The clashes that have intensified in recent days along Yemen’s western coast have brought the Bab el-Mandeb Strait back to the center of the regional security agenda. The Houthis’ advances in Dhubab and the Hanish Islands following their advance in Mocha, as well as their arrival at the strategically located Perim (Mayyun) Island within the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, represent a development that could have consequences extending beyond the military balance in Yemen.[i] Given Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic location, instability in the area can directly affect energy flows and maritime trade between Europe and Asia. However, the key factor distinguishing the current developments from previous Red Sea crises is that they are unfolding at a time when alternative energy routes have gained greater importance due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. For this reason, the growing security risks in Bab el-Mandeb raise the question of the extent to which a regional conflict could spill over into the global energy and trade system.
Ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait reach the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, whereas if this route becomes unavailable, they are required to take a longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Indeed, since late 2023, attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea have prompted many shipping companies to alter their routes, resulting in longer transit times and higher costs.[ii] The latest military advances, meanwhile, are increasing the Houthis’ capacity to exert pressure on maritime traffic through the strait.
To understand the broader implications of the current developments, it is necessary to examine the connection between Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), an average of 21.6 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the Strait of Hormuz in the final quarter of 2025, while this volume fell to 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026. Over the same period, the volume of oil passing through Bab el-Mandeb increased from 5.4 million to 8.1 million barrels per day.[iii] A key factor behind this shift was Saudi Arabia’s decision to redirect part of its oil flows through the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu in response to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, the fact that Bab el-Mandeb, one of the alternative routes that helps reduce vulnerability in the Strait of Hormuz, is itself coming under growing security pressure is transforming the relationship between the two straits from one of strategic substitution into one of mutual vulnerability. For the Middle East, the emerging “dual-strait” vulnerability stems less from the possibility that both straits could be closed simultaneously than from the narrowing of alternatives capable of compensating for disruptions in one strait due to instability in the other.
On 10 September 2026, the number of commercial commodity vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz fell to as low as seven. Given that the pre-war daily average was approximately 125 vessels, this decline illustrates the scale of the current vulnerability. During the same period, maritime traffic through Bab el-Mandeb continued, with 26 commodity vessels recorded as having transited the strait on 11 September.[iv] Therefore, at the current stage, it is not possible to speak of a closure of Bab el-Mandeb. The main risk lies instead in the fact that the security of an alternative route, whose importance has increased as traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has declined, is becoming more fragile at the same time. Indeed, amid concerns over regional supply and maritime transportation, Brent crude oil prices remained above $100 per barrel as of 11 September.[v]
This situation presents a strategic dilemma, particularly for Saudi Arabia. The East-West Pipeline and the Port of Yanbu provide Riyadh with the capacity to export oil without using the Strait of Hormuz. However, the security of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb is also critical for shipments bound for international markets via the Red Sea. Consequently, developments along Yemen’s western coast have become linked not only to the military balance in a neighboring country but also to the security of alternative energy export routes to the Strait of Hormuz. The fact that an alternative developed to mitigate risks at a transit point has encountered another security issue demonstrates that energy supply security depends not only on production capacity but also on the resilience of the routes that transport that production to global markets.
Whether the simultaneous emergence of risks in the two straits will develop into a global crisis does not depend solely on whether maritime transit is completely disrupted. Uncertainty over energy supplies, rising insurance and freight costs, the diversion of vessels to longer routes, and extended delivery times may also transmit regional security problems to the global economy. Indeed, the extension of the mandate of the European Union’s EUNAVFOR Aspides operation until February 2027, which aims to protect commercial vessels and support freedom of navigation, demonstrates the continuing importance of maritime security in and around Bab el-Mandeb for international actors.[vi] The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has also highlighted that disruptions around the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in recent years have forced vessels to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope, placing additional pressure on transport costs, delivery times, and the reliability of supply chains.[vii] If risks in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb persist simultaneously, the global system’s ability to offset these disruptions through alternative routes may come under even greater pressure. Therefore, the potential for a regional security crisis to generate global economic consequences should be assessed not only in terms of the complete closure of the straits, but also through the gradual narrowing and increasing cost of the available alternatives.
The implications of Bab el-Mandeb’s growing strategic importance for the peace process in Yemen should not be overlooked. Although the relative decline in large-scale fighting following the United Nations-brokered truce in Yemen in 2022 created significant space for a political settlement, a lasting peace agreement has yet to be reached. In August 2026, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg stated that Yemen was facing the most serious risk of a return to large-scale conflict since the 2022 truce. He also warned that, at a time when regional trade and energy flows were already under pressure due to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden could further draw Yemen into broader regional tensions.[viii] Following the renewed intensification of fighting on 7 September 2026, Grundberg stressed that a return to large-scale conflict would further complicate the path toward a political settlement and called on the parties to make use of the existing military coordination mechanisms.[ix]
This situation creates an important dilemma for the peace process in Yemen. The growing importance of Bab el-Mandeb for global energy and trade security may strengthen the interest of international actors in preserving stability in Yemen. However, the same process may also increase the significance of local actors in Yemen within regional power dynamics, causing the conflict in Yemen to become more deeply intertwined with regional rivalries. Therefore, Yemen’s growing geostrategic importance does not automatically facilitate a political settlement. On the contrary, the closer linkage of Bab el-Mandeb’s security with energy flows and global maritime trade may make peace in Yemen more necessary while at the same time making the political environment in which such peace could be achieved more complex.
In conclusion, the Houthis’ advance along Yemen’s western coast has once again made the security of Bab el-Mandeb an important issue on both the regional and global agenda. Under current conditions, the continuation of commercial traffic through the strait means that it is not yet possible to speak of a direct global energy or trade crisis. However, at a time when vulnerability in the Strait of Hormuz has increased dependence on alternative energy routes, the fact that Bab el-Mandeb is also coming under growing security pressure makes it increasingly difficult to assess the Middle East’s critical maritime chokepoints in isolation from one another. In the coming period, the decisive factor will be not only military developments in the two straits, but also the extent to which the energy and trade system can compensate for a new disruption along either route. Therefore, the possibility that this “dual-strait” vulnerability could develop into a global crisis should be assessed not only in terms of the complete closure of the straits, but also through the narrowing of alternative routes, rising transportation costs, and the possibility that regional conflict may further constrain the space for a political settlement in Yemen.
[i] “Yemen’s Houthis reach strategic island at mouth of vital shipping lane”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-reach-strategic-island-mouth-vital-shipping-lane-2026-09-11/, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[ii] Reuters, “Explainer-Why is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait so important?”, Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/explainerwhy-is-the-bab-elmandeb-strait-so-important-4896052, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[iii] “Short-Term Energy Outlook – Energy Security”, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[iv] “Hormuz shipping traffic falls to single digits, data shows”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hormuz-shipping-traffic-falls-single-digits-data-shows-2026-09-11/, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[v] “Oil set for weekly gain of over 7% on supply disruptions; US diesel hits record high”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-prices-set-end-week-over-100-first-time-nearly-4-months-2026-09-11/, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[vi] “Red Sea: Council extends the mandate of Operation ASPIDES to safeguard freedom of navigation”, Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/23/red-sea-council-extends-the-mandate-of-operation-aspides-to-safeguard-freedom-of-navigation/, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[vii] “At Maritime Summit, UNCTAD highlights impact of disruptions”, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/news/maritime-summit-unctad-highlights-impact-disruptions, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[viii] “Briefing by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, to the Security Council”, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY), https://osesgy.unmissions.org/en/node/136496, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
[ix] “Statement by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen on recent escalation”, OSESGY, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/en/node/136655, (Accessed: 11.09.2026).
