The de facto closure that began in the Strait of Hormuz on 27 February 2026 was completed one month as of 30 March 2026. The disruption at this strategic chokepoint, through which approximately 20 percent of global oil supply passes, together with the limited capacity of existing alternatives, has once again revealed that the dependence of global trade on certain chokepoints constitutes a structural risk.[1] In this context, the Middle Corridor extending to Europe via Türkiye and the Development Road Project are considered as two prominent main routes.
In the first week of the crisis, the speed at which trade flows changed direction was observed in a concrete manner. In the Middle Corridor, which extends from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus to Türkiye, and from there to Europe, traffic in the ports of Baku, Poti, and Aktau increased by 35–40 percent during the first week of the crisis.[2] This increase demonstrates that the route in question is not merely a theoretical alternative, but possesses a capacity that can be effectively activated during times of crisis. The ability of the corridor to provide uninterrupted access during such periods makes it a predictable trade route.
This transformation should not be considered limited to physical flow alone but must also be evaluated in its financial dimension. The rapid rise in war risk premiums in the Strait of Hormuz from 0.25 percent to 3 percent indicates that trade security has become a variable that directly translates into costs.[3] This increase in insurance costs has become a determining factor in route preferences, making the cost advantage of land-based transportation more visible. The fact that insurance expenses in the Middle Corridor are 60–70 percent lower compared to maritime transportation has been one of the main factors accelerating the preference for this route.[4]
The Middle Corridor offers a clear advantage in terms of time and distance compared to maritime transportation, with its approximately 7,000 km length and a transport time of 12–18 days, as opposed to 30–45 days by sea.[5] This difference represents not only logistical efficiency but also a capacity that provides predictability during periods of crisis. The fact that approximately 96 percent of transportation on the China–Europe route is still carried out by sea indicates that global trade is concentrated on a limited number of routes and therefore carries a structural fragility. This concentration reveals the need for a necessary diversification that will ensure the continuity of the system in times of crisis, rather than merely preferring alternative routes.
The Development Road Project, designed as a multimodal transportation route connecting the Persian Gulf to Europe via Türkiye, makes it possible to reduce dependence on Hormuz and to transfer Asia originating cargo directly to land routes without directing it toward narrow maritime chokepoints.[6] This structure not only redirects trade flows to an alternative route but also offers a more flexible and sustainable logistics model through sea–land integration. Compared to maritime transport, the shortening of distance and the predictability of transit times enable the route to stand out as a strategic complementary capacity in times of crisis.
These developments also call into question the sustainability of maritime security. The inability to maintain commercial flows despite the naval capacity of the United States in the region demonstrates that securing these routes militarily remains limited. This situation is likely to lead to a tendency for trade flows to shift toward more stable and lower risk routes and for capacity to be distributed among alternative corridors.
While these developments are taking place, it is also observed that infrastructure investments aimed at the Bosphorus crossing, one of the most critical chokepoints of the Middle Corridor, have accelerated. Indeed, the approval by the World Bank on 30 March 2026 of a 2-billion-dollar financing for the Istanbul Northern Railway Crossing Project indicates that this route has become a strategic priority not only for regional but also for global trade continuity. While the Marmaray line is currently limited to an annual freight capacity of approximately 3 million tons, making the Bosphorus crossing a structural bottleneck, it is aimed to increase this capacity to 50 million tons with the new line.[7] An increase on this scale represents a critical threshold that will enable the uninterrupted functioning of routes such as the Middle Corridor and the Development Road.
In conclusion, the de facto closure in Hormuz constitutes a development that accelerates the ongoing transformation in the structure of global trade rather than a temporary crisis. This process reveals that conducting trade flows through a single route is not sustainable, while significantly increasing the importance of land-based transportation routes. When the current capacity of the Middle Corridor and the new structure that will emerge with the completion of the Development Road are evaluated together, trade between Asia and Europe will evolve into a more balanced and multi-axis structure. The 2-billion-dollar financing provided by the World Bank for the Istanbul Northern Railway Crossing Project demonstrates that the international community acknowledges Türkiye’s central role in this transformation. This development also confirms Türkiye’s strategy of becoming a regional energy and logistics hub beyond being merely a transit route. In this framework, Türkiye stands out as a central junction that determines the direction of trade and energy flows and ensures continuity and predictability.
[1] “Chief Economist warns of severe global food security risks from disruption to Strait of Hormuz trade corridor”, FAO, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-chief-economist-warns-of-severe-global-food-security-risks-from-disruption-to-strait-of-hormuz-trade-corridor/en, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026)
[2] “Türkiye’s land, rail routes gain edge as Middle East tensions choke global sea lanes”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-s-land-rail-routes-gain-edge-as-middle-east-tensions-choke-global-sea-lanes/3851275, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[3] “Strait of Hormuz disruptions: Implications for global trade and development (UNCTAD/OSG/TT/INF/2026/1)”, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/node/51538, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[4] “Ship insurers weigh war risks for critical but perilous Gulf route”, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/transportation/ship-insurers-weigh-war-risks-for-critical-but-perilous-gulf-route, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[5] World Bank Group. (2023). Middle Trade and Transport Corridor: Policies and Investments to Triple Freight Volumes and Halve Travel Time by 2030. Washington, D.C: The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/40626, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[6] International Maritime Organization (IMO). (IMO Council condemns attacks on merchant ships and urges international coordination to safeguard civilian shipping, during extraordinary session in London. https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-calls-for-safe-passage-framework-in-strait-of-hormuz.aspx, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[7] “World Bank approves $2B loan for Istanbul north rail project”, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/transportation/world-bank-approves-2b-loan-for-istanbul-north-rail-project, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
