependence on Russia. A concrete step in China’s efforts to diversify its routes was the signing of a cooperation agreement between the Port of Qingdao and the Port of Baku in 2024.[iii] The Russian Federation, on the other hand, aims to maintain its traditional logistics monopoly and economic influence over Central Asia. However, the Middle Corridor’s potential to increase the economic autonomy of Central Asian states from Russia creates a serious conflict of interest for Moscow.
The primary goal of the European Union (EU) and the United States is to bypass Russia by diversifying energy and trade routes and to support the strategic autonomy of countries in the region. However, the risk posed by China’s dominance in financing corridor infrastructure remains a critical concern for the West. Finally, while Türkiye and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) aim to deepen regional integration and expand their geopolitical influence and strategic depth, they must also confront tariff disagreements and a lack of operational coordination across the region.[iv] This multipolar competitive environment offers Azerbaijan the opportunity to expand its strategic autonomy and attract different sources of financing.
Azerbaijan is an indispensable hub for both the physical infrastructure and the institutional coordination of the Middle Corridor. This dual role makes the country a key actor in Eurasia’s logistic map. Azerbaijan aims to increase the capacity of the Port of Alat from 15 million tons to 25 million tons annually. This integrated structure directly affects the overall efficiency of the corridor by accelerating customs and transshipment operations. Additionally, the modernization of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway line—whose capacity has been expanded to 5 million tons per year—constitutes a strategic upgrade that ensures uninterrupted transport of Asian cargo across the Caspian Sea toward Türkiye and Europe. Azerbaijan’s role as an institutional center reached its peak with the country’s accession to OADBIT. This step goes beyond economic cooperation by establishing a shared security architecture through documents such as the “Regional Security Framework” and the “Concept for Stability and Sustainable Development.” This integrated security approach sends a strong signal to international investors that the corridor is protected not only physically but also insured against political risks.
Maximizing the potential of the Corridor requires not only leveraging its geopolitical advantages but also managing its operational risks effectively. Operational risks include high Caspian transit costs, insufficient fleet capacity, and non-standard tariffs and customs procedures in different countries. However, these challenges also present a major opportunity: reducing transit time to 12–15 days has the potential to eliminate the Northern Corridor’s competitiveness altogether. The primary geopolitical risks involve Russia’s indirect interventions—such as tariff or political disputes—aimed at slowing the corridor, as well as the possibility of renewed regional border tensions. In response to these risks, there is a significant opportunity to attract Western financing, driven by the EU and the United States’ search for alternative logistics routes to China. Finally, ecological risks include increased shipping pressure on the Caspian Sea’s sensitive ecosystem and a lack of environmental standards, while the adoption of green logistics standards could create opportunities to attract ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) funds.
Fully realizing the potential of the Middle Corridor depends on maximizing institutional coordination and quickly removing critical operational obstacles. Azerbaijan and its partners can prioritize the following specific actions to transform the corridor into a global main artery. First, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia must urgently implement the decision to establish a joint logistics operator that will provide end-to-end services along the corridor and manage a single tariff and operational synchronization. This structure will fundamentally resolve the lack of coordination. Research demonstrates that the absence of digitalized single-window systems and the prevalence of non-standardized procedures significantly increase transit times.
Second, it is essential to migrate customs and logistics documentation to a single digital platform recognized and used by all corridor countries, which will increase predictability and transparency and reduce transit times by %30. Third, trade volume in the Middle Corridor is expected to triple by 2030, and to meet this demand, in addition to increasing the operational efficiency of Alat Port[v] urgent and significant capital investments can be made in a consortium-based approach for the ferry and container ship fleet. Finally, a transparent and competitive common tariff structure for port services, railway transit fees, and other charges could be established to increase the corridor’s cost-effectiveness. Such tariff standardization would lower overall logistics costs and strengthen the corridor’s competitiveness.
[i] “Orta Asya Devlet Başkanları 7. İstişare Toplantısı Özbekistan’da Yapıldı”, Anadolu Ajansı, www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/orta-asya-devlet-baskanlari-7-istisare-toplantisi-ozbekistanda-yapildi/3745133, (Date Accession: 11.12.2025).
[ii] “The Middle Corridor: A Renaissance in Global Commerce”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/the-middle-corridor-a-renaissance-in-global-commerce/, (Date Accession: 11.12.2025).
[iii] Urciuolo, L. (2024). The Middle Corridor Initiative: Where Europe and Asia Meet (Briefing Paper No. 01). European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS).
[iv] Güzide, E., & Tiryaki, M. (2024). Regional Integration Mechanisms and Strategic Depth in the Caspian Region. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 16(2), 211–230.
[v] World Bank. (2024). Middle Corridor: A Strategic Opportunity for Eurasian Trade. World Bank Economic Review, 48(1), 85–102.
