What would become of the role and mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established during the Cold War, after the end of that period has been one of the greatest military-political debates of the twenty-first century. Having found a new mission in the 1990s through interventions in ethnic nationalist conflicts, civil wars, and crises, NATO entered a process of change and transformation in order to address the multidimensional and transnational security threats of the twenty-first century.
NATO’s process of reshaping itself continues in accordance with contemporary conditions and needs. The clearest example of this was seen at NATO’s 2022 Madrid Summit, when China was described for the first time in the Strategic Concept as a “systemic challenge.” [i]Furthermore, the participation of the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, which constitute NATO’s Indo-Pacific Four, in the Madrid Summit demonstrated that this cooperation was progressing towards institutionalization. Nevertheless, following the 2022 Madrid Summit, the manner in which NATO’s cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners would develop and the limits of this cooperation remained important questions. At this point, there are a number of variables, limitations, challenges, and impossibilities that must be discussed.
To begin with the variables, the rapid transformation of global and regional circumstances is perhaps one of the most influential factors affecting NATO’s efforts to identify a new mission and determine its direction. In this context, highly distinct geographical regions such as the Americas, the North Atlantic, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific have their own specific or priority security threats and problems. Accordingly, the perspectives of European allies and Indo-Pacific partners regarding issues identified by the United States (US), such as the “China” issue, may also differ. From this perspective, the perception that China constitutes a “challenge” may vary depending on time, place, or actor.
Continuing with this example, the views of the US, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific Four regarding China have varied considerably since the announcement of the 2022 Strategic Concept. This variation has also been clearly reflected in the level of participation of the Indo-Pacific Four in NATO summits since 2022. While the leaders of these countries participated in certain summits at the highest level, in other years they attended at the ministerial level. This situation may be regarded as an indication that the dimensions of NATO’s cooperation with the Indo-Pacific Four are still in the process of taking shape and becoming institutionalized.
NATO’s cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners also has a number of limitations. Foremost among these is the fact that NATO’s area of responsibility and authority is limited to the North Atlantic.[ii] However, over the past five or six years, the US and the United Kingdom have argued that NATO’s area of responsibility and authority should not remain confined to the Euro-Atlantic region and have emphasized the importance of also encompassing the security of the Indo-Pacific. In this respect, they have referred to the need for a “global NATO.”[iii] It is important to emphasize in this context that, following the September 11 attacks, the US intervened in Afghanistan under the concept of a “pre-emptive strike,” with the objective of “eliminating the threat at its source.” For approximately twenty years, NATO allies and partner countries deployed military forces in Afghanistan under the authority of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Whether NATO could undertake missions in the Indo-Pacific in the future similar to its Afghanistan mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), constitutes a critical issue of debate concerning global peace and security.
NATO’s cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners also faces several significant challenges and impossibilities. One of the foremost challenges is whether NATO, which was established as a North Atlantic alliance, can become involved in the security agendas of the Indo-Pacific. For this reason, the idea that certain Indo-Pacific countries could establish a collective defence alliance independent of NATO but associated with it has long been a subject of debate. Certain democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific that are integrated with Western actors in one way or another face considerable challenges and constraints in constructing their own geopolitical axis in the region. For example, the combined military and defence capacities of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand remain extremely weak and inadequate in comparison with actors such as China, North Korea, and Russia. Therefore, it appears extremely difficult for the “democratic” countries of the Indo-Pacific that share similar views with the West to construct an independent defence and security axis without Western support.
NATO’s opening towards the Indo-Pacific, which became concrete with the 2022 Madrid Summit, and its new vision defining China as a “systemic challenge” are clear indications of the Alliance’s efforts to move beyond its traditional geographical boundaries. However, despite the determination expressed at the rhetorical level, the partnership that NATO is seeking to develop with the Indo-Pacific Four (AP4) encounters structural and strategic obstacles. Actor-specific differences in threat perceptions, the geographical limitations arising from the Alliance’s founding treaty, and the military capacity deficiencies of the countries in the region in the face of revisionist powers constitute the greatest barriers to the objective of a “global NATO.” As the experience in Afghanistan has demonstrated, although NATO possesses the operational capacity to act beyond its traditional area, the multilayered geopolitical equation of the Indo-Pacific makes a similar engagement highly risky.
In conclusion, under the current circumstances, neither the construction of an independent collective defence architecture by the Indo-Pacific partners without the West’s direct military umbrella nor NATO’s complete institutional integration into the region appears possible in the short term. This situation demonstrates that NATO–Indo-Pacific cooperation is likely to remain, in the near future, a loose “platform for strategic dialogue,” limited to intelligence sharing, cyber defence, and diplomatic coordination rather than military integration, and that the limits of this cooperation will be determined by these global impossibilities themselves.
[i] “2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT”, NATO, https://www.act.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/290622-strategic-concept.pdf, (Date Accessed: 11.07.2026).
[ii] For further information: “NATO’nun Görev Alanı Tartışmaları ve Pasifik’in Güvenliği”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/natonun-gorev-alani-tartismalari-ve-pasifikin-guvenligi/, (Date Accessed: 11.07.2026).
[iii] “UK’s Liz Truss: NATO Should Protect Taiwan Too”, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/liz-truss-nato-taiwan-protect/, (Date Accessed: 05.05.2022).
