The European Union (EU), which defines itself through values such as interdependence, cooperation, international law, freedom, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, and which has constructed its internal structure in line with these values so as to reduce the likelihood of conflict among its member states, is widely regarded as the institutionalized embodiment of Kant’s theory of perpetual peace. In accordance with Kant’s approach, the EU sought to ensure its security not through military means, but through democracy, the rule of law, economic integration, and diplomacy.
However, the Strategic Compass, adopted one month after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War, clearly reveals a profound cognitive rupture in the Kantian approach. The document emphasizes that, in the face of threats—primarily from Russia—norms such as cooperation and the rule of law are no longer sufficient to ensure security, and that the EU’s surrounding environment has turned into a geopolitical arena that necessitates the use of force. The SAFE program and the ReArm Europe Plan, which aim to translate the Strategic Compass into concrete policy, were adopted, followed by the Military Schengen initiative, which envisages the restructuring of EU infrastructure to be compatible with military mobility.
The Military Schengen initiative is particularly significant in that it illustrates the EU’s gradual transformation from a traditionally economic and value-oriented actor into one centered on security and defense. This initiative should not be seen merely as a logistical project; rather, it must also be evaluated as a strategic instrument that strengthens the EU’s collective defense capacity. When its founding logic is recalled, the Schengen project—beyond economic integration—was also part of a peace- and value-based identity project that aimed to facilitate the free movement of people and to strengthen a sense of Europeanness, in other words, to support European integration. From this perspective, Military Schengen[i] should be assessed not only as an initiative that facilitates military logistics and enhances deterrence, but also as an indicator of a security-oriented transformation in the EU’s identity.
The approval by the European Parliament on 25 November 2025 of a €1.5 billion defense plan to finance defense spending[ii] and support Ukraine can also be regarded as a natural complement to this transformation process. Within the EU, countries with differing national interests and defense priorities have converged around a strategic vision such as the Europeanization of the defense industry.
The current picture indicates that the EU is moving beyond an integration project based on Kantian peace architecture toward a European security union that is capable, when necessary, of using force and of ensuring its own security through its own capacity. This transformation corresponds with the Hobbesian logic, which argues that security in the international arena can only be achieved through the accumulation of power and the enhancement of deterrent capabilities. The EU now perceives the international system as an anarchic and competitive environment and is gravitating toward an approach that embraces Hobbesian assumptions such as strategic autonomy and collective defense in order to survive.
So, is the EU’s shift in its security paradigm from Kantian philosophy to a Hobbesian perspective a necessity or a choice? This question can be evaluated from both angles. When geopolitical threats such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis, rising threats in North Africa and the Middle East, and ongoing power competition in the Eastern Mediterranean are taken into consideration; alongside the inequalities in the national defense capacities of member states in response to the US demand that Europe assume greater responsibility for its own security; the EU’s insufficient military capacity to react swiftly to crises; and the restrictions imposed on the EU’s economic security by China’s rise in technology and the economy—it becomes evident that, for the EU, the Hobbesian approach is not an option but rather a necessity for ensuring its security.
On the other hand, the most well-known example of the Kantian assumption that economic integration and interdependence prevent conflict is the Germany–Russia energy cooperation that lasted until 2022. The mutual dependence of the two sides theoretically reduces the risk of conflict and ensures security. In other words, instead of increasing its military capacity, the EU could have chosen to ensure security by expanding the network of economic interdependence—an option that is more consistent with the EU’s identity as a normative power.
However, for neither the United States nor countries with strong defense industries is this option considered as pragmatic as the adoption of the Hobbesian understanding. This is because the United States has three fundamental motivations for the securitization of the EU through the Russian threat. First, Russia’s sphere of influence in Europe, which had expanded through German–Russian cooperation, is curtailed, and Russia is even transformed into the primary security threat for Europe. Second, the rise of Germany—seeking to undermine US influence in Europe and aspiring to European leadership by deepening cooperation with Russia—is blocked. Third, NATO is refunctionalized, and the security-oriented approach positions the EU as a burden-sharing actor within NATO. Naturally, strengthening the defense industries of European countries does not merely turn them into financial contributors to NATO; it also transforms the EU into a strong market in which US defense companies benefit from joint production and export opportunities. As a result of these three factors facilitated by the Hobbesian approach, the United States strengthens its global military capacity against Russia and China and forms a common front against its rivals.
For European countries with strong defense industries such as Germany, France, and Italy, the adoption of the Hobbesian approach—compared to the Kantian perspective—offers a strategic source of revenue of greater magnitude, in which the balance of power shifts in their favor. A securitized EU, through the cycle of increased armament, more joint defense projects, and more defense funds, provides countries with defense industries opportunities to expand their export volumes and to obtain direct financing from the EU’s common defense funds.
Countries with limited defense industrial capacity, on the other hand, increase their defense spending against the Russian threat. Examples such as Poland and the Czech Republic purchasing Leopard 2 tanks and various armored vehicles from Germany; Estonia and Lithuania acquiring air defense systems and warship equipment from France; and Poland and Romania purchasing helicopters and naval defense radar systems from Italy demonstrate the emergence of a cycle that increases the revenues of countries with advanced defense industries. Consequently, for exporting countries, economic interests constitute a strong motivation for the adoption of a Hobbesian security approach.
Naturally, the prominence of Hobbesian elements in the security paradigm also brings challenges for the EU. Factors such as the differing security interests of member states and the high budgets required for defense projects hinder the attainment of ultimate goals in defense integration. Moreover, the EU’s heavy dependence on NATO for its military capacity constitutes an obstacle to the achievement of strategic autonomy.
In addition, how to strike a balance between normative identity and power politics remains a critical question for the EU. Defense-oriented policies contradict the EU’s peaceful and normative identity. The securitization of the EU—an actor accepted both within the Union and in the international arena for its normative identity—raises questions of legitimacy. On the other hand, if the EU succeeds in constructing a security identity that integrates rule of law, transparency, and democratic oversight—core elements of its normative identity—into its defense mechanisms, it may gain a strategic advantage that differentiates it from the United States and other actors.
In conclusion, the current initiatives undertaken by the EU in the field of security and defense demonstrate a clear shift from Kantian normative approach toward Hobbesian pragmatism. This transformation represents not merely a technical enhancement of defense capacity, but a historical rupture that redefines the political logic of EU integration. For an entity long regarded as a peace project, the EU now seeks to position itself as a geopolitical power in an international environment marked by intensifying global power competition. However, the success of this objective depends on the establishment of an integration between normative identity and security identity. In other words, the fate of the European (Security) Union hinges upon the development of an identity synthesis in which Kantian values and Hobbesian instruments are blended.
[i] “European Commission, Commission Moves Towards ‘Military Schengen’ and Transformation of Defence Industry”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2724, (Date Accessed: 28.11.2025).
[ii] “European Parliament approves new EU $1.7 billion defence investment programme”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/european-parliament-approves-new-eu-17-billion-defence-investment-programme-2025-11-25/, (Date Accessed: 28.11.2025).
