At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense Ministers’ Meeting held on June 18, 2026, at the headquarters in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth criticized European allies for refusing to allow U.S. forces to use European bases for operations against Iran, stating that the U.S. would review its presence in Europe.[i] A few weeks ago, he also announced Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw approximately 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany.[ii] When both statements are considered together, the impression arises that the U.S. wishes to gradually withdraw from Europe and is preparing to fully transfer the security burden to its allies. However, the continent’s current security architecture paints a picture that contradicts this impression and demonstrates that the U.S. role remains decisive in Europe at the structural level.
This is because Ramstein Air Base in Germany serves as one of the key air logistics hubs not only for Europe but also for Washington’s operations in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. U.S. European Command, located in Stuttgart, is not only the command center for U.S. forces in Europe but also one of NATO’s main headquarters for crisis management. The Aviano and Sigonella bases in Italy are at the center of air and intelligence operations stretching from the Mediterranean to the Middle East, while the RAF Lakenheath and Midenhall bases in the United Kingdom, in addition to being strategic bases, play a critical role in rapid air deployment. At the same time, a significant portion of NATO’s European infrastructure for air defense, early warning, satellite intelligence, airlift, nuclear deterrence, and missile defense still relies on U.S. capabilities. Considering that a significant portion of NATO’s total defense spending is covered by the United States[iii], this demonstrates that even today, as discussions about an autonomous European Army gain momentum, the continent’s current security architecture is largely built upon U.S. military presence and deterrence.
This picture, which appears to be a contradiction between rhetoric and reality on the ground, actually provides an important framework for understanding how post-American European security was constructed. During the Cold War, Europe’s security landscape centered on Central Europe and was built upon the American military infrastructure stretching from the Fulda Gap to Ramstein, and from Stuttgart to Landstuhl. This structure reflected the geostrategic needs of the era, which were aimed at containing the Soviet threat. Today, however, Washington’s perception of threats has changed significantly. Germany no longer constitutes the center of gravity for European security; instead, it is shaped by the need to contain Russia, ensure the security of the Black Sea basin, and strengthen NATO’s eastern flank.
Consequently, “post-America” European security refers to a process in which Washington is redefining the European security landscape according to its threat priorities. Indeed, at a time when the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Germany is on the agenda, Poland’s rising role in the European security architecture should not be viewed as a coincidence. Indeed, from Washington’s perspective, Poland is not only situated at the center of the eastern flank but also holds a key position in managing military activity along the Suwalki Corridor, the Belarusian border, and the Kaliningrad axis. At the same time, Poland, one of the countries within NATO that has increased its defense spending the fastest in recent years, has significantly expanded its military capabilities with U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets, Abrams tanks, Patriot air defense systems, and HIMARS long-range rocket systems. However, Washington’s emphasis on Poland should not be limited to defense spending or arms sales. The Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in 2020 has transformed the U.S. military presence in Poland from a temporary deployment into a permanent security infrastructure. In this context, the permanent deployment of the U.S. Army’s V Corps Forward Headquarters in Poznan, the stationing of approximately 10,000 troops in Poland[iv], and the provision of financing to facilitate Poland’s purchase of $4 billion worth of U.S. weapons systems,[v] indicates that Warsaw is being positioned not only as a key ally on NATO’s eastern flank but also as one of the central hubs of Washington’s new command and deterrence architecture in Europe.
In contrast, Europe’s strategic response to this is significant for the future of European security in a post-American era. For as the geography in which security is generated changes, so do the actors shaping security policies. For this reason, Brussels may view Poland’s rising role not merely as a development concerning NATO’s eastern flank, but as a structural transformation that will directly affect the future of Europe’s security architecture. Indeed, Brussels does not want the European security architecture to be shaped solely around a Washington-Warsaw axis and is striving to integrate Poland’s growing security role into the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. One of the most concrete indicators of this approach is the swift inclusion of Poland’s Eastern Shield initiative in the EU’s common security agenda.
Originally conceived as a national project focused on border security, such as surveillance and infrastructure protection, along the Belarus-Kaliningrad border, this initiative has, over time, come to be viewed as a joint security investment serving the collective defense of Europe’s eastern border. Similarly, under the EU’s SAFE program, Poland has been designated as one of the priority countries and has received the largest allocation, 43.7 billion euros, among the participating nations.[vi] These examples demonstrate Poland’s desire to maintain its growing security role within the EU’s institutional framework. Indeed, as the center of gravity for security shifts toward the Baltic-Black Sea corridor, the EU seeks to prevent the center of political decision-making in European security policies from shifting to Eastern Europe as well.
In conclusion, post-American European security refers to a structural transformation in which the European security landscape is being redefined, rather than a period of U.S. withdrawal from Europe, the center of gravity of security has shifted eastward, and the EU is striving to manage this new geopolitical reality within its institutional framework.
[i]Malek Fouda, “Hegseth, NATO Müttefiklerini Eleştirdi: Avrupa’daki ABD Varlığı Gözden Geçirilecek”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/2026/06/19/hegseth-nato-muttefiklerini-elestirdi-avrupadaki-abd-varligi-gozden-gecirilecek, (Date of Access: 19.06.2026).
[ii] Ayşe İrem Çakır, “ABD Savunma Bakanlığı, Almanya’daki Yaklaşık 5 Bin Askerini Geri Çekecek”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/abd-savunma-bakanligi-almanyadaki-yaklasik-5-bin-askerini-geri-cekecek/3924681, (Date of Access: 14.06.2026).
[iii] “Global Military Spending Rise Continues As European And Asian Expenditures Surge”, SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-military-spending-rise-continues-european-and-asian-expenditures-surge, (Date of Access: 14.06.2026).
[iv] “Increasing the US military presence in Poland”, Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland, https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/increasing-the-us-military-presence-in-poland, (Date of Access: 15.06.2026).
[v] “US to Give Poland New $4 Billion Loan For Arms Purchases, PAP Reports”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-give-poland-new-4-billion-loan-arms-purchases-pap-reports-2026-06-12/, (Date of Access: 15.06.2026).
[vi] Eren Beksaç, “Polonya, SAFE Programı Kapsamında 43,7 Milyar Avroluk Kredi Anlaşması İmzaladı”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/polonya-safe-programi-kapsaminda-43-7-milyar-avroluk-kredi-anlasmasi-imzaladi/3931567, (Date of Access: 15.06.2026).
