Although the Russian-Ukrainian war strengthened the security cooperation significantly in Eastern Europe, historical disagreements between the regional states persist. On the contrary, with the prolongation of the war the disagreements of the past have resurfaced, challenging the political relations. The historical memory and debates over state decorations between Poland and Ukraine, diplomatic rupture between Belarus and Ukraine, and security anxieties in the Baltic region show that Eastern Europe’s resilience is being tested not only militarily, but also politically and societally. Therefore, the current situation and Russia’s geopolitical objectives should not be viewed as separate developments. This period can be viewed as a part of a broader competition shaped by geopolitical rivalry that can have an impact on the security architecture of Europe.
In fact, these developments offer Russia a geopolitical environment that could generate important and strategic opportunities. One of Russia’s main objectives is not only to put pressure on Ukraine, but also undermine the unity on Europe’s Eastern flank. Today, given that there is yet no definitive outcome on the military front, historical disputes, identity politics, and public polarization increasingly have the potential to become strategic tools.
Security Cooperation and Political Tensions in Poland-Ukraine Relations
Although the relations between Poland and Ukraine have strategically improved after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, historical tensions resurface occasionally. Especially the Volhynia events during the Second World War, politics of historical remembrance and differing approaches towards national heroes have resulted in disputes between the two countries. Some orders, medals, or official honors given to historical figures can foster sensitivities among the public. While this situation does not eliminate the two countries’ shared security interests, it can sometimes undermine the mutual trust.
This can be exemplified by the announcement made by the Polish Presidency on 19 June that Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky had been stripped of the Order of the White Eagle, the country’s highest state decoration. The decoration was awarded to Volodymyr Zelensky by the then the Polish president Andrzej Duda in 2023. The justification for this decision was reportedly due to Zelensky’s decision to grant the honorary title “Heroes of the UPA” to a unit of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[i]
Additionally, in support of the president, former Ukrainian presidents Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yuschenko, and Petro Poroshenko also returned their state decorations that had been awarded to them by Poland. Other high-ranking Ukrainian officials also joined this protest. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha viewed Warsaw’s decision as “a strategic mistake that would only serve Moscow’s interests” and stated that he returned the Commander’s Cross with Star of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland, which had been awarded to him. Similar steps were taken by the Chief of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov, and Ukraine’s Ambassador to Poland Vasyl Bodnar.[ii]
Moreover, Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosinisk-Kamysz announced that Poland would not transfer MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine due to Ukraine’s refusal to share its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production technologies.[iii]
It would not be realistic to claim that these disputes will directly end the security cooperation. However, the negative perceptions in the public opinion may narrow down the room for manoeuvre of political decision-makers. In the countries where the historical memory is interwoven with politics, symbols can have a far greater impact than diplomatic statements.
Another point worth noting is the timing of the escalation of this tension. The legacy of the Volhynia events, disputes regarding the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and disagreements over state decorations are not only a matter of historical issues; at the same time they also serve as political instruments influencing the voter behavior in Poland.
Ahead of the parliamentary elections planned for next year, the surge in harsher rhetoric toward Ukraine can be seen as a result of a political competition between the government and the opposition.Moreover, the divergent vision of the pro-EU Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Karol Nawrocki, adds to the prolongation of the tension-laden rhetoric in domestic politics. However, this does not mean that Poland’s support for Ukraine, driven by regional security anxiety, has disappeared. The real issue is the extent to which domestic political competition impacts foreign policy decisions.
Belarus-Ukraine Tensions: Frozen Diplomacy
Relations between Belarus and Ukraine are, however, different in character. The deepening of Minsk administration’ military integration with Moscow has rendered the Belarus borders to be a constant security risk for Ukraine. As diplomatic relations have mostly stalled, mutual distrust has also grown. The fact that the Minsk administration is closely linked militarily and politically to Moscow is regarded as a serious security concern by Kyiv.
Ukraine’s demand for the withdrawal of military equipment along the Belarusian border is not considered to be a coincidental development. Besides, the fact that Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko apologized to the Ukrainian President for his previous statements toward him, shows that, at least for now, Belarusian leadership does not wish to further escalate tensions. On the other hand, a possible conflict with Belarus could allow Russia to exert a strategic pressure on the northern front, while also forcing Ukraine to redirect its military resources to different fronts.
The fact that there is a persistent perception of the crises in Eastern Europe as a “conflict among Slavic peoples” may benefit the strategic interests of Moscow. This perception may help Russia frame its policies not as part of a regional power struggle, but as a historical and cultural internal reckoning.
One of the long-term objectives of Russian foreign policy is to weaken the political cohesion of the West with Eastern Europe. For this reason, direct military pressure is used alongside information operations, historical narratives, disinformation campaigns, and rhetoric that could deepen societal polarization, as important tools. These actions are regarded as elements of hybrid warfare.
The ideal scenario for Moscow would be for Eastern European countries to lose their shared threat perception and start viewing each other as historical rivals again. Such a development could make it harder to develop common policies in NATO and the European Union, expanding Russia’s room for maneouvre in the region.
The Baltic Region: Indirect but Real Risk
The weakening of the political cohesion in Eastern Europe can have a much greater impact on the Baltic states. The security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania largely depends on NATO’s deterrence and political solidarity of the allies.
If serious political divisions emerge in Eastern Europe, it could increase Russia’s political pressure on the Baltic region. This pressure does not necessarily have to be a military one, it can also involve hybrid threats such as cyber operations, information warfare, and energy security. The possibility that ethnic Russian communities could be instrumentalized to reach geopolitical objectives should not be dismissed.
The present tensions in Eastern Europe should not be understood only as bilateral diplomatic disputes. They are also strategic developments that can affect the future of the European security order. It is evident that the historical disputes between Poland and Ukraine, Belarus-Ukraine tensions, and security concerns in the Baltic region are not independent of one another.
From Russia’s perspective, a divided Eastern Europe could mean weaker political coordination on the West’s eastern flank. The preservation of regional solidarity will remain to be decisive not only for Ukraine, but also for the future of the entire security architecture on Europe’e eastern border.
[i] Лилия Ржеутская, Яцек Лепяж, “Что стоит за “войной орденов” между Польшей и Украиной”, DW, https://www.dw.com/ru/cto-stoit-za-vojnoj-ordenov-mezdu-polsej-i-ukrainoj/a-77664608, (Accessed: 01.07.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Kateryna Serohina, “Poland refuses MiG-29 transfer to Ukraine after drone tech dispute”, RBC-Ukraine, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/poland-refuses-mig-29-transfer-to-ukraine-1782789530.html, (Accessed: 01.07.2026).
