Analysis

From Collective Defense to Institutional Resilience: NATO’s New Approach to Security

For NATO, resilience does not replace traditional military preparedness; rather, it refers to the new security infrastructure that makes it possible.
The Ankara Summit was a process in which NATO’s diplomatic and institutional resilience—as well as its military capabilities—were put to the test.
The summit also highlights how NATO is striving to adapt to the changing security environment.

Paylaş

This post is also available in: Türkçe Русский

At first glance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit held in Ankara was dominated by discussions on defense spending, the “Russian threat,” support for Ukraine, and transatlantic burden-sharing. However, the summit’s deeper significance lies not so much in the specific content of the decisions made, but rather in the transformation evident in NATO’s approach to defining security. Through the Ankara Summit Declaration, the Alliance strongly reaffirmed its commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the principle that “an attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all allies.” At the same time, it has prioritized areas such as strengthening the defense industrial base, expanding joint production capacity, accelerating innovation, and developing capabilities in space and cyberspace, as well as unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and joint combat infrastructure.[i] This demonstrates that NATO is seeking to build collective defense on an increasingly broad concept of resilience.

For this reason, it can be said that the conditions ensuring the feasibility of collective defense were redefined at the Ankara Summit. From NATO’s perspective, the main issue is no longer merely the invocation of Article 5 when an attack occurs. The Alliance’s ability to sustain its military forces over the long term, produce ammunition and equipment, maintain its critical infrastructure in working order, preserve its technological superiority, and ensure that its political decision-making processes continue to function in the face of crises have also become integral components of deterrence.

From NATO’s perspective, the concept of resilience—which emerged at the Ankara Summit—is not entirely new. NATO links resilience to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and considers it one of the fundamental prerequisites for national and collective defense capabilities. In NATO’s official approach, resilience encompasses the capacity to prepare for major shocks, withstand them, respond to them, recover quickly, and ensure the continuity of Alliance operations. Energy, communications, transportation, health systems, food and water resources, and civil-military cooperation are also part of this framework.[ii]

A distinctive feature of the Ankara Summit is that it links the current resilience agenda more directly to the defense industry, technological transformation, and political cohesion within the alliance. The main reason for this is that, in today’s security environment, military superiority alone is not sufficient to provide deterrence. Prolonged wars, ammunition consumption, hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, supply chain disruptions, and defense industry production capacity have become strategic variables that directly influence the outcome of conflicts. Therefore, from NATO’s perspective, resilience does not replace traditional military preparedness; rather, it represents the new security infrastructure that makes it possible.

The declaration states that by 2025, European allies and Canada will have increased their investments in core defense needs by more than $139 billion; it was announced that new procurements exceeding $50 billion were announced in Ankara and that collective production capacity will be expanded. It was also noted that NATO’s deterrence and defense structure will be supported by nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities, as well as space and cyber assets; and that investments will be made in deep precision strikes, integrated air and missile defense, unmanned systems, advanced technologies, and intelligence.[iii]

When these factors are considered together, it becomes clear that military power is measured not only by the size of existing forces, but also by the economic and technological infrastructure required to produce, deploy, and sustain those forces. In this sense, the Ankara Summit demonstrates that NATO is moving toward establishing a security ecosystem that will reduce the cost and likelihood of war from the outset, as well as its capacity to respond to war, and that it has prioritized enhancing its institutional resilience.

In academic literature, NATO’s longevity is linked to its capacity to adapt to a changing international environment. According to Trine Flockhart, NATO’s institutional resilience stems from the organization’s ability to strike a balance—under varying conditions—between its role as a military alliance and its role as a community of shared values.[iv] This adaptation does not mean that political divisions within the alliance have disappeared. On the contrary, it requires NATO to constantly reposition itself in the face of evolving threats and diverging priorities among its members. More recent studies, however, show that resilience is taking on an increasingly inward-looking and defensive meaning in NATO’s security narrative; military defense is complemented by a concept of “total defense” that encompasses society, industry, and civilian capabilities.[v]

Consequently, the fundamental shift in the external security dimension of the Ankara Summit is the recognition that the credibility of Article 5 depends not only on political commitments or military forces, but on a much broader infrastructure, including production capacity, technological superiority, civilian preparedness, and institutional continuity. However, this broadening of the concept of resilience raises an important question: Has NATO’s approach to resilience—developed in response to external threats—also translated into the Alliance’s capacity to manage political uncertainties and leadership crises within its own ranks?

One of the notable aspects of the Ankara Summit is that NATO demonstrated a more advanced capacity to adapt, not only in the face of external threats but also to maintain its institutional functioning amid political uncertainties within the alliance. This can be seen particularly through the statements made by U.S. President Donald Trump before and during the summit, as well as the allies’ reactions to those statements. Trump specifically targeted Spain regarding defense spending and threatened trade sanctions after Madrid refused to accept the 5 percent defense spending target.[vi] Nevertheless, unlike the institutional deadlocks seen in previous years, the summit concluded with the adoption of a joint declaration.

This does not mean that NATO has resolved its internal political issues. On the contrary, significant differences of opinion persist within the alliance regarding defense spending, burden-sharing, and the United States’ long-term commitments to European security. However, the Ankara Summit signals the emergence of a new management practice aimed at preventing these differences from escalating into crises that completely paralyze NATO’s institutional functioning. In this context, concrete examples of this include the allies’ efforts to anticipate Trump’s rhetoric in advance, shaping their negotiation strategies accordingly, and, in particular, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s adoption of a more cautious diplomatic tone aimed at preserving consensus within the alliance.[vii]

In this context, what stood out at the Ankara Summit was not a change in Trump’s rhetoric, but rather NATO’s approach to managing that rhetoric. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, Trump’s harsh criticism of defense spending and his remarks regarding allies had dominated the summit’s agenda, and the alliance’s image of unity had been seriously called into question. At the Ankara Summit, however, although similar rhetoric continued, the summit’s institutional outcomes were relatively less affected.[viii] In this regard, the Ankara Summit served as a test not only of NATO’s military capabilities but also of its diplomatic and institutional resilience. This is because, in today’s security environment, the risks facing alliances are fueled not only by external threats but also by political differences among members and uncertainties stemming from leadership. In this context, NATO’s performance at the Ankara Summit suggests that the alliance has developed institutional reflexes aimed not so much at eliminating political differences as at preventing these differences from paralyzing the organization’s core decision-making mechanisms.

Although the discourse on resilience lies at the heart of the alliance’s new security paradigm, this approach does not eliminate NATO’s structural problems. Disagreements among members regarding defense spending persist, uncertainty remains regarding the U.S.’s long-term approach to European security, and full strategic alignment on the perceived threats posed by Russia and China has not been achieved. Therefore, rather than being viewed as a new paradigm that resolves all of the Alliance’s vulnerabilities, resilience can be regarded as an institutional governance approach aimed at making these vulnerabilities manageable.

What is noteworthy here is that the NATO summit has established a two-tiered institutional resilience framework, bringing together both the external and internal security dimensions of resilience within the same framework. While enhancing defense industry capacity, protecting critical infrastructure, and maintaining technological superiority strengthen external deterrence, preserving political cohesion, managing the uncertainties that leadership transitions may create, and ensuring the sustainability of the Alliance’s decision-making mechanisms constitute the fundamental elements of internal resilience. In other words, from NATO’s perspective, resilience is now viewed as a matter of institutional continuity rather than merely military readiness.

In this context, the most significant outcome of the Ankara Summit is not merely the adopted declaration or the commitments regarding defense spending. The summit also highlights how NATO is striving to adapt to the changing security environment. While seeking to enhance its deterrence against external threats, the Alliance is also working to develop the resilience needed to manage internal political uncertainties and leadership-related crises through institutional processes. However, this does not mean that NATO’s internal divisions have been eliminated. On the contrary, the Ankara Summit demonstrates that as the Alliance redefines security, it has begun to view its own internal vulnerabilities as an integral part of security planning, just as much as external threats. In conclusion, the Ankara Summit can be viewed as a turning point at which NATO repositioned institutional resilience as a “complementary element of security” in order to make collective defense more sustainable.


[i] “The Ankara Summit Declaration”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration, (Date Accessed: 10.07.2026).

[ii] “Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3”, NATO, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3, (Date Accessed: 10.07.2026).

[iii] NATO, a.g.e. 2026.

[iv] Trine Flockhart, “Is NATO ready for the multi-order world?”, Centrum Balticum, https://centrumbalticum.org/trine-flockhart-is-nato-ready-for-the-multi-order-world, (Date Accessed: 10.07.2026).

[v] Pol Bargués, Jonathan Joseph, Ana E Juncos, “The transformation of EU and NATO security narratives: towards resilience and total defence?”, International Affairs, 2026, 102 (4), 1119–1137, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag050, s. 1135-1137.

[vi] Aislinn Laing ve David Latona, “Spain says Trump softened rhetoric after learning of Madrid’s contributions to NATO”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/spain-says-trump-softened-rhetoric-after-learning-madrids-contributions-nato-2026-07-09/, (Date Accessed: 10.07.2026).

[vii] Andrew Gray ve Lili Bayer, “NATO weathers another Trump storm but braces for more after Ankara Summit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-weathers-another-trump-storm-braces-more-after-ankara-summit-2026-07-09/, (Date Accessed: 10.07.2026).

[viii] Gram Slattery ve Humeyra Pamuk, “From threats to praise, Trump keeps allies guessing at NATO Summit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/threats-praise-trump-keeps-allies-guessing-nato-summit-2026-07-09/, (Date Accessed: 10.07.2026).

Başak ERTUNÇ
Başak ERTUNÇ
Başak Ertunç graduated in 2024 from the Department of International Relations at Galatasaray University, ranking fourth in her class, with a thesis titled “Chanter pour l'Europe: Une Analyse Discursive des Paroles des Chansons d'Israël à l'Eurovision.” During her undergraduate studies, she spent a semester as an exchange student in the Department of Political Science at Sciences Po Strasbourg. She is currently continuing her studies in the Department of Global Security and International Policy Analysis as part of the Dual Degree Master’s Program jointly offered by Galatasaray University and the University of Bordeaux. Başak is currently working on her master’s thesis titled “Between South-South Solidarity and Power Projection: Health Investments, Discourse, and the Construction of China’s Role in South Africa.” Her primary areas of interest include constructivist international relations theory, identity and cultural studies, discourse analysis, securitization theory, global health diplomacy, and the role-building processes of international actors. Başak is fluent in English and French.

Similar Posts